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Abstract  
This thesis investigates the attitudes of New Zealand newspapers to the social and 
economic tensions exacerbated by the emergence of a newly assertive labour 
movement in 1890, culminating in the August-November Maritime Strike, and the 5 
December General Election. Through detailed analysis of labour reporting in six 
newspapers (Evening Post, Grey River Argus, Lyttelton Times, New Zealand Herald, 
Otago Daily Times, Press) this thesis examines contemporary conceptions of New 
Zealand society and editors’ expectations of trade unions in a colony that emphasised 
its egalitarian mythology. Although the establishment of a national press agency in 
1880 homogenised the distribution of national and international news, this study 
focuses on local news and editorial columns, which generally reflected proprietors’ 
political leanings. Through these sites of ideological contest, conflicting 
representations of the ascendant trade union movement became apparent. While New 
Zealand newspapers sympathised with the striking London dockers in 1889, the 
advent of domestic industrial tensions provoked a wider range of reactions in the 
press. Strikes assumed a national significance, and the divisions between liberal and 
conservative newspapers narrowed. To varying degrees both considered militant 
action by organised labour a threat to the colony’s peace and prosperity – sentiments 
that pervaded their reporting. The New Zealand Maritime Strike confirmed these 
prejudices and calcified the perception of organised labour’s malevolence. Despite 
the year’s upheavals, this thesis contends that the press struggled to comprehend 
labour’s political ambitions, ignoring the unprecedented mobilisation of thousands of 
new voters, shifting public opinion, and the transformative impact of electoral reform. 
Distracted by the mainstream political obsession with land reform and convinced that 
public prejudices, stoked by their own reporting, would obviate a labour presence in 
the new parliament, the victory of the Liberal-labour coalition confounded the 
publishing establishment. 
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1 
Introduction  
 
On 8 September 1890, the Canterbury financier George Gatonby Stead purchased the 
Christchurch Press. While aspects of the acquisition remain shrouded in mystery, the 
paper’s financial difficulties were well documented. Intense competition with rival 
publications during the 1870s and 1880s saw the Press suffer heavy losses. Despite 
healthy circulation figures, stock issues in the 1880s failed to ameliorate the 
newspaper’s problems – in 1887 the Press ran an operating loss of £4,926 and 
accrued debts of over £10,000.1 The company chairman, R.J.S. Harman, directed a 
programme of aggressive expansion, enlarging the newspaper from four to eight 
pages in 1887. Harman’s buccaneering management merely prolonged the Press’ 
decline. By June 1890, the company required additional investment of £20,000 to 
continue printing. The directorate proposed the creation of a new company to manage 
the Press, Weekly Press, and Truth, and sought buyers. Negotiations with Stead 
began in August, and the Christchurch Press Company opened for business early the 
next month.2 
      R.B. O’Neil, the company’s official historian, characterised George Stead’s 
intervention as an act of benevolence, linking the financier’s purchase to his 
formative experiences as a racing correspondent in the 1860s. More cynical 
interpretations of the acquisition that ‘took the business community by surprise and 
evoked admiration and envy’ are not hard to imagine.3 Just two months later, Stead 
announced his candidacy for the Avon seat in the December General Election. In the 
intervening months he assumed a prominent role in Canterbury society, joining the 
                                                
1 In 1882, the circulation of the Press stood at 5,000. D.R. Harvey, ‘Circulation Figures of Some 
Nineteenth Century New Zealand Newspapers’, Archifacts [Bulletin of the Archives and Records 
Association of New Zealand], December 1988 and March 1989, p.26; R.B. O’Neil, The Press 1861-
1961: The Story of a Newspaper, Christchurch: Christchurch Press Company Limited, 1963, pp.105-
06. 
2 O’Neil, The Press, pp.106-08. 
3 ibid., p.107. 
 
 
 
2 
executive of the newly formed Employers’ Association and organising the campaign 
to reopen the Lyttelton wharves with volunteer labour during the Maritime Strike.4 
By acquiring a newspaper, Stead hoped to join the illustrious list of politicians who 
had served as newspapermen. While this tradition had faded, the lines between 
journalist and politician remained hazy – two of Stead’s contemporaries, John 
Ballance and William Pember Reeves, owned newspapers that extended their political 
‘voice’ far beyond the debating chamber.  
      A few months before Stead’s purchase, John Millar, President of the Maritime 
Council, proposed the publication of a weekly tabloid, Labour. At the Council’s bi-
annual meeting in May, he unveiled a dummy edition, hoping to persuade the 
executive to fund the enterprise. His editorial stance was clear – under the masthead 
ran the socialist axiom: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs’.5 Although unionists circulated Australian, British, and American periodicals, 
New Zealand workers had been without a newspaper since the collapse of the short-
lived weekly, the Watchman (1884-1886).6 Millar envisaged the Council as an 
institution to promote labour solidarity, and recognised that the inability to 
communicate with the newly mobilised community of trade unionists obstructed the 
progress of industrial reform and the development of class consciousness. Despite 
Millar’s noble intentions, the journal never reached publication. Delegates voted to 
postpone the launch of Labour until it could be assured a sound financial future. 
Some months later the Maritime Council entered into a fatal industrial battle. 
      These competing efforts to enter the newspaper industry occurred during a 
turbulent period in New Zealand history. The colony’s troubled emergence from a 
                                                
4 Lyttelton Times (LT), 30 August 1890, p.6; Star, 6 September 1890, p.3.  
5 Conrad Bollinger, Against the Wind: the Story of the New Zealand Seamen’s Union, Wellington: 
New Zealand Seamen’s Union, 1968, pp.34-35. 
6 On 18 October 1890, the radical journalist Arthur Desmond established the Tribune, a labour weekly. 
Yet the paper collapsed in early December after just eight issues. Bert Roth, ‘A History of Socialist 
Newspapers in New Zealand’, Socialist Action, Vol. 8, no.7, May 1976, p.4. 
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prolonged economic depression that began in 1879 revealed deep tensions regarding 
the nature and future of New Zealand society. Prompted by a brief economic revival, 
trade unions underwent an extraordinary transformation, with membership soaring 
from under 3,000 to more than 20,000 in 18 months.7 These unions were organised 
along new principles – imported from Europe, North America, and Australia – which 
saw thousands of unskilled workers federated into large conglomerates. The rise of 
new unionism, with its focus on redressing the power imbalance between labour and 
management, as well as improving working conditions and living standards via mass 
organisation and collective action, engendered animosity between workers and 
employers – a conflict initially ignored, then exaggerated by the press. After a series 
of regional disputes in which capital and labour contested these objectives, the 
Maritime Strike began on 26 August 1890. The strike originated in Australia, but 
spread to New Zealand when unionists stopped work to protest domestic ship-
owners’ boycott of union labour. Fearing an attempt to eliminate the union presence 
in New Zealand, the Maritime Council – the first colony-wide labour federation – 
advised its affiliates to boycott domestic and inter-colonial shipping and coal mining 
until ship-owners negotiated a settlement. Despite the unionists’ optimism, the strike 
soon failed. Trade unions had made huge gains in the preceding two years, yet they 
were unprepared for a confrontation with the colony’s largest companies, and the 
groundswell of public animosity stirred up by a hostile press. 
      Increased industrial unrest catalysed the discussion of deeper grievances 
regarding social structure – debates that coloured reporting of labour issues in 1890. 
For workers, small farmers, and middle-class radicals, the depression shattered the 
                                                
7 Tony Simpson, ‘The Holt Narrative and the Industrial Relations Agenda’, New Zealand Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, no. 3, 1987, p.147. 
 
 
 
4 
twin myths of consensus and egalitarianism, deeply embedded in the Pākehā psyche.8 
By the late 1880s, a growing portion of society, represented by the nascent Liberal 
party, believed that land tenure reform, specifically breaking the large estates, was 
necessary for New Zealand to remain a society that rewarded industry with 
opportunity and advancement.9 Labour fit uneasily into this new paradigm. Although 
the Liberals, supported by their allies in the press, sympathised with trade unions’ 
demands for industrial reform, they believed closer land settlement would ameliorate 
the colony’s problems, including industrial unrest.10 Yet, despite growing public 
discontent, most newspapers refused to consider the labour movement as anything 
other than a vehicle for the advancement of pernicious agitators. Refusing to abandon 
the vision of New Zealand as a land of equal opportunity, free from entrenched 
privilege, newspaper editors perceived the emergence of class agitation as evidence 
that greedy organisers had duped workers into harming their own interests.11 During 
the December General Election, these competing interpretations played out in 
electorates across New Zealand, as voters decided between the Atkinson 
Government’s measured approach, and the Liberals’ promise of reform. 
      This thesis examines the newspaper coverage of labour issues in New Zealand, 
analysing evolving responses to the unprecedented coalition of trade unionists that 
formed an important, if overlooked, component of the liberal ascendancy in 1890. 
Reporting on labour issues was coloured by two conflicting conceptions of New 
                                                
8 Bob Consedine, ‘Inequality and the Egalitarian Myth’, in David Novitz and Bill Willmott (eds.), 
Culture and Identity in New Zealand, Wellington: GP Books, 1989, p.172; Melanie Nolan, ‘The 
Reality and Myth of New Zealand Egalitarianism: Explaining the Pattern of a Labour Historiography 
at the Edge of Empires’, Labour History Review, Vol. 72, no. 2, August 2007, pp.113-34. 
9 John E. Martin, The House: New Zealand’s House of Representatives 1854-2004, Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 2004, p.103. 
10 David Hamer, The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891-1912, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1988, pp.56-58; Timothy McIvor, The Rainmaker: A Biography of John Ballance, 
Journalist and Politician 1839-1893, Auckland: Heineman Reed, 1989, p.167 
11 Jeanine Graham, ‘Settler Society’, in W.H. Oliver and B.R. Williams (eds.), The Oxford History of 
New Zealand, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp.137-38. 
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Zealand society. The first was the notion of the colony as an egalitarian society, free 
from ‘old-world’ evils (including both worker exploitation and class consciousness). 
Coverage of the 1889 London Dock Strike and 1890 Sweating Commission displayed 
sincere compassion and a determination to eradicate the worst excesses of industrial 
capitalism. Yet, challenged by a labour movement eager to assert its influence in the 
workplace, a stronger commitment to order, consensus, and moderation tempered 
such sympathies. Although editors agonised over the suffering of London’s dockers, 
they remained wary of the power and ambition of federated labour.  
      Increased industrial unrest in the autumn and winter of 1890 exacerbated this 
tension as the press continued to espouse the principles of trade unionism, while 
condemning their practice. Striking for improved conditions fell outside the limits 
expected of unions, and was considered greedy and opportunistic. Newspapers across 
the political spectrum averred that labour should accept inequity with forbearance, 
which would eventually attract public notice and support. Although this seldom 
transpired, newspapers used New Zealand’s reputation as a worker’s paradise to stifle 
the demands of a frustrated labour movement. However, the coverage of the 1890 
General Election raises the question whether the antagonism of the press can be 
considered a cynical endeavour to maintain the status quo or an indication of the 
divergence between elite opinion and the concerns of the wider population. Once 
campaigning began, the press, with few exceptions, dismissed the Opposition’s 
chances of success – confident that the Maritime Strike had demonstrated the dangers 
of radicalism. The conviction that the public would shun labour-leaning politicians 
was so ingrained that newspapers only seriously considered the possibility of a 
Liberal victory in the final weeks of the campaign. Having assured readers for months 
that trade unions occupied a marginal social position, editors underestimated the 
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Opposition’s popularity amongst professionals and rural smallholders, as well as 
urban workers. 
       Previous studies of New Zealand newspapers in 1890 limited their focus to 
comparisons between the liberal Lyttelton Times and the conservative Press. Laurel 
Hepburn uses the contrast between those newspapers to bolster her argument that 
newspapers were ‘ideological protagonist[s]’ on behalf of their proprietors.12 
Similarly, Ian Merrett notes that the ‘widely divergent’ views of the two Christchurch 
dailies broadly represented colonial opinions.13 James Taylor, however, argues that a 
narrow focus on two polarised newspapers is a common flaw in New Zealand 
historians’ use of newspapers to illuminate social debates.14 By contrast, in his study 
of the relationship between the Australian media and union funding during the 1889 
London Dock Strike and 1890 Maritime Strike, R.B. Walker cast a wider net, 
analysing coverage from a wide range of regional newspapers.15 Given the number of 
metropolitan and regional newspapers in the 1880s, a wider analysis must be 
undertaken before any sound conclusions are reached. I have based my research 
around six daily newspapers (New Zealand Herald, Evening Post, Grey River Argus, 
Lyttelton Times, Press, and Otago Daily Times) located across the colony and 
encompassing a broad spectrum of political affiliations. 
 
      The New Zealand newspaper industry began in 1840 with the first domestic 
printing of the New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, and inaugural 
                                                
12 Laurel Elizabeth Hepburn, ‘The Attitudes of the Newspapers in Canterbury to the Emergent Labour 
Movement, and Related Issues, from 1885 to 1890’, MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1985, p.159. 
13 Ian A. Merrett, ‘A Reappraisal of the 1890 Maritime Strike in New Zealand’, MA thesis, University 
of Canterbury, 1969, p.258. 
14 James Taylor, ‘Contemporary Media Portrayals of the 1913 Dispute’, in Melanie Nolan (ed.) 
Revolution: The 1913 Great Strike in New Zealand, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005, 
p.143. 
15 R.B. Walker, ‘Media and Money: The London Dock Strike of 1889 and the Australian Maritime 
Strike of 1890’, Labour History, no. 41, November 1981, pp.41-56. 
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publication of the New Zealand Advertiser and Bay of Islands Gazette in Russell. As 
settlement spread, newspapers began publication in major provincial towns: New 
Zealand Herald and Auckland Gazette, 1841; Nelson Examiner, 1842; Otago News, 
1848; Lyttelton Times, 1851; Taranaki Herald, 1852. Early newspapers were 
hindered by low population density, scarcity of equipment, and government 
interference. The Crown Colony administration punished its critics by withdrawing 
advertising contracts, confiscating presses, and foreclosing printers.16 The economic 
and demographic boom of the 1860s allowed newspapers to become profitable, and 
prompted the transition to daily editions – reducing the reliance on government 
advertising. The Otago Daily Times and Christchurch Press were both founded in 
1861, followed by a new New Zealand Herald in 1863, and Wellington’s Evening 
Post in 1865. Despite early tribulations, by 1865 annual aggregate circulation 
exceeded five million in a colony with a Pākehā population of 171,000.17 
      Political motives often spurred the formation of a newspaper. William Wilson, the 
former proprietor of the New Zealander, founded the New Zealand Herald on 13 
November 1863 following an ideological dispute over the Taranaki and Waikato 
wars. While his partner John Williamson advocated a philo-Māori policy, Wilson 
favoured ‘vigorous prosecution’ – forcing Māori submission to the Crown.18 Initially 
the Herald favoured a strong military approach, yet the paper quickly became more 
aligned to prevailing public opinion. Although a political disagreement instigated the 
Herald’s inception, Guy Scholefield deemed the paper a ‘striking example of a 
                                                
16 Patrick Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press 1840-1800: A Study of the Organizational and 
Political Concerns of New Zealand Newspaper Controllers, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
1990, pp.12-34. 
17 S.W. Bradley, Newspapers: An Analysis of the Press in New Zealand, Auckland: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1973, p.5; David C. Thorns and Charles P. Sedgwick, Understanding 
Aotearoa/New Zealand: Historical Statistics, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1997, p.32. 
18 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, p.133. 
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newspaper founded as a business rather than a political organ’.19 In the 1880s the 
paper flourished, boasting an average daily circulation of 6,350.20 Politically, the 
Herald supported the Grey, Stout-Vogel, and Atkinson Governments, but became a 
prominent critic of the Liberal administration after 1890. 
      Dublin journalist Henry Blundell established the Evening Post as Wellington’s 
first daily newspaper in 1865. The newspaper was a family business; Henry served as 
editor, while his sons Henry, John, and Louis worked as typesetter, canvasser, and 
reporter respectively. Fiercely independent, Blundell followed ‘a liberal course of 
policy’, and eschewed political office to uphold the newspaper’s integrity.21 The 
paper opposed successive governments in the 1870s and 1880s, but endorsed the 
nascent Liberal coalition in 1890.22 With a strong local focus, the Post dominated the 
Wellington newspaper market, withstanding competition from an assortment of new 
publications in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1890 the paper published six editions weekly, 
and reported a daily circulation of 8,000.23 
      Scottish publisher James Kerr launched the Grey River Argus in November 1865. 
Initially, the newspaper was published tri-weekly, but entered daily production in 
1871. Under the stewardship of William Henry Harrison (1868-1879) and Florence 
Romuald McCarthy (1880-1914), the Argus developed a reputation for outstanding 
journalism. In an era when artisan values were incongruent with the values of the 
mainstream press, the Argus was notable for its support of the labour movement.24 
Advocacy of artisan radicalism saw the Argus come into conflict with its conservative 
rival, the Greymouth Evening Star, which began publishing in 1866. By the early 
                                                
19 Guy H. Scholefield, Newspapers in New Zealand, Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1958, p.83. 
20 Ross Harvey, ‘The Power of the Press in Colonial New Zealand: More Imagined Than Real?’, 
Bibliographical Society of Australia and New Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, pp.137-38. 
21 Evening Post (EP), 8 February 1865, p.2. 
22 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, p.163. 
23 EP, 7 February 1890, p.2. 
24 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, p.243. 
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1880s, the average daily circulation of the Argus fluctuated between 740 and 1,050 
copies.25  
      The Lyttelton Times was established in 1851, funded by prospective Canterbury 
colonists. The newspaper quickly suffered financial difficulties and soon came under 
private ownership. Appointed as general manager in 1861, by 1867 William Reeves 
had become the proprietor and editor of the Times, and developed the newspaper’s 
reputation as an ‘advocate of the rights and liberties of the people’.26 Reeves’ son, 
William Pember Reeves, began writing for the newspaper in 1882, and later became a 
correspondent on the House of Representatives. Over the next decade Pember Reeves 
gradually accumulated responsibility at the Times, becoming editor in 1889. The 
Times’ fierce rivalry with the Press hurt the former financially – between 1882 and 
1886, profits fell from £8,400 to £5,100.27 Nevertheless, in 1890, the Times was 
among the colony’s highest selling newspapers, boasting a daily circulation of over 
7,600.28 
      The Christchurch Press was first published on 25 May 1861 by former Lyttelton 
Times editor James FitzGerald. Backed by Canterbury’s ‘pastoral elite’, FitzGerald 
established the newspaper to protest the Times’ support of the public works program 
initiated by Sefton Moorhouse, the Provincial Superintendent.29 From the outset, the 
paper was conservative, advocating economic austerity and defending the interests of 
its propertied owners. The Press quickly became a leading voice in colonial politics, 
                                                
25 Harvey, ‘Circulation Figures of Some Nineteenth Century New Zealand Newspapers’, p.22. 
26 The Cyclopedia of New Zealand [Canterbury Provincial District], Christchurch: Horace J. Weeks 
Ltd, 1903, p.238. 
27 Keith Sinclair, William Pember Reeves: New Zealand Fabian, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, 
pp.49-52, 68. 
28 LT, 4 September 1890, p.4. 
29 Hepburn, ‘The Attitudes of the Newspapers in Canterbury’, p.14. 
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and by the 1880s was regarded as ‘the most Conservative...paper published in New 
Zealand’.30  
      Julius Vogel founded the Otago Daily Times, New Zealand’s first daily 
newspaper, on 15 November 1861. Heralding a new commercial era, Vogel imported 
a steam driven press from Britain in 1862. Early adoption of industrial methods saw 
the paper achieve enormous advances on previous circulation and profit margins. By 
1863 the paper’s circulation exceeded 7,000. However, the collapse of the Otago gold 
rush in the late 1860s ended the prosperity that the Otago press had thrived on. 
Advertising revenue fell, and management worried that Vogel’s political posturing 
exacerbated the paper’s financial difficulties. At odds with the commercial 
requirements of the newspaper, Vogel was ousted from the editorship in 1868. Under 
new ownership the Otago Daily Times opposed the Vogel administration, but 
supported the Grey Government in 1878.31 By 1883 the paper’s circulation had fallen 
to 4,650, a result of fierce competition with Dunedin’s two other major dailies, the 
Evening Star and Morning Herald.32 
     The emerging commercial potential of newspapers in the 1860s changed the New 
Zealand press. Eager to maintain profitability, proprietors began restructuring their 
concerns on commercially sound principles. The introduction of the steam engine and 
cylindrical printing press allowed newspapers to reach broader audiences. Multiple 
newspapers competing in small metropolitan markets depressed prices, and 
eventually a mass ‘penny press’ replaced the old subscription model.33 Between 1860 
and 1890, as the population increased six-fold, the number of newspapers published 
                                                
30 O’Neil, The Press, p.100. 
31 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, pp.111-18. 
32 Harvey, ‘Circulation Figures of Some Nineteenth Century New Zealand Newspapers’, p.26. 
33 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, pp.174-76. 
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in the colony soared from 20 to 122.34 Although the proliferation of newspapers 
coincided with the expansion of the literate population, New Zealand did not 
experience a ‘democratisation’ of its press. While the range of published news and 
opinion broadened, the hegemonic interests of the establishment – ‘Pakeha property 
and provincial order’ – remained ascendant. As Ruth Butterworth explains, ‘worker 
and Maori concerns were conspicuously absent and consistently denigrated’ (she 
might have added women to the list) in an industry committed to the maintenance of 
consensus.35  
       Established in 1880, the United Press Association (UPA) amalgamated 
newspapers into a cohesive grouping ‘that could appropriately be called the New 
Zealand press’.36 A consolidation of the telegraph services established to utilise the 
trans-Tasman telegraph cable in 1876, the UPA monopolised access to international 
news through the Reuter’s Telegram Company service. Affiliated newspapers were 
restricted to reporting on local events with regional news coverage provided by the 
Association. Although newspaper editors selected copy, the UPA effectively 
homogenised domestic and international news.37 Furthermore, by restricting access to 
the UPA telegraph to two newspapers in each town, members crushed their rivals by 
providing readers with exclusive content – at the expense of a democratic public 
culture.38 Thus, the editorial represented the clearest articulation of each newspaper’s 
                                                
34 J.O. Wilson (ed.), A Union Catalogue of New Zealand Newspapers, Preserved in Public Libraries, 
Newspaper Offices, and Local Authority Offices, Wellington: General Assembly Library, 1938, 2nd 
edition, 1961, pp.1-65; Thorns and Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand, pp.38, 65-66. 
35 Ruth Butterworth, ‘The Media’, in Novitz and Wilmott (eds.), Culture and Identity in New Zealand, 
p.146. 
36 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, p.237. 
37 Grant Hannis, ‘The New Zealand Press Association 1880 – 2006: The Rise and Fall of a Co-
operative Model for News Gathering’, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 48, no. 1, March 
2008, p.53. 
38 Although the anti-competitive nature of the telegraph cartel worried politicians, little was done to 
prevent the UPA from ‘crushing’ its rivals. See ‘Press Telegrams Committee Report: Minutes of 
Evidence’, Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR), 1880, I-5, pp.1-37; 
Butterworth, ‘The Media’, in Novitz and Wilmott (eds.), Culture and Identity in New Zealand, p.145. 
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‘distinctive individualit[y]’ – the major site of ideological contest in the late 
nineteenth century New Zealand press, and the focus of this study.39 
      George Stead’s investment in an insolvent newspaper, and John Millar’s struggle 
to establish a labour periodical offer several insights into the interaction between 
press and society in 1890. The argument that economic imperatives subsumed 
partisanship during the 1860s transition to a commercial press has been overstated. 
The emerging era of commercialisation combined patronage with cutthroat 
competition as newspaper proprietors negotiated the transition to a popular, mass 
media. Technological and educational advances allowed the press to reach wider 
audiences, yet few newspapers were profitable.40 Most newspapers’ editorial policies 
lay between Laurel Hepburn’s assertion that newspapers prioritised political rhetoric 
over reliable information, and Patrick Day’s argument that economic rationality 
moderated political allegiances.41 The expansion of the newspaper market in the 
1860s presented newspaper owners with a dilemma. Daily publication was an 
expensive enterprise, not always offset by the political opportunities afforded to the 
proprietor. As a general rule, in the 1880s a metropolitan newspaper was not 
commercially viable unless it could maintain a circulation of 2,500.42 To attract a 
broad readership, newspapers tempered their previous dogmatism. The realities of 
press activity rendered political biases inevitable, yet newspapers were no longer 
irrevocably committed to any individual politician. 
                                                
39 Aled Jones, Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century 
England, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996, p.88. 
40 John Ballance and William Pember Reeves’ struggles to keep their respective newspapers (the 
Wanganui Herald and the Lyttelton Times) solvent during the 1880s are well documented. McIvor, The 
Rainmaker, pp.107-08, 155-58; Sinclair, William Pember Reeves, pp.49-52, 128-30. 
41 Day, The Making of the New Zealand Press, pp.134-136; Hepburn, ‘The Attitudes of the 
Newspapers in Canterbury’, p.24. 
42 Ross Harvey, ‘Formula for Success: Economic Aspects of the Nineteenth-Century New Zealand 
Press’, in R. Harvey, W. Kirsop, and B.J. McMullin (eds.), An Index of Civilisation: Studies of 
Printing and Publishing History in Honour of Keith Maslen, Clayton: Monash University Centre of 
Bibliographical and Textual Studies, 1993, p.211. 
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      By 1890, the newspaper was the most immediate and influential medium. The 
conviction that newspapers influenced society was widespread, particularly among 
those engaged in their ownership and production. Yet, the accumulation of power and 
assumption of political and moral leadership by the press was a recent phenomenon. 
As late as the 1860s, information transmitted orally at the theatre, pulpit, and soapbox 
was, as Aled Jones has suggested for Britain, more powerful, engaging, and 
influential than printed text. By refusing to ‘disseminate the outpourings of a 
nobody’, the press established a hierarchy of voices, privileging the perspectives of 
editors and proprietors.43 As circulation figures entered the thousands in most major 
centres, newspapers became embedded in the culture. Alan Lee’s statement that ‘the 
[British] press in the nineteenth century was the most important single medium of the 
communication of ideas’ is certainly applicable to New Zealand.44 Observing 
publishers’ monopoly over the transmission of information in late nineteenth century 
Britain, Frank Taylor remarked that the newspaper was ‘alone in its permanence’. 
Although he understood that newspapers rarely altered readers’ convictions, he 
believed journalism formed opinions by giving ‘shape to masses of half-articulate 
feeling’.45 Certainly no other medium could influence mass audiences to the extent of 
the ubiquitous newspaper with its repetitive daily articulation of a partisan agenda.  
      British theories articulating the power of the nineteenth century press cannot be 
uncritically applied to colonial societies. New Zealand newspapers developed in 
emerging regional towns and small rural centres, not industrialising cities. 
Readerships were small – Ross Harvey estimates that between seven and 12 per cent 
                                                
43 Jones, Powers of the Press, pp.88, 180. 
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of the population ‘saw’ a newspaper in the late nineteenth century.46 Harvey is correct 
to note the relative minority of newspaper readers in New Zealand, but relegating 
domestic newspapers to mere local newsletters is misleading. Rollo Arnold argues 
that the press fostered a ‘village and globe outlook’, melding extensive local 
correspondence with global news and features.47 Newspapers published stories from 
across the world, while editorials established strong positions on colonial and 
international issues. J.E. Traue argues that New Zealand’s fragile book and periodical 
culture gave newspapers ‘a far more important role than their contemporaries in 
Britain and Europe’.48 New Zealand did not have the mass reading market of Britain 
or America, but the ways in which domestic newspapers presented and framed 
stories, set agendas, and promoted solutions were nevertheless influential. 
      In a print culture, newspaper coverage strongly influences which issues are 
defined as ‘important’ by the public. The relative placement and degree of newspaper 
attention a story receives influence how it is understood and evaluated by audiences.49 
Framing of news stories is used to engender public support or opposition to the 
actors, issues, and policies presented. Robert Entman defines framing as the selection 
and emphasis of ‘some facets of events and issues, and making connections among 
them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution’.50 
Frames increase the salience of information within a text, rendering it more 
noticeable to reading audiences.51 The two essential elements of a frame are defining 
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a problem, which sets the agenda for the frame, and outlining a remedy, which 
promotes support or opposition to a policy or actor. Frames are constituted by groups 
of words and images that stimulate a particular reaction to actors in a political 
conflict. Entman states that frames that connect culturally resonant terms and use 
emotive language are easily noticeable and understandable. The ‘magnitude’ of a 
frame is increased by the repetition of framing language and its resonance with pre-
existing ideas, information, and convictions of an audience.52 
      While this basic approach to frame analysis is broadly applicable, serious 
difficulties exist in adapting contemporary media theory to nineteenth century New 
Zealand newspapers. The methods of analysis remain useful, but the context presents 
significant challenges. In 1890, the press remained a fractious and barely cohesive 
body. Frames did not filter down through a hierarchy of news organisations, as 
Entman suggests, because no such hierarchy existed (the UPA standardised news 
dissemination rather than influencing newspapers’ editorial decisions).53 
Newsgathering was localised, and editors rarely reprinted or extracted copy from 
‘elite’ or influential publications. Despite the small domestic reading audience, there 
is good reason to think that news frames resonated strongly in the 1880s, as 
newspapers monopolised the transmission of information in an era before the advent 
of audio and visual mass communications. The lines between journalist, politician, 
and scholar were blurred, and Ross Harvey argues that the ‘heavy representation’ of 
newspapermen in the House of Representatives was unsurprising given UPA 
members’ exclusive access to domestic and international news.54 
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      Historians studying the rise of and reaction to American liberalism in the ‘Gilded 
Age’ have demonstrated the value of examining newspapers’ role in the late 
nineteenth emergence of progressivism. In The Reconstruction of American 
Liberalism, Nancy Cohen emphasises the role of newspapers as vectors through 
which liberal reformers influenced the public sphere.55 Writing on the capitalist 
mobilisation against such reformers, Jeffrey Haydu defines frames broadly, as sets of 
ideas and attitudes that not only shaped print journalism, but also deeply permeated 
American society.56 Although the late nineteenth century New Zealand press has been 
a popular research subject for the last thirty years, historians and media theorists have 
predominantly addressed ‘the press’ as a coherent body. As a result, much is known 
about newspapers’ ownership, financing, and organisational structures, yet we 
understand rather less about the news itself – the production these organisations 
engaged in. James Taylor’s excellent study of the coverage of the 1913 Great Strike 
remains a notable exception.57 Through an analysis of the daily news and editorial 
coverage produced by newspapers in 1890, this thesis will address gaps in our 
understanding of the interaction between press and society, the representation of the 
emerging labour movement, and the disjuncture between elite perceptions of New 
Zealand and the rumblings of dissatisfied artisans, labourers, farmers, and radicals. 
      The discussion is organised into four chronological chapters. The first situates the 
events of 1890 within the economic upheavals of the late nineteenth century, 
examines the rise of organised labour in New Zealand, and provides a 
historiographical framework for considering 1890. The second chapter analyses 
newspaper coverage of industrial unrest in the first half of 1890, and looks at the 
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growing hostility directed at newly assertive trade unions. By late July, this hostility 
had evolved into undisguised anger. Chapter three assesses coverage of the 
Whitcombe and Tombs dispute and the Maritime Strike, with a focus on the 
contradictions between the press rhetoric, the framing of the strike, and the events of 
July-November 1890. Although the Maritime Strike ended a month before the 5 
December General Election, the press struggled to consider the implications of 
unprecedented labour organisation and the rise of the Liberals. Chapter four examines 
the Liberals’ emergence, situates organised labour within the political environment, 
and assesses newspapers’ limited consideration of labour politics just weeks after the 
largest strike in New Zealand’s history dominated the headlines. 
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Chapter One: New Zealand’s Economy and Society, An 
Overview 1850-1890  
 
The Colonial Economy, 1850 to 1890: 
 
On the back of Governor George Grey’s land purchases in the 1840s, New Zealand 
entered a period of steady growth and developing prosperity. A series of land deals 
between 1845 and 1853 netted the Crown over 32 million acres, mostly in the South 
Island, encouraging a wave of pastoral expansion, and laying the ‘foundations of a 
dominant European economy’.1 Emerging domestic markets that encompassed both 
Māori and Pākehā populations, and the booming economies of New South Wales and 
Victoria, offered New Zealand farmers considerable scope for profit. Fruit, 
vegetables, cheese, wool, grain, timber, and gum became major tradable 
commodities. Growing British demand stimulated export values, which rose from 
£393,000 to £1.3 million between 1853 and 1861. Yet the balance of trade remained 
negative throughout the period as demand for imports soared.2 ‘Boosters’, a mix of 
retailers, merchants, farmers, and millers, helped transform emerging towns into 
commercial centres, by establishing regular auction sales and mobilising resources for 
land improvement.3 Urban development also stimulated the financial services sector. 
Total bank deposits doubled from £343,000 to £883,000 in the four years from 1857 
to 1861, and the Bank of Otago and Bank of New Zealand emerged as rivals to the 
previously dominant Union Bank of Australia.4 
      The 1860s gold rushes fundamentally changed the New Zealand economy. Gold 
was discovered in the Coromandel in 1852, and in 1857, the first major rush occurred 
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in Nelson. However, the discovery of gold in Otago in May 1861 opened the 
floodgates. Within three years, the Otago goldfields’ population increased from 
several hundred to 24,000.5 At the height of the gold rush, more migrants arrived in 
the colony than any other period in New Zealand history. Between 1861 and 1865, 
93,169 people arrived in the colony, lured by the promise of a booming economy.6 
The rush transformed Dunedin into New Zealand’s commercial capital, and a number 
of important companies – Hallenstein Bros, Ross and Glendining, DIC, James 
Speight and Co., Union Steam Ship Company – began during the decade.7 Auckland 
also prospered in the 1860s, benefiting from the New Zealand Wars; in the short-
term, merchants profited from the garrisoning of troops in the city, while the city’s 
leading capitalists grew wealthy through land confiscations and their dominance of 
the Fox-Whitaker Government.8  
      The years between 1870 and 1890 were economically turbulent for New Zealand. 
Although gold remained a significant export in the 1870s, particularly from the West 
Coast and Coromandel fields, the booms of the previous decade were over. Of the 
£21 million of gold extracted in Otago during the 1860s, only £600,000 was produced 
in 1869.9 Cash land sales fell from 691,174 acres in 1864, to 199,309 in 1868.10 Trade 
was declining; exports fell from £7.4 million in 1865 to £5.1 million in 1870, and 
imports shrank from £10.2 million to £8.2million. As the economy slowed, 
immigration abated. From the highs of the first half of the decade, net migration 
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plummeted to just 20,536 between 1866 and 1870.11 Economic dissatisfaction led to a 
parliamentary vote that toppled the Stafford Government, and returned William Fox 
as Premier and Julius Vogel as Treasurer. Over the next decade, the Fox-Vogel 
Government implemented a programme of centralised economic development that 
used London finance to promote land settlement, build infrastructure, and subsidise 
large-scale immigration to bolster the labour force and settler population.  
      Under Vogel’s stewardship, colonial debt rose from £7.3 million to £18.6 million, 
but his plan revolutionised the economy.12 Net migration surged: 136,743 immigrants 
flooded into the colony between 1871 and 1880.13 By 1880 the Railways Department 
operated almost 1,200 miles of railway, mostly in the South Island.14 Connecting 
railways with the emerging steamship network further strengthened interior 
communications and transportation – between 1859 and 1879 the journey between 
Auckland and Dunedin was reduced from 15 to six days.15 Government acquisition of 
vast tracts of Māori land in the North Island precipitated a dramatic expansion in 
farming. At the same time, the South Island experienced a wheat boom – cereal 
acreages increased from 240,000 to 640,000 during the decade, and between 1871 
and 1886, 9.5 million additional acres were fenced.16 The resurgent economy boosted 
trade; by 1880 the value of exports had doubled to just over £10 million.17 
      The frenetic speculation of the 1870s came to a crashing halt in 1878, following 
the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank. Although British malpractice caused the 
failure, the bank blamed its losses on ‘dubious colonial investments’, and London 
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investors lost confidence in New Zealand.18 Banks withdrew £1.5 million of credit 
within a year, leaving borrowers overcommitted.19 Over the next decade there were 
11,444 bankruptcies – nearly ten per cent of the Pākehā adult male population.20 To 
succeed, Vogel’s plan required healthy export prices and steady growth, yet the 
banking crisis was compounded by a series of bad harvests, and a worldwide slump 
in commodity prices that would persist until 1895.21 Between 1888 and 1890 the 
colony experienced net emigration as workers sought security in prosperous New 
South Wales and Victoria. The ‘Long Depression’ had reached New Zealand.  
      The impact of the prolonged global recession on the New Zealand economy was 
variable, rather than universally bleak. Canterbury and Otago suffered first as their 
economies were sensitive to fluctuating commodity prices, while Auckland, where 
wool and wheat were less important, enjoyed growth until 1886. In the southern 
North Island, growth slowed but the region did not experience the dramatic exodus 
that afflicted the South Island.22 Unemployment became an urgent concern, and the 
Atkinson Government appointed a Royal Commission to examine the problem in 
1883, but ignored its recommendations to lower interest rates for farmers, foster local 
industries, and implement agricultural labour schemes.23 Seven years later, Sir Harry 
Atkinson remarked, ‘two men are in fact competing for one man’s work’.24 However, 
technological improvements offered hope of invigorating the sluggish economy. In 
1882, the Dunedin, equipped with a new compression refrigeration hold, carried the 
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first cargo of frozen meat from Port Chalmers to London. Before long, farmers would 
regularly export agricultural produce to metropolitan markets, alleviating the colony’s 
economic reliance on wool.25 Despite the pronounced slump at the end of the decade, 
in the long-term workers benefited from economic growth. Although real GDP per 
capita fell slightly during the 1870s and 1880s, real wages rose 1.64 per cent annually 
over the same period.26 Amid the prevailing economic gloom of the 1880s, 1889 was 
a period of relative prosperity, prompting a wave of employment and unionisation. 
 
Early New Zealand Trade Unionism: 
 
Economic fluctuations disrupted early attempts to entrench trade unionism in New 
Zealand. Trade unionists successfully stood out for the eight-hour working day in 
Wellington (1841) and Dunedin (1849), yet labour organisation proceeded 
gradually.27 Waves of unionisation occurred during economic ‘booms’, but these 
nascent organisations typically collapsed during ‘busts’. Growing prosperity and the 
Vogelian influx of former British trade unionists in the 1870s stimulated a wave of 
unionisation. Between 1872 and 1875, ten unions were formed in both Canterbury 
and Dunedin, while six were established in Auckland and Wellington.28 
Communication difficulties hampered colony-wide organisation, largely limiting 
trade unionism to the four main centres.29 As trade stagnated from 1879 and 
unemployment soared, many of the organisations established by early pioneers 
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vanished. Unions began re-emerging in the early 1880s, only to collapse as the 
depression deepened. Yet, as Herbert Roth argues, workers had reason for optimism:  
Each wave [of unionisation] was stronger than the previous one and the intervals 
between them became shorter. As each tide receded in periods of intensified economic 
depression, it still left a larger number of unions standing than previously.30 
      Early trade unions limited membership to skilled workers. Union rules, 
regulations, and names were imported from Great Britain, along with the migrants 
who had brought their experience of trade unionism with them. Memberships of these 
‘craft’ bodies remained small, rarely exceeding 50 members, as tradesmen were 
selected for their competence, sobriety, and health. Furthermore, entrance fees and 
subscriptions were high to provide accident and unemployment benefits in the 
absence of state assistance. Early trade unions were all-encompassing institutions that 
protected traditional privileges and formed the locus of workers’ social lives.31 Yet, 
craft unions cannot be considered conservative organisations. During the 1870s, the 
‘fighting’ bootmakers launched trade societies in all four main centres, ‘consistently 
struck against [wage] reductions’, and pioneered arguments for arbitration as a 
method of dispute resolution.32 An element of artisan radicalism permeated these 
societies, as famously championed by the Dunedin printer Samuel Lister in his 
weekly paper, the Otago Workman. Established in 1887, the paper espoused ‘atheism, 
anticlericalism, republicanism and the values of brotherhood and democracy’ while 
denouncing the greed of the wealthy.33  
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The Rise of New Unionism, 1880-1890:  
 
In the late nineteenth century, labour organisation tactics evolved across North 
America, Europe, and Australasia as trade unionists adjusted to the new economic 
pressures of the Second Industrial Revolution.34 New economies of scale saw the 
factory replace the workshop. Falling wages, mechanisation, and an influx of 
unskilled workers marginalised older skills. Within this context, the emergence of 
new unionism is associated with two of the largest industrial disturbances in the 
British Empire: the London Dockers’ Strike in 1889, and the Australasian Maritime 
Strike in 1890. Although the term ‘new unionism’ entered the vernacular concurrent 
with these strikes, the movement began two decades earlier.35 The legal recognition 
of the right to organise, beginning with the 1871 Trades Union Act in Britain and 
followed by similar legislation in New South Wales (1876 and 1881), New Zealand 
(1878), Victoria (1884), and Queensland (1885), fundamentally changed trade 
unionism, allowing labour organisations to develop beyond mutual benefit societies.36 
In the years following beneficial legislation, semi-skilled and unskilled Australasian 
workers began coalescing into large federations. Trades and Labour Councils (TLCs) 
– bodies where delegates from all trades discussed common goals – first emerged in 
Sydney in 1871, Auckland in 1876, Melbourne in 1879, Adelaide in 1884, and 
                                                
34 For details of the global strike wave that accompanied changing patterns in labour organisation 
between 1886-1894 see Leopold Haimson and Charles Tilly (eds.), Strikes, Wars and Revolutions in 
an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Neville Kirk, Labour and Society in Britain and the 
USA. Volume 2: Challenge and Accommodation, 1850-1939, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1994, pp.97-
105, 115-35. 
35 Ray Markey notes that British usage of the term ‘new unionism’ emerged in 1890. The earliest 
Australian references occurred during the 1891 New South Wales Royal Commission on Strikes. In 
New Zealand, newspapers began using the term in late 1891. Ray Markey, ‘New Unionism in 
Australia, 1880-1900’, Labor History, no. 48, May 1985, p.17; Star, 16 July 1891, p.4. 
36 A.E.P Duffy, ‘New Unionism in Britain, 1889-1890: A Reappraisal’, The Economic History Review, 
Vol. 14, no. 2, 1961, pp.308-09. 
 
 
 
25 
Christchurch in 1889, and five inter-colonial labour congresses were held between 
1879 and 1890.37  
      Labour historians have debated the precise definition, conceptual distinctiveness, 
and specific historical emergence of new unionism.38 Nevertheless, several 
fundamental principles are generally recognised. The important features of the new 
unions were their mass character and foundation of semi-skilled and unskilled labour, 
centralised leadership structure, and their intention to use industrial action to improve 
working conditions and wages. Broadly, new unions transcended the narrow focus on 
mutual benefits that defined smaller craft organisations. Mass organisation altered 
workers’ self-perception, encouraging class consciousness. New unionism opened up 
a ‘wider community of interest’ that extended beyond craft and colonial boundaries.39 
Aided by the telegraph and the newspaper, new unionism assumed an international 
dimension as workers, ideas, and finances flowed between emerging labour 
federations across the globe.  
     Australian labour organisers laid the foundations for new unionism in New 
Zealand in the 1880s. Motivated both by solidarity and the threatening ease of inter-
colonial labour mobility, Australian organisers travelled across New Zealand 
spreading unionism to unorganised workers. These early efforts targeted maritime 
and export industries, the locus of New Zealand labour agitation in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Ports were ‘nodal points’ through which migrants, money, and 
ideas entered and exited the colony – the basis of its survival, and the breeding 
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ground for transnational labour organisation.40 When George Sangster of the 
Australian Federated Seamen’s Union (FSU), toured New Zealand ports in 1880, no 
union existed. He left behind a Federated Seamen’s Union of New Zealand with 
branches in Port Chalmers, Auckland, and Wellington.41 The foundation of the 
Seamen’s Union marked the first notable unionisation of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. In 1886 the West Coast organiser John Lomas affiliated the Denniston 
Miners’ Union, established in 1884, with the Victorian-based Amalgamated Miners’ 
Association (AMA). The move strengthened trans-Tasman bonds forged during the 
1885 Denniston strike, when AMA subscriptions allowed the miners to prevail over 
the Westport Colliery Company (WCC).42 In spite of his efforts, Amalgamated 
Shearer’s Union (ASU) President William Spence failed to organise the New Zealand 
shearing sheds. His 1887 visit saw the formation of a short-lived branch of the ASU, 
led by another Australian, James Slattery. Slattery claimed a total membership of 
2,300 in June 1887, yet runholders refused to employ organised men and the union 
collapsed within the year.43 In 1887, a chapter of the American organisation, the 
Knights of Labour, began in Christchurch, followed by an Auckland branch in June 
1889.44 
      Once established, most New Zealand labour organisations quickly adopted the 
principles of new unionism. Total union membership expanded from under 1,000 in 
1880 to over 2,500 in 1885.45 Between 1885 and 1888 membership numbers 
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fluctuated, as the first wave of new unionism crumbled in the economic gloom of the 
‘black’ 1880s. Emblematic of the changes within the labour movement were the 
dynamic full-time organisers who galvanised trade unionism with their crusading 
zeal. In 1887, recently elected FSU General Secretary John Millar, an educated and 
‘dashing...master mariner’, devised an innovative solution to combat the wage cuts 
imposed by the Northern Steam Ship Company.46 Bankrolled by the Australian FSU, 
New Zealand seamen launched the co-operative Jubilee Steam Ship Company in a 
ruthless attack on Northern’s business. After 13 months of intense competition 
Northern capitulated and re-engaged all union men, unable to sustain Millar’s 
financial bloodletting.47 John Millar was not alone in his crusade to foster solidarity 
among New Zealand workers. Throughout 1889, John Lomas traversed New Zealand, 
relentlessly organising the colony’s miners. By March 1890, the AMA boasted 12 
New Zealand branches and 2,000 members.48 Twelve new unions, numbering 12,250 
members were organised in 1889, bringing the number of trade unions to 75 with a 
total membership close to 20,000 in early 1890.49 
 
Representing Labour – An Overview of Trade Unions in the Late Nineteenth 
Century Press: 
 
Labour issues received varying local and colonial coverage in the late nineteenth 
century press. All six newspapers published daily news columns that featured UPA 
reports on the domestic labour movement, from the suggestively titled section in the 
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New Zealand Herald (‘The Labour Agitation’), to the Lyttelton Times’ diplomatic 
rubric (‘Work and Wages’). These columns featured synopses of union meetings and 
publicised future events. In the smaller, four page dailies, (Grey River Argus, Otago 
Daily Times, Evening Post), such columns were often the only source of published 
information on organised labour.50 However, the New Zealand Herald, the Lyttelton 
Times, and the Press (each eight pages) supplemented syndicated stories on organised 
labour with regular reports from local union and TLC meetings.  
      In addition to reporting on domestic trade unions, newspapers informed readers 
about the international labour movement. Daily ‘labour’ columns combined domestic 
news with reports on international strikes, disputes, and negotiations. For example, on 
7 May, the Evening Post and Grey River Argus reported on the ‘sweating scandal’ 
and ‘eight-hours demonstration’ in London, strikes in Vienna, and donations to the 
Brisbane Labour Federation’s strike fund.51 Furthermore, newspapers augmented 
global labour news with editorial analysis. The New Zealand Herald frequently 
published editorials summarising trends within the international labour movement. 
Despite the paper’s aversion to labour federation, in February it noted that the 
international labour movement, although ‘more powerful now than at any time it its 
history’, had prudently eschewed violence, a development that promised future 
industrial harmony.52 Later in the year, the paper examined the history of American 
and European trade unionism.53 At the Lyttelton Times, William Pember Reeves 
published a series of articles on radical politics, later collected in a pamphlet entitled 
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‘Some Historical Articles on Communism and Socialism’.54 The articles, published 
pseudonymously, appeared between April and June, and ranged from reflections on  
Plato’s Republic to contemporary European socialism. Coverage in the Otago Daily 
Times was more expansive, with the paper running an extensive fortnightly labour 
column, ‘The Outlook of the Industrial World’.  
      The breadth of newspapers’ engagement with the international labour movement 
belies the post-war claim that Australasia existed in isolation from the Northern 
Hemisphere. In the 1950s, Bill Pearson’s evocative assessment of the New Zealand 
character, ‘Fretful Sleepers’, assumed samizdat status as it circulated through 
networks of academics and artists.55 Before returning from London in 1952, Pearson 
depicted a society that existed in profound isolation, detached even from ‘Home’ (the 
United Kingdom).56 In 1961, Geoffrey Blainey’s argument that the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ separating the Antipodes from the Old World fundamentally shaped the 
Australian colonies was heralded within the academy.57 Distance undeniably 
influenced the development of Australasian colonies, but by the 1880s the 
communication of information and ideas had already compressed the geographical 
obstacles between the metropolis and the periphery. While London remained between 
one and three months journey from Australasia in 1890, newspapers reported on 
events in Great Britain and Europe days after they had occurred. 
     More recently, historians have embraced the notion that networks of ideas, 
information, and people linked Great Britain with its colonies, and connected the 
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colonies in unique cultural conglomerations. In 1986, Eric Fry compiled a history 
examining the common strands in Australasia labour history, and a year later Keith 
Sinclair established an explicitly transnational agenda in Tasman Relations.58 Over 
the last ten years, the notion of a social, economic, and cultural ‘Tasman world’ has 
become a popular tool for historians considering Australasia and the Pacific beyond 
the national trope.59 James Belich posits that the nineteenth century Australasian 
colonies operated as an organic entity that was both vague and semi-tangible, but also 
real and influential. A ‘constant ebb and flow’ of people, money, and ideas traversed 
the Tasman Sea. Financiers, soldiers, sailors, shearers, and miners worked in a fluid 
Australasian labour market, while inhabitants of all seven colonies were united by 
their joint cultural status as ‘neo-Britains’ – outposts of a wider pan-British culture.60 
By reporting and editorialising on events from across this broad community of 
interests, newspapers reflected and reinforced these frames of reference, situating the 
local labour movement within a cultural world that stretched beyond the colony’s 
borders. 
 
The Historiography of 1890: 
 
1890 was a landmark year in New Zealand political and industrial relations, yet it has 
been relatively neglected in labour historiography. While the strikes of 1912, 1913, 
and 1951 have all received considerable academic attention, fewer studies focus on 
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the 1890 strike.61 Associated with the rise of organised labour, party politics, and the 
beginning of 21 years of Liberal government – ‘the end of the old world’ – 1890 has 
been a convenient starting point for labour historians since William Pember Reeves 
celebrated the Liberals’ achievements in The Long White Cloud and State 
Experiments in Australia and New Zealand.62 Yet, the characterisation of 1890 as the 
prelude to a ‘new era’ has seen labour historians overlook prior events, and as Erik 
Olssen argues, even ‘the new social history...has been subverted here into a 
celebration of the Reevesian paradigm’.63     
      Unlike more prominent episodes in New Zealand labour history, the best studies 
of the Maritime Strike remain unpublished. Ian Merrett’s 1969 thesis is the most 
comprehensive examination of the strike. Merrett aimed to revise the ‘gross mis-
representation’ of the strike, as popularised by J.D. Salmond’s thesis – the 
authoritative history of the subject for over 50 years.64 He rejected the traditional 
notion that the strike was a response to Australian workers’ demands, viewing this 
interpretation as a repetition of contemporary conservative dogma. Instead, Merrett 
argues that both the Union Company and the Maritime Council were reluctantly 
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drawn into an Australian dispute by their respective trans-Tasman affiliations, 
although the strike continued for practical and ideological reasons. For labour, failure 
to strike implied their acquiescence to the limitation of association, while capitalists 
sensed an opportunity to crush the growing trade unions. James Bennett’s 1986 thesis 
locates the Maritime Strike within a triangular (Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) 
nexus of new unionism.65 He suggests that the 1889 London Dock Strike cemented 
the concept of ‘combination’ as an effective bargaining strategy, amongst an inter-
colonial labour force that maintained strong cultural and ideological bonds. More 
recently, W.J. Gardner located the Maritime Strike within another triangular axis – 
the growing compulsory arbitration movement in the British Empire. His study 
emphasises the similarities between contemporary labour struggles in New Zealand, 
Ulster, and South Australia.66 
      Ian Merrett contends that employers considered trade unions desirable in 1890.67 
His assertion is surprising in a year marked by the intransigence of both labour and 
capital in industrial disputes. In his work on the coal mining industry, Len Richardson 
documents mine owners’ determination to prevent unionised colliers entering the 
pits.68 John Martin discusses a similar antipathy to labour organisation amongst 
farmers and runholders.69 Gavin McLean, in his history of the Union Steam Ship 
Company, reaches a similar conclusion. He notes that the company directors insisted 
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on strict managerial control, an attitude that led to frequent clashes with unions.70 
Although anti-union sentiments were pervasive, the politics of the wealthy cannot 
simply be described as an ‘oligarchic brake’ on social progress. Jim McAloon 
contends that property owners stood on both sides of debates concerning land, public 
expenditure, and political rights.71 Thorough analysis of newspaper coverage of 
labour issues in 1890 will clarify the debate, and offer a fuller understanding of the 
position of trade unions in New Zealand society. 
      Despite the limited discussion of the events of 1890, historians have long 
contested the years’ significance for labour. W.J. Gardner contends that the year 
passed with a ‘feeling of opportunity lost’ for the creation of a new, balanced 
society.72 Conversely, John Martin argues that 1890 has been exaggerated as a 
‘benchmark year’ dividing the ‘dark ages’ of economic and industrial injustice with a 
‘modern enlightened era’ that began after the 1890 General Election.73 Like David 
Hamer, Martin contends that the Liberals’ labour policies continued 20 years of 
industrial reform.74 Jim McAloon and W.J. Gardner contest these attacks on the 
‘genuineness’ of colonial democratic ideology, with McAloon arguing that the 
election, the first under the one-man, one-vote system instituted by the 1889 
Representation Act Amendment Bill, saw a ‘seismic shift’ towards populism and 
democracy in New Zealand political culture.75 
       The debate fits within a wider discussion concerning the extent and causation of 
political change in the 1880s, between proponents of what John Angus described as 
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the ‘consensus’ and ‘conflict’ interpretations of New Zealand history.76 Originated by 
William Pember Reeves and perpetuated by Keith Sinclair, the ‘conflict’ school 
stresses that the 1880s depression fuelled class conflict and widened the divide 
between conservative and radical politicians.77 Their interpretation holds that class 
tensions were manifested in the rejection of the Atkinson Government in favour of 
the Liberals’ promises of reform. In the late 1950s, a new interpretation arose, 
emphasising the relative absence of class tensions, the prevalence of social mobility, 
and the existence of a broad liberal consensus within late nineteenth century society. 
In this articulation of New Zealand history, stated most comprehensively by David 
Hamer in The New Zealand Liberals, the 1890 election displayed strong historical 
continuities rather than representing a profound shift in colonial political culture.78  
      While interpretations of the Liberals’ rise to power remain contested, labour’s 
role in the electoral process has been under-emphasised. The traditional interpretation 
of labour politics in 1890 stresses a dramatic shift in focus from the industrial to the 
political arena, following the collapse of the Maritime Strike. As Erik Olssen and Len 
Richardson argue, ‘defeat on the industrial front was complete [after November 
1890], but within months the unionists had thrust themselves firmly into the political 
arena. Previously trade union officials had been ambivalent in their attitude to 
politics’.79 The assertion that the significance of the Maritime Strike lay in its failure, 
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particularly given the Liberals’ progressive legislative agenda, is uncontroversial. 
Yet, examining 1890 as an isolated ‘turning point’ ignores existing research on 
labour’s political agitation in the 1870s and 1880s. Nevertheless, defeat clearly forced 
trade unions to reconsider any lingering ambivalence regarding Parliamentary 
representation, and commit to political, as well as industrial activism. 
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Chapter Two: ‘The Trade Unions are on their tr ial ’: Precursors 
to the Marit ime Str ike in New Zealand  
 
The 1889 London Dock Strike, indelibly linked with the rise of new unionism, 
signalled the maturity of the movement in Great Britain, and captivated the English-
speaking world. New Zealand newspapers were no exception, lamenting the plight of 
London’s working poor while glossing over the unprecedented federation that 
allowed the dockers to collectively demand wage increases. The formation of New 
Zealand’s first labour federation, the Maritime Council, weeks after the strike ended, 
similarly elicited little press attention. While the rise of domestic trade unions was no 
secret, the phenomenon was largely ignored in early 1890. However, newspapers’ 
complacent attitude towards the rising labour movement quickly faded as the 
Maritime Council assumed a prominent role in disputes affecting vital industries – 
shipping, mining, and the railways. Contests over wages and working conditions, the 
staples of industrial ferment, were augmented by new demands to regulate 
interactions between labour and management, compounding establishment unease 
with the newly assertive labour movement. New Zealanders sympathised with 
workers’ concerns, as the 1889-1890 ‘sweating’ crisis revealed, yet as the impact of 
labour federation became apparent so did reservations about trade unions’ expanding 
influence. Newspapers continued to support workers struggling against iniquitous 
employers, yet insisted that trade unions display the utmost moderation in their 
actions, ignoring the vast political and economic imbalances that allowed employers 
to dismiss their concerns. As labour grew weary of the handicaps imposed by the 
hollow doctrine of moderation, the press sought to marginalise the resurgent labour 
movement, striving to convince readers that the colonial consensus remained intact.  
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Common Cause? Australasian Reactions to the 1889 London Dock Strike: 
 
The London Dock Strike began on 12 August 1889 when the impoverished dock 
labourers, frustrated by their implacable employers, sought to increase their hourly 
wages from 5 to 6d. Within a week 10,000 men were out, a figure that exploded to 
150,000 by 30 August. Despite the unprecedented public demonstrations, time and 
hunger imperilled the dockers’ cause. Daily relief costs ran to £1,250, and the Dock 
Directors intended to starve the workers into submission. When negotiations failed, 
the strike leaders circulated a general strike manifesto.1 The threat diminished public 
sympathy for the dockers, and was quickly withdrawn.2 On the verge of defeat, news 
of Australian support rescued the strike – on the day of the manifesto’s publication, 
trade unions telegraphed £700 to London. The donation, and promise of further 
assistance renewed enthusiasm at the pickets as the strike spread across London. By 
14 September, Australian aid stood at £36,164, three quarters of the total strike relief 
fund.3 The dockers now had the upper hand, and forced their employers to negotiate a 
settlement. The Mansion House Agreement, signed on 16 September, ended the strike 
– the dock companies re-employed the union men, and offered improved terms from 
4 November 1889. 
      Sympathetic Australian newspaper coverage of the London Dock Strike 
stimulated public generosity. Yet P.F. Donovan’s claim that Australian newspapers 
uncritically followed the sympathetic agenda set by the London dailies is erroneous.4 
While world news could be published within two days, high telegram rates limited 
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newspapers to printing brief summaries.5 Editorials arrived with complete editions of 
British newspapers, which took around a month to reach Sydney, precluding 
Australian (and New Zealand) periodicals from closely following London opinions. 
The suggestion that the dockers received widespread acclamation in the British press 
is also misleading. Aside from the ‘radical’ newspapers (Pall Mall Gazette, Star, 
Lloyd’s News), the strike received no consistent support in the mainstream press.6 The 
Times, usually described as the dockers’ ally, became critical of ‘professional 
agitators’ as the strike continued into September.7 Its views resonated with those of 
the conservative London Standard, which registered concern at the ‘sinister liberality’ 
of the ‘aggressive outsiders’ from the Antipodes.8  
      Nevertheless, from 29 August, Australian newspapers began reporting extensively 
on the strike. Aside from framing the news in a manner sympathetic to the dockers, 
Australian newspapers encouraged readers to contribute to the strike relief fund. A 
Melbourne Age editorial on 29 August inspired readers to establish a relief fund and 
send the paper money for transmission to London.9 With 80,000 readers and strong 
connections with Trades Hall, the Age led Victorians to donate more money per 
capita than any other Australian colony.10 In Sydney, the liberal Daily Telegraph 
pressured leading citizens to contribute to the cause and rebuked those who 
hesitated.11 Even conservative papers like the Melbourne Argus and Sydney Morning 
Herald encouraged charity.12 Inspired by sympathetic reporting, public meetings held 
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across Australia established generous relief funds that rescued the strike from the 
brink of collapse. 
      New Zealand newspapers devoted considerably less column space to the London 
strike than their Australian counterparts. UPA membership gave editors access to 
Reuter's foreign news cables (via the Melbourne Age-Argus telegraph service), which 
provided all of the news reported on the strike in New Zealand and Australia.13 The 
strike was first covered by the Evening Post on 20 August, and picked up colony-
wide on 22 August. As in Australia, coverage was brief until 29 August, by which 
point most newspapers allocated a designated column to the strike. Editors tended to 
emphasise New Zealand connections to the strike – particularly the plight of the 
refrigerated vessels Fifeshire and Kaikoura. With ships unable to unload their cargoes 
or take on coal to maintain refrigeration, it was feared that 35,000 mutton carcasses 
would rot.14 
      Although New Zealand newspapers sympathised with the London dockers, they 
eagerly compared British social ills with apparent colonial class harmony.15 The 
Otago Daily Times hoped the Dock Strike would expose the plight of the urban poor 
and stressed the necessity of ‘taking some steps to mitigate the condition of the 
millions in Great Britain who drag out a precarious existence’.16 Similarly, the 
Lyttelton Times evoked the hardships suffered by London wharf labourers as they 
unloaded New Zealand produce.17 The Grey River Argus lauded the strike as ‘one of 
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the grandest object lessons of the century in educating the working class regarding 
their rights and the means of securing them’.18 These editorials were not only 
instructive, but also cautionary. On 30 August, the Evening Post warned New 
Zealanders to ‘guard against the development of weak features in the social 
development of the Mother Country’.19 The incredible commercial disruption and 
social upheaval produced by the Dock Strike was juxtaposed with the relative 
industrial amity in New Zealand simultaneously as an act of self-congratulation and 
of warning. While the Otago Daily Times praised the dockers’ cause, it remained 
wary of federated labour, adding the caveat that the future demands of workingmen 
‘may not always be just’.20 The desire to avoid similar disruption in the colony was 
clear – a path that required moderation from both labour and capital. 
     Unlike Australia, widespread press sympathy did not translate into financial 
generosity towards the London dockers. New Zealanders contributed a paltry £400 to 
the relief fund, just one tenth of a shilling per capita.21 Such miserliness is partially 
explained by New Zealand newspapers’ avoidance of the fundraising role taken by 
their Australian counterparts.22 While the Sydney Daily Telegraph publicly 
humiliated stingy capitalists, the New Zealand Herald cautioned workers against 
supporting the London strike. The paper questioned the dockers’ motives, noting that 
25s. per week was ‘not a bad wage for the rudest kind of unskilled labour’. If money 
were telegraphed to London, the Herald believed it should be given to the men 
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prevented from working by the striking unionists.23 Commenting on the 
unprecedented display of inter-colonial beneficence, the Otago Daily Times 
cryptically noted that Australian generosity was ‘significant...[but] its precise 
significance is not so clear’.24 
      Within a month of the London dockers’ victory, the new union movement 
consolidated its position in New Zealand. After a three-day conference in Dunedin, 
beginning on 26 October, the Maritime Labour Council of New Zealand (Maritime 
Council) was established on 28 October. Seeking to redress the lack of solidarity 
within New Zealand labour circles, John Millar gathered representatives from the 
seamen’s, wharf labourers’, and miners’ unions. Those present sought to form a 
federation with the cumulative power to ‘enforce the carrying out of legitimate and 
necessary reforms where a single Union might find the task beyond its individual 
strength’.25 Modelled on the Australian Maritime Council (1885), the body was New 
Zealand’s first colony-wide labour organisation that transcended trade divisions. John 
Millar was elected Secretary, with D.P. Fisher (Wellington TLC President) as 
President, and John Lomas as Treasurer. Initially, membership of the Maritime 
Council was limited to maritime or cognate trades (including miners), and at its 
inception it had 3,850 members (reported as 8,000).26  
      Coverage of the Maritime Council’s formation was sparse as journalists were 
excluded from the inaugural meetings.27 The Evening Post and Press only published 
brief reports on 26 October, while the Grey River Argus and New Zealand Herald 
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ignored the event altogether.28 Coverage in the Lyttelton Times was more extensive, 
with a story on 28 October summarising the Maritime Council’s Constitution.29 In the 
only editorial on the Maritime Council, the Otago Daily Times regarded the 
development with the same caution as it had the London Dock Strike. The new 
federation was judged to possess a ‘great deal more strength’ than its individual 
components, and the paper advised Millar to exercise his authority wisely. Ostensibly 
the Otago Daily Times supported the Council, yet qualified that sentiment by 
concluding, ‘there is such a thing...as the tyranny of labour’.30  
      At the end of 1889, newspapers were divided over trade unionism. All paid lip 
service to the necessity of labour organisation, yet the necessity of industrial action 
was contested. Liberal newspapers believed that trade unions were necessary to curb 
the excesses of industrial capitalism that had produced the London strike. Thus, the 
domestic rise of trade unionism, a decade-long process by 1890, was perceived as an 
opportunity for moderate social reform. By contrast, conservative newspapers warned 
readers that labour federation had dangerous consequences. On the eve of 1890, the 
runholders, merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals that constituted 
New Zealand’s capitalist class regarded the nascent wave of unionisation with 
apprehension. For all their successes, trade unions were on their guard. 
Unemployment remained high, and the majority of the workforce was unorganised 
and desperate for jobs – there was no room for error.31  
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Trouble at Home – The Sweating Commission: 
 
The opening of the Royal Commission on Sweating in Dunedin on 9 February 1890 
encouraged trade unionists to believe that agitation had started to pay dividends. An 
official inquiry into private enterprise on the suspicion that it caused social-ills 
represented a novel exercise of state power.32 Public concern regarding ‘sweating’ – 
sub-contracting piecework (typically in the garment industry) to women and children 
at starvation wages – had existed since the passage of the Employment of Females in 
Workrooms and Factories Act 1873, but reached a crescendo in October 1888 
following a fiery address by the Dunedin social reformer, Reverend Rutherford 
Waddell.33 In his sermon, ‘The Sin of Cheapness’, Waddell argued that the desire for 
cheap merchandise had forced wages below a subsistence level.34 Reporting on the 
sermon, the Otago Daily Times claimed, ‘the system prevails in Dunedin even to a 
worse extent than it does at Home’.35 In January 1889, Otago Daily Times journalist 
Silas Spragg investigated ‘The Sweating System in Dunedin’. His articles, published 
between 22 and 28 January, elaborately detailed the excessive hours and brutal 
conditions suffered by seamstresses and factory workers.36 His conclusion matched 
Waddell’s – sweating was an urgent social problem produced by ‘excessive 
competition’ for manufacturing contracts. On 7 June 1889, former Premier Sir Robert 
Stout addressed the Anti-Sweating Committee and called for the government to 
appoint a Royal Commission to consider the matter.37 Four days later, the 
Tailoresses’ Union was formed in Dunedin. Public outrage at the existence of 
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Dickensian ‘workhouses’ in New Zealand proved influential – on 28 January 1890 
Governor Onslow authorised an official inquiry.  
       Although the Sweating Commission had a colony-wide focus, newspaper 
coverage of the inquiry was typically parochial. As a rule, newspapers provided 
extensive summaries of testimony before the Commission when it sat in their region, 
and largely ignored its proceedings elsewhere. Surprisingly, the Otago Daily Times’ 
coverage of the Dunedin hearings (10-28 February) was sparse, particularly in light of 
the newspaper’s efforts to expose industrial exploitation. Throughout the Dunedin 
session, the newspaper limited its coverage of the Commission to brief tri-weekly 
summaries, without editorial comment. The Daily Times had four pages, yet space 
constraints did not prevent the similarly sized Evening Post from publishing daily 
updates on the Dunedin sessions. Like the Otago Daily Times, the Press and Lyttelton 
Times reported on events in Dunedin sporadically. The Grey River Argus, published 
from a town outside the Commission’s purview, covered the opening day’s 
proceedings in Dunedin, then ignored the inquiry until its Wellington hearings began 
in April. 
      When the Sweating Commission sat in Christchurch and Auckland, local 
newspapers were more attentive than the Otago Daily Times had been in Dunedin. In 
Christchurch, both the Press and Lyttelton Times reported on the testimony heard 
before the Commission in comprehensive daily stories, but did not publish editorial 
comment. The New Zealand Herald also ran thorough daily reports on the 
Commission, but used the opportunity to attack the inquiry. Prefacing a report on 29 
March, the Herald remarked that the day’s testimony had ‘incited little interest’.38 
Displeasure with the Sweating Commission was stated more directly by the Evening 
Post. In an editorial published a week before the Commission sat in Wellington, the 
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paper decried the investigation as a ‘farcical comedy’, its purpose contradicted by the 
absence of ‘sweating’ in the colony. For the Post, the Commission’s title evoked 
‘visions of ill-fed, over-worked, under-paid, and intensely miserable work-people’, 
but revealed little more than a few cases of ‘unduly long hours’. Concerned with the 
expense of the Commission, and the prospect of needless government intervention, 
the Post called for an immediate end to the ‘absurdity’.39 
      Despite the Post’s bluster, the mandate of the Sweating Commission was not to 
determine the existence of ‘sweating’, but to broadly investigate employment 
conditions.40 Yet, when the Commission released its report, newspapers disregarded 
the inquiry’s wider purpose, framing it as a repudiation of rumours that ‘old-world’ 
injustices occurred in New Zealand. The Commission found no evidence of 
‘sweating’, but recommended an amended Factories Act to prevent employers 
exploiting legislative loopholes, a minimum factory working age of 14, and limits on 
the employment of workers under 18. A dissenting opinion, written by three labour 
representatives on the Commission, argued that if ‘sweating’ was defined broadly as 
the existence of overcrowded workshops, long working hours, and subsistence wages, 
it occurred to a ‘very large extent’.41 While the Otago Daily Times admitted 
legislative amendments were required, it disregarded the dissenters’ reservations as 
purely semantic.42 The Herald took a similar position. Rather than expanding the civil 
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service to monitor compliance with labour legislation, it favoured a cheaper 
alternative – conferring the existing factory inspectors with additional powers.43 
      Although the Sweating Commission failed to improve working environments in 
the short-term, it revealed much about the socially accepted role for trade unions in 
1890. Witnesses from diverse backgrounds emphasised the advantages of moderate, 
mutual benefit societies, rather than assertive ‘new’ unions. Between February and 
April, many informants noted that unionisation had improved their industries. 
Conversely, witnesses remarked on the absence of workers’ organisation in industries 
where conditions remained poor. Within the Commission, the almost exclusive focus 
on non-confrontational tactics indicated self-censorship. On several occasions the 
Commissioners were notified that witnesses had declined to testify for fear of being 
blacklisted – confessions that revealed existing animosities between unions and 
employers.44 When newspapers depicted trade unions positively, it was usually to 
emphasise their value as organisations for the maintenance of industrial harmony. 
The notion that ‘moderate’ unions could protect workers without government 
intervention was fanciful, but commonly asserted by newspaper editors. The Herald 
believed that further state intervention was unnecessary, as trade unions had already 
demonstrated that they could maintain wages and working conditions.45 Both the 
Evening Post and Otago Daily Times concurred, and the Lyttelton Times went further, 
lamenting the extent of exploitation in the baking trade, with the caveat that trade 
unions alone should ‘carry any reasonable reforms they determine upon’.46 
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The Petone Woollen Mill Strike: 
 
The scholarly lacuna surrounding the Petone Woollen Mill Strike reinforces the 
notion that historians have neglected aspects of 1890.47 One of the year’s most 
protracted disputes, the Petone Woollen Mill Strike began in late January, and lasted 
over four months. Wellington Woollen Company (WWC) employees stopped work 
on 12 February in response to the dismissal of 59 workers on the day after company 
directors discovered the existence of a union.48 While the company asserted that 
falling sales necessitated retrenchment (a claim belied by their annual report), 
workers believed that the company had acted to crush the Woollen Mill Operatives’ 
Union (WMOU).49 Trades and Labour Councils boycotted WWC products, and 
unions across the colony contributed to a strike relief fund. Arbitration began in early 
April, but the Wellington TLC’s mishandling of evidence complicated proceedings. 
Eventually the Maritime Council intervened on behalf of the WMOU, and brokered a 
settlement on 19 June. Although lingering suspicions surrounded the WWC’s 
commitment to the agreement, the firm reemployed between 30 and 40 workers, and 
on 7 July the Wellington TLC asked the labour community to ‘help bring about a 
revival in their trade’.50 
      Although the Petone strike was an isolated regional event, it received colony-wide 
newspaper coverage. The Grey River Argus and Press ran regular UPA copy on the 
strike, while the New Zealand Herald published sporadic updates between February 
and June. Significantly, the Evening Post’s editorial coverage of the dispute revealed 
a series of broad expectations of both capital and labour. The paper’s sympathies lay 
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with the garment workers, as available evidence suggested ‘certain employés had 
been dismissed because they joined the Union’. Although the Post encouraged the 
WWC to reduce unsustainable wages, it believed ‘the day has gone by in this 
colony...when public opinion will tolerate or excuse such tyranny of capital over 
labour’.51 However, press sympathy only lasted as long as organised labour remained 
moderate, in spite of trying circumstances. When the Wellington TLC rejected 
binding arbitration, the Post castigated the council’s temerity.52 Similarly, D.P. 
Fisher’s failure to produce written evidence proving that the union had existed before 
the workers’ dismissal was criticised as ‘a most extraordinary bungle’ that 
jeopardised the entire case. The duplicity of the WWC had been overshadowed by the 
‘incompetence’ of organised labour. Following the ‘fiasco’, the paper ceased 
reporting on the strike, save for news that the Maritime Council had resolved the 
matter in mid-June.53 
       The ‘social norms’ frame applied by the Evening Post to the Petone Woollen 
Mill Strike gained traction in the first half of 1890. Newspapers expressed sympathy 
for beleaguered unionists, and criticised tyrannical capitalists for imposing cruel 
working conditions. In reality such sympathy was empty. Despite its advocacy of the 
right to organise, the Post only endorsed a diluted manifestation of trade unionism. 
Any threat of disruptive industrial action was censured, but newspapers offered no 
reliable support in lieu of organised labour’s most effective bargaining tactics. 
Invariably the suggested remedy for workplace ills was the transformative power of 
negative publicity and sensible negotiation. Sir James Hector, chairman of the Royal 
Commission on the Grey Valley Mines, expressed such sentiments in his November 
1890 report. He believed that wage bargaining occurred within ‘reasonable’ market 
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constraints, thus strikes were irrational, unnecessary, and altogether ‘too grasping’.54 
To function harmoniously, ‘moderate’ unionism required evenly matched adversaries. 
Yet while capitalists devoted their vast resources to maximising profits, even the 
largest trade unions had few assets and were unable to muster more than one or two 
fulltime advocates. Until labour achieved some form of parity, capital would not 
adopt a conciliatory attitude or voluntarily enter negotiations.55 The invocation of 
such expectations and stereotyped industrial actors gave press rhetoric a liberal 
veneer, but left trade unions hamstrung in any confrontation with a well financed, 
politically connected adversary. In later disputes this inherently paradoxical frame 
would dominate newspaper reportage. 
 
Feudalism in New Zealand? The Railways Dispute: 
 
In early 1890, labour disputes were small and localised, with few implications for the 
colony at large. This changed in May, when the spectre of a colony-wide railway 
strike loomed over faltering negotiations between the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants (ASRS) and the Railway Commissioners. Railwaymen’s ‘wages 
were low and hours long [the 60 hour week prevailed], while seemingly trivial 
infractions were subject to harsh discipline’.56 A railways union had the potential to 
become a political and industrial force, yet the ASRS only came into existence in 
1886.57 Harried by management pressure, the union was confined to its Auckland 
base. The election of a dynamic new leader, James Edwards, in 1889, catalysed an 
organising campaign that boosted membership to 3,700 in the new year.58  
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      The short-lived Railway Commission was unpopular long before the May 
dispute.59 Under the 1887 Government Railways Act, three independent 
Commissioners (J. McKerrow, J.P. Maxwell, and W.M. Hannay) replaced the 
General Manager of the Railways Department. Section 27 of the Act shielded the 
Commission from political interference, effectively giving the Railway 
Commissioners unbridled power over the railway network.60 In February 1890, 
Auckland businessman Samuel Vaile wrote several articles in the New Zealand 
Herald advocating railway management reform. Vaile condemned the 
Commissioners’ lack of accountability, likening the Railways Department to a feudal 
state: 
By the passing of the Act of 1887 the entire power and patronage of our railway   
system, with its 4326 appointments has been placed in the hands of some six or eight 
families...All these thousands of men hold their posts absolutely by the goodwill of the 
Commissioners. They therefore dare not offend them. Whatever may happen, they 
have no appeal.61 
      When tensions escalated in May, the press turned against the railwaymen. 
Following the ASRS Conference in March, James Edwards sought to meet the 
Commissioners to discuss reforms proposed by members.62 Startled by the union’s 
sudden rise, the Commissioners refused to recognise Edwards as a legitimate 
representative of their employees. Throughout May, regional branches of the ASRS 
unanimously voted to allow the Executive to ‘resort to extreme measures’ if the 
Commissioners continued their obstinacy.63 The threat of a railway strike divided the 
press. Despite its previous condemnation of the Commissioners, the Herald 
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commended their decision to blacklist the ASRS, arguing that employees should be 
consulted without the pernicious influence of ‘professional agitators’ that ‘live[d] on 
strikes and labour agitations’. Parliamentarians that attacked the Commissioners were 
dismissed as ‘popularity hunt[ers]’ exploiting the issue for political gain.64 Other 
papers replicated the frame used in coverage of the Petone Woollen Mill strike. The 
Otago Daily Times professed sympathy with the railwaymen, but warned that the 
strike threat would ‘surely alienate public support’.65 William Pember Reeves 
expressed similar sentiments in the Lyttelton Times – condemning the 
Commissioners’ ‘don’t know you’ attitude, while instructing the railwaymen to avoid 
a ‘premature’ strike.66 
      Not all newspapers equivocated in their analysis of the dispute. Both the Evening 
Post and Grey River Argus identified the Railway Commissioners’ pugnacious 
attitude as a threat to industrial harmony. On 20 May, the Post argued that the ASRS 
had a serious case against the Commissioners, who were obliged to answer such 
accusations quickly.67 The Commissioners delayed for another week, and the paper 
rebuked their repudiation of union representatives. ‘The Commissioners have only 
themselves to blame...and even now, when forced to give way, they have done so as 
ungracefully as possible’. By contrast, the ASRS was ‘trusted to fairly represent all 
legitimate grievances’.68 The Argus also distrusted the Commissioners, noting, ‘their 
version of the case is not to be relied on as a statement of the real facts as to the 
working of our railways and the treatment of the men’.69 Both papers placed the onus 
on the Commissioners to resolve the dispute – either by disproving the accusations, or 
settling with the aggrieved railwaymen. 
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      Although the threat of a railway strike had dominated headlines, newspapers 
displayed little interest in the dispute’s resolution a month later. Once the colony had 
avoided the paralysis of its internal transport network, the urgency of railway reform 
diminished. Most newspapers reported on the June negotiations between the Railway 
Commissioners and the ASRS, but ignored the resolution in their editorial columns. 
An agreement, reached after a series of meetings between 16 and 26 June, reduced 
the working week to 54 hours and introduced accident compensation. Restrictions 
applied over the next two years would phase out the piecework system and limit boy 
labour.70 While the liberal press celebrated the settlement, conservative newspapers 
disregarded it. Ignoring its earlier disavowal of ‘premature’ action, the Lyttelton 
Times hailed ‘one of the most remarkable victories ever won by labour over capital in 
New Zealand’, attributing the victory to ‘good organisation’ and the railwaymen’s 
ability to ‘apply the screw’.71  
      The Railway Servants’ victory over the stubborn Commissioners was not the only 
outcome of the June settlement. The New Zealand Herald had introduced a new 
frame into the press coverage of labour disputes in 1890. Previously, newspapers had 
tended to hold overzealous capitalists accountable for the eruption of industrial 
disharmony. Such problems were to be solved by earnest public pressure and patient 
negotiation, regardless of the strength and belligerence of either party. Yet, mirroring 
the London Times’ assessment of the 1889 Dock Strike, the Herald identified 
‘professional agitators’ as the originators of industrial unrest. Careful not to arouse 
public indignation by attacking the ‘honest toiler’, the Herald sought to alienate his 
intermediary. The union official was depicted as both a dangerous ideologue and 
brazen opportunist who provoked workers’ dissatisfaction to guarantee his income 
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and further his political ambitions. Thus, industrial harmony could not be achieved 
through the growing labour federations, but through direct negotiations between 
employers and individual workers. Carefully targeted, the frame reinforced a myth of 
colonial consensus, isolating ‘agitators’ as renegade voices. Deliberately ignoring the 
vast power imbalance between the worker and his master, it also presumed a 
paternalistic benevolence that capitalists seldom displayed. 
      The railways dispute provided the New Zealand Herald with an opportunity to 
express its growing frustration with organised labour. Weeks earlier, in an editorial 
denouncing a miners’ strike in Westland, the Herald had signalled a change in its 
rhetoric on labour issues. In response to a miner’s ‘unfair’ dismissal, the local TLC 
threatened to strike unless the man was reinstated. Framing the incident as evidence 
of the unionists’ ‘desire to tyrannise’, the Herald issued a warning to organised 
labour: ‘the Trade Unions are on their trial, and every step is being keenly watched 
both by enemies and friends’. Trade unions could either reject strikes and command 
public sympathy, or lose their veneer of legitimacy.72 The message was blunt: trade 
unionism would only be tolerated if labour pursued harmonious relations with capital. 
 
The Benefits of Solidarity – The Shag Point Dispute: 
 
While historians have overlooked some aspects of New Zealand labour history in 
1890, they have also stressed the importance of events that contemporaries 
overlooked. The Shag Point dispute of May and June is one of the latter. Located 30 
miles north of Dunedin, the Shag Point mine opened in 1863, and employed around 
35 men in 1885.73 Shag Point was a harsh environment – the remote mine was driven 
into a sheer hill and followed coal seams below sea level, and consequently suffered 
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frequent flooding. Inspired by the ‘development potential of the mine’, Dunedin 
entrepreneurs Edgar Hazlett and Robert Glendining acquired the mine in 1889. The 
mine was a commercial failure – plagued by flooding, and labour and mechanical 
difficulties, it remained unprofitable into the 1900s, despite the investment of over 
£10,000.74  
      Problems arose at Shag Point in early 1890 when the local colliers affiliated with 
John Lomas’ newly expanded Amalgamated Miners’ and Labourers’ Association 
(AMALA). As Len Richardson has documented, mine owners were hostile towards 
unionised workers, fearing that the New Zealand industry would emulate its British 
counterpart and become a hotbed of class ferment.75 On 6 May tensions peaked 
following the allegation that the miners had mixed stone and coal to exaggerate their 
productivity. Taking umbrage at the accusation, the president and secretary of the 
Shag Valley Miners’ and Labourers’ Association (SVMLA) confronted management, 
and faced instant dismissal for their insubordination. When the miners struck in 
protest, over 60 workers and their families were evicted from company housing.76 
The standoff continued for several weeks until the Maritime Council intervened, 
dispatching John Millar to negotiate with Hazlett and Glendining. On 14 June, Millar 
called for a boycott of all goods consigned by or to the owners’ business concerns 
unless the dismissed workers were reinstated. Rattled by the assertiveness of the 
Council’s intervention, Hazlett and Glendining capitulated. Len Richardson and 
Herbert Roth argue that the Shag Point victory was pivotal for organised labour, 
demonstrating the power and potential of federation.77 Upon his return to Westport, 
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John Lomas received a hero’s welcome as unionists celebrated a decisive victory in 
the ‘battle against the power of the few to injure the many’.78 
      Newspaper editors were more circumspect in their reporting on the dispute. Aside 
from the local Otago Daily Times, New Zealand dailies ignored the Shag Point 
dispute, save for sporadic updates from the UPA telegraph. From the outset, the 
Otago Daily Times viewed the miners with suspicion. On 10 May, the paper 
contested the origins of the strike, suggesting that union members had been punished 
for poor work rather than unfairly treated. The dispute was framed as a test case that 
demonstrated ‘how labour unions intend[ed] to use the power they ha[d] acquired’.79 
If Shag Point was a test, the Otago Daily Times believed that trade unions had failed. 
Despite reporting that ‘four out of every five disinterested persons’ believed Hazlett 
and Glendining to be ‘wrong from beginning to end’, the paper perceived the 
Maritime Council’s intervention negatively.80 By threatening a general boycott, John 
Millar had introduced a ‘dangerous principle’ into the industrial system. In response, 
the Otago Daily Times warned the Maritime Council ‘in their hour of victory to be 
very careful’.81 Once again, a combination of assertiveness and cooperation enabled 
labour to triumph over capital in 1890. Yet as newspaper coverage demonstrated, 
challenges to the accepted limits of ‘moderate’ unionism unsettled the establishment.  
 
The Maritime Council’s Biannual Conference: 
 
While the miners resisted management at Shag Point, the Maritime Council executive 
assembled in Wellington for its biannual conference. Held between 8 and 19 May, the 
conference gathered delegates from affiliated trade societies across the colony. 
Intended as both a review of the Council’s achievements and a forum to determine 
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future strategy, the conference had an ambitious agenda. Over the preceding months, 
the Maritime Council had become the paramount labour organisation in the colony, 
encompassing not only miners and seamen, but also representatives from a variety of 
shore-bound occupations. The Petone Woollen Mill and Shag Point disputes ended 
soon after the conference, and both featured on the Council’s agenda. At the 
conference, the Maritime Council also resolved to celebrate ‘Demonstration Day’, an 
annual public holiday to be held on 28 October. The proposed holiday, scheduled on 
the anniversary of the Council’s formation, was intended to celebrate the social, 
political, and economic achievements of the labour movement. The Council also used 
the conference to discuss and publicise their ambition to fully realise the goals of new 
unionism in New Zealand. Among the topics for debate was: 
A proposal for the amalgamation of all labour organisations in the colony under one 
body...which will be able to exercise much more influence and power than the present 
existing associations can presently wield.82 
Successfully executed, the plan would see Maritime Council membership swell from 
9,750 workers to almost 20,000, transforming the organisation into one of the most 
powerful institutions in the colony.83 
      A colony-wide labour federation was a radical, if not unprecedented, proposal in 
1890, yet the Maritime Council’s bold statement of ambition barely reached the pages 
of most newspapers. Six months earlier, the left-leaning Grey River Argus repudiated 
the idea. In November 1889, at a Westport reception, John Lomas instructed workers 
to transcend parochialism and coalesce into ‘one grand union’.84 In response, the 
Argus published several letters condemning the proposal. ‘An Onlooker’ likened 
Lomas to ‘Don Quixote tilting at windmills’, criticising his ignorance of economic 
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principles. The correspondent argued that labour federations distorted the market and 
ultimately collapsed wages.85 Later, on 1 April 1890, at a Canterbury TLC meeting, 
Lomas urged the colony’s workers to ‘amalgamate into one strong body’, yet the 
Press ignored his call for action.86  
      Why did newspapers ignore the Maritime Council’s provocative declaration? 
Although journalists were excluded from the conference, newspapers printed 
syndicated daily summaries of the proceedings. Certainly, all reported that the 
Council intended to discuss the possibility of forming a colonial labour federation. 
However, in 1890 both liberal and conservative newspapers appeared unwilling to 
consider domestic labour issues other than strikes and disputes. Aside from the 
Evening Post’s attack on the Sweating Commission, newspaper editorials only 
addressed instances of industrial conflict – a selective treatment that reinforced 
negative public perceptions of organised labour. Astonishingly, in 1890 the Press did 
not publish a single editorial on labour issues until 5 August. Although the Maritime 
Council conference occurred while workers picketed in Otago and Wellington, and 
railwaymen across the colony threatened to stop work, the lack of editorial response 
to the proposal indicated a general disregard for organised labour outside the 
combative realm of industrial conflict. 
 
Bad Intentions or Bad Publicity? The Grey Valley Coal Company Strike:   
 
Economic deterioration not only encouraged the organisation of previously isolated 
mining communities, but also forced previously independent mining companies to 
amalgamate. The Westport Coal Company (WCC) was established in 1879 and its 
directors intended to replicate the success of the British coal barons.87 Yet, by the 
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early 1880s, imprudent expansion, boardroom infighting, and the loss of half a year’s 
production during the 1884-1885 Denniston strike financially crippled the company. 
To keep West Coast mining operations solvent, in 1886 the Union Company 
consolidated the Grey Valley mines under the aegis of the Grey Valley Coal 
Company (GVCC). Eager to secure an assured fuel supply at a fixed price, the Union 
Company extended its monopoly over maritime transport into the energy sector.88 
Ownership of the GVCC allowed the Union Company to influence the price, output, 
and distribution of the colony’s domestic coal supply, and created a powerful 
conglomerate hostile to the interests of organised labour. The ‘secret working 
arrangements and private understandings’ of monopoly capitalism had arrived on the 
West Coast.89 
      Relations between labour and the new management were uneasy from the outset. 
Gavin McLean argues that the Union Steam Ship Company ran the Grey Valley 
mines entirely in its short-term interests. They invested little money in the operation 
and searched ceaselessly for opportunities to economise.90 Yet the mine remained 
unprofitable, reporting a net loss approaching £17,000 in 1890.91 Furthermore, 
workers resisted the erosion of their privileges and the extension of management 
prerogative. Miners implemented work sharing, reduced working hours at the 
coalface, and doggedly refused to relinquish their traditional holidays. In December 
1889, the Grey Valley Miners’ Association (GVMA) successfully resisted a 12.5 per 
cent wage reduction, yet on 1 July management tabled a vindictive ultimatum: the 
miners should either accept a 20 per cent cut in hewing rates or operate the mines on 
lease from the company. If neither proposal were accepted, the mines would close. 
                                                
88 In 1884, the company consumed 113,391 tons of coal – nearly a quarter of the colony’s total annual 
production. McLean, The Southern Octopus, p.85. 
89 ibid., p.95. 
90 ibid., p.94. 
91  ‘The Labour Dispute on West Coast of Middle Island (Correspondence Relative To)’, AJHR, H-52, 
1891, pp.4-5. 
 
 
 
59 
The scheme was designed to cripple the local union; keeping the mine idle would 
isolate the miners from the wider labour community and force hundreds of workers to 
leave the valley. After careful consideration, the GVMA rejected the proposal, and 
were locked out. Despite his radical convictions, John Lomas was reluctant to enter a 
prolonged confrontation with management. Three weeks after the mine closed, the 
GVMA accepted a wage reduction of 5d. per ton (less than the initial proposal of 
between 6 and 12d.) and work resumed on 1 September.92 
      The varied responses to the Grey Valley lockout suggest that news frames were 
not hierarchically imposed in the New Zealand press. Only the liberal press 
commented on the dispute, yet no newspaper supported either camp unreservedly. 
When GVCC management delivered its ultimatum, both the Lyttelton Times and Grey 
River Argus instructed both sides to be patient, eager to prevent imprudent decisions 
from crippling the local economy.93 The Argus understood the gravity of the GVCC’s 
financial difficulties, but believed, as the miners did, that costs ought to be reduced 
throughout the business, not solely in workers’ wages.94 The Evening Post agreed, 
and contrary to its earlier cynicism regarding the motives of the Wellington Woollen 
Company, argued that, once revealed, the ‘facts’ would depict the GVCC in a 
favourable light. Furthermore, it contended that colliers were among the highest paid 
workers in the colony, thus they could afford wage reductions to avert the company’s 
bankruptcy.95 The Argus agreed, assuming it was ‘safe to say’ that colliers earned 
reasonable wages.96 Later, after ‘careful enquiry’ into the case, the Post withdrew its 
support for the mining conglomerate. Underneath a letter outlining the proposed wage 
system from GVCC Managing Director Martin Kennedy, an editorial postscript 
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informed readers ‘that the rates of pay offered to and refused by miners are less than 
those current in other collieries’.97 
      After the lockout began, the Grey River Argus continued reporting on the dispute, 
despite diminishing interest in the Grey Valley miners. In addition to emphasising the 
unfair burden wage cuts placed on the miners, the Grey River Argus condemned 
unionist tactics that could jeopardise the regional economy. When rumours surfaced 
that the GVMA intended to call out the pump men, effectively crippling the entire 
operation, the Argus chastised the would-be saboteurs.98 The Grey Valley mine shafts 
stretched below sea level, thus serious flooding would permanently close the 
operation. When the Argus reviewed the dispute on 13 August, it argued that the 
miners’ chief problem was publicity. The paper believed that the miners held the 
sympathy of ‘the public and Press alike’, but had failed to publicise their agenda, 
wasting an opportunity to pressure the GVCC. Despite the devastating consequences 
of a protracted lockout, the miners had neglected to inform the public of the 
precarious position the GVCC had engineered. Stating that ‘the whole tendency of 
the thought of the great majority of the people...is strong sympathy with the toiling 
masses – with, in short, flesh and blood as against money grubbing’, the Argus 
argued that the cause of organised labour resonated strongly with New Zealanders – 
the challenge for its leaders was to devise and disseminate the rhetoric to unleash the 
silent majority.99 
 
An ‘Altogether Unjustifiable’ Strike – The Marine Officers’ Dispute:  
 
By mid-1890, the industrial harmony boasted of by ‘colonising crusaders’ and 
politicians was under serious pressure. A week after the GVCC delivered its 
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ultimatum, the Mercantile Marine Officers’ Association of New Zealand (MMOA) 
threatened to strike. Ships’ officers established the MMOA in late 1889 as they 
sought to distinguish their interests from those of ordinary crewmen. The FSU 
responded angrily, expelling all MMOA members.100 However, by July the MMOA 
had affiliated with the Maritime Council, and Conrad Bollinger claims the bodies 
shared a ‘fraternal understanding’ born of their common interest as maritime 
workers.101 Led by J.H.W. Highman, the MMOA came to prominence on 7 July when 
it threatened to strike unless employers offered sizeable wage increases and employed 
a minimum of three officers per vessel. With the assistance of the Maritime Council, 
Highman believed that the ship-owners would capitulate. Yet John Millar was 
unconvinced, advising Highman to delay the strike as the Maritime Council 
‘decline[d] to be plunged into trouble before having ample proof that demands 
refused [were] reasonable’.102 Millar considered the officers’ demands extravagant, 
and instead volunteered to arbitrate the dispute. Without the backing of the Maritime 
Council, the MMOA retreated, and Highman agreed to meet with George McLean, 
Chairman of the Union Company. The negotiations were swift, and a secret 
agreement preventing the strike was reached on 24 July. 
      Newspapers praised John Millar’s intervention, declaring the Maritime Council a 
welcome moderate element in union circles. In a report on the threatened strike, the 
Otago Daily Times published ‘private’ remarks attributed to Millar, in which he 
stated his reluctance to jeopardise the livelihoods of 20,000 men on behalf of just 300 
officers. The Times attributed his caution to Maritime Council’s ‘breadth of 
foundation’ – mass organisation allowed labour to negate the demands of fringe 
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elements.103 The Evening Post expressed similar sentiments, applauding Millar’s 
‘timely and proper’ intervention for preventing an ‘altogether unjustifiable’ strike.104  
      Yet the Evening Post did not believe that Millar alone had placated the marine 
officers. The paper hailed George McLean’s decision to publicise his correspondence 
with the MMOA as an integral factor in the cancellation of the strike. All six 
newspapers printed their correspondence, intended to discredit the union, without 
providing Highman a right of reply. The letters, written between 26 May and 8 July, 
were publicised in an admittedly desperate attempt to thwart the strike by George 
McLean, who acknowledged that Highman had not sanctioned their publication.105 
The Post argued that McLean had acted in the public interest, and astoundingly no 
newspaper questioned the authenticity of the correspondence. The maritime officers’ 
demands were unpopular, and the story gave newspapers an opportunity to attack 
‘radical’ elements within the labour movement. By simultaneously praising the 
Maritime Council and criticising the MMOA, the press reinforced the notion that the 
strike was an ideological line separating reasonable unionists from greedy agitators.  
       
      By the late 1880s, two decades of labour organisation and agitation had begun 
bearing fruit. Broad-based unions were established and had successfully fought for 
improved working conditions. Rather than campaigning in isolation, organised labour 
began operating in a ‘spirit of national unity’.106 Despite the lack of a genuine labour 
presence in the press, newspapers appeared bemused by, rather than immediately 
hostile to, the newly assertive labour movement. Editorial responses to the London 
Dockers’ Strike were prefaced with sympathy for the workers, yet the mass 
organisation and trans-colonial appeal that aided their cause divided the press. For 
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most, new unionism was a foreign phenomenon worthy of investigation, without 
offering insights about domestic labour. The nascent Maritime Council was not 
entirely ignored, yet the paucity of debate over an organisation that advocated the 
incorporation of all New Zealand workers suggests that editors did not fully 
comprehend its influence. 
      From April, the proliferation of industrial disputes across the colony prompted 
newspapers to clarify their positions on the revitalised labour movement. 
Remarkably, little separated the opinions expressed by recognised ‘liberal’ and 
‘conservative’ newspapers. As a rule, both tended towards an increasingly negative 
framing of labour issues as industrial unrest intensified. The strike was never a 
popular negotiating tactic, but the escalation of industrial disharmony and the overt 
influence of the Maritime Council worried the press. Disputes in early 1890, like the 
Petone Woollen Mill Strike, were considered undesirable, but not as sinister 
examples of the union official’s creeping influence. Shocked by the threat that 
federated workers posed to vital industries and their willingness to transcend trade 
unions’ traditional focus on work and wages, the tone of newspaper coverage grew 
more strident towards the middle of the year. Moderate unions and organisers were 
tolerated, but newspapers stressed the division between desirable and undesirable 
unionism, with the strike as metaphorical line in the sand. In the dedicated union 
official, architect and assertive face of the newly confident labour movement, a new 
‘public enemy’ was recognised. On 1 July, the New Zealand Herald warned readers 
of the dangers of an assertive labour movement. In a few years, trade unions had 
transformed from small benefit societies to powerful interest groups. This rapid rise, 
the Herald feared, not only led trade unions to ignore the plight of non-unionised 
workers, but to consolidate their stranglehold over the workplace and ‘strike for 
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wages that [would] command luxuries’ – an unmitigated horror for the colonial 
elite.107 
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Chapter Three: Entangl ing  Al l iances? The Arrival of the 
Marit ime Str ike in New Zealand. 
 
As the economy slackened into winter, industrial relations deteriorated. Minor 
disturbances threatened to boil over into serious disputes. Amid growing press unease 
with labour federation, the climate favoured belligerent employers over the loose 
network of trade unions. Flashpoints in July and August catalysed underlying 
tensions between capital and labour, eventually resulting in the outbreak of the 
Maritime Strike, the largest industrial dispute in New Zealand’s history. At issue was 
the principle of union recognition, a contest fundamental to the industrial system, but 
one that lacked the emotive appeal of disputes over wages and working conditions. 
The upheavals of the coming months revealed the fallacy of the much-heralded 
‘moderate’ unionism, which required rigorous press scrutiny to level the vast 
imbalances between workers and their employers. Confronted with threats to colonial 
stability and prosperity, conservative newspapers abandoned the last vestiges of 
impartiality, seizing an opportunity to marginalise union leaders – portrayed as the 
instigators and sole beneficiaries of the strike. Newspapers exaggerated the gravity of 
industrial disturbances, both major and minor, as editors sought to mobilise public 
opinion, often contradicting the nationally syndicated reporting that filled their 
newspapers. Confronted by an aggressive cadre of employers and a baying press, 
liberal newspapers wilted, offering scant defence of the unions, while quietly blaming 
employers for the impasse.  
 
      James Mills’ Union Steam Ship Company played a leading role in the industrial 
turmoil that engulfed New Zealand in the second half of 1890. Mills founded the 
Union Company on 12 July 1875 to compete for a share of the lucrative coastal 
shipping trade, which exceeded two million tons annually, and doubled to four 
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million tons by 1890.1 Determined to avoid the erosion of his authority via a public 
share offer, Mills forged a syndicate of Scottish and Dunedin investors to finance the 
initial purchase of five steamers. Through the 1870s and 1880s, the company 
embarked upon a process of steady expansion, monopolising domestic shipping 
within 15 years of its inception. Rather than aggressively assimilating smaller 
companies, Mills preferred the slow acquisition of assets and judicious mergers, 
careful to avoid overstretching his capital. In 1880, the company listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, and consequently the British share of its capital rose to 87 per cent. 
The Union Company first offered trans-Tasman services in 1876, and quickly 
prospered, cleverly combining passenger and cargo routes with government mail 
subsidies. Protected by its ‘Tasman moat, [the company] developed along semi-
monopolistic lines’, dominating the domestic market, then expanding across the 
Pacific. By 1890, the line boasted a fleet of 43 steamers, with nominal capital of £1 
million.2 
      Strict managerialism and hierarchal discipline underpinned the success of the 
Union Company. In 1879, the company produced a comprehensive series of standing 
orders to regulate procedures across its fleet. Unofficially known as the ‘Union 
Company Bible’, the handbook exemplified Mills’ authoritarian streak.3 He 
concentrated power in the hands of his managers and imposed strict discipline 
throughout the company. Employees were rewarded for good service, but 
transgressors suffered harsh punishments. Combined with the Union Company’s 
remarkable influence in all aspects of colonial political and economic life, the tight 
control Mills exerted over his employees led enemies to nickname his business ‘the 
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Southern Octopus’. While Mills tolerated trade unionism, his authoritarian style left 
little room for compromise. Upon the establishment of the Victoria Marine Masters’ 
and Mates’ Union in 1885, he immediately circularised the company’s masters, 
demanding information about employees who had joined. Later, pre-empting the 
dispute with the MMOA, the Board of Directors stated: ‘it is undesirable that Masters 
should join the union, and further, that the Directors would stand by Masters not 
joining’.4  
 
Capitalist Counter-mobilisation – The Whitcombe and Tombs Affair:  
 
The rise of the Maritime Council stalled in July, when it suffered an embarrassing 
defeat at the hands of Christchurch stationers Whitcombe and Tombs. Founded in 
1883 by master printer George Tombs and entrepreneur George Whitcombe, the 
company printed and retailed books. Although Tombs established the Canterbury 
Master Printers’ Association (CMPA) in 1889, and served as its inaugural president, 
he had a reputation for harsh employment policies – a concern the Sweating 
Commission addressed in March.5 In February 1890, the Canterbury Typographical 
Association (CTA) submitted a list of workplace reforms to the CMPA. In early 
March, CMPA members met with the CTA and fixed a minimum weekly pay rate of 
£2.15s. Whitcombe and Tombs abstained from the agreement, as it required that they 
pay equal wages to their female compositors.6 Following the meeting, Whitcombe 
and Tombs instructed its bookbinders to leave the union, and dismissed those who 
refused. Initial negotiations failed, and in May the CTA requested the Maritime 
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Council’s assistance. Unable to persuade Whitcombe and Tombs to negotiate, on 31 
July John Millar called for all transport workers to boycott the firm’s cargo.7 
      Millar’s hopes of a prompt settlement were dashed on 11 August, when the 
Railway Commissioners and Union Company both declined his request to withhold 
carriage of Whitcombe and Tombs’ goods. Furthermore, the Commissioners notified 
Millar that employees who refused duty would be dismissed. Cowed by the 
Commissioners’ announcement, the railwaymen withdrew from the proposed 
boycott.8 Without the support of the ASRS, the boycott was untenable, yet 
newspapers exaggerated the aggression of the Maritime Council’s statements. On 4 
August, the Press described the boycott of a local business as a matter ‘involv[ing] 
the unity of all the labour organisations in the colony, and they are determined to 
fight it out to the death’.9 The following day’s editorial inflated the threatened boycott 
into a rumoured general strike. Ignoring Whitcombe and Tombs’ provocations, the 
paper argued that Christchurch citizens would repudiate organised labour if the 
‘strike’ occurred.10 To emphasise the disastrous consequences of economic 
disruption, the Press interviewed local businessmen to ascertain ‘the probable effect 
of extreme measures as regards the public’. Belying the story’s ominous brief, the 
Press found few informants willing to predict the impending catastrophe imagined by 
its editor. 11 
      While the Press refused to acknowledge Whitcombe and Tombs’ belligerence, 
most newspapers criticised the publisher without offering organised labour any hope 
of redress. The Otago Daily Times contended that the threatened boycott arose from 
Whitcombe and Tombs’ ‘excessive combativeness’ and ‘unaccommodating spirit’. 
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However, by ‘resorting to extreme measures’, the Maritime Council had committed a 
greater sin. Ignoring the stationers’ disdain for negotiation, the paper believed that the 
principle of union recognition was best upheld via public pressure.12 The Lyttelton 
Times concurred, lauding Millar for ‘so repeatedly holding out the olive branch’, but 
criticising his threat to disrupt the local economy.13 An early advocate of the ‘social 
norms’ frame, the Evening Post applied a similar analysis to the story. On 11 August, 
the paper reprinted a lecture on ‘boycotting’ given by the Reverend Joseph Berry at 
the Taranaki Street Wesleyan Hall. While Berry argued ‘this firm in Christchurch 
ought to be thoroughly dealt with’, he refused to condone the boycott as an acceptable 
means of forcing arbitration, considering it antagonistic and infectious. Instead, he 
instructed the Maritime Council to rely on the public to coerce Whitcombe and 
Tombs into accepting arbitration.14 Once again, newspapers professed to promote the 
principles of labour organisation while condemning their practice. 
      An emergency meeting of Whitcombe and Tombs shareholders on 12 August 
stoked fears that the threatened boycott would escalate into a general strike. When 
arbitration was voted on, shareholders representing 80 per cent of the company’s 
ownership decided against negotiation with the Maritime Council.15 Social pressure 
had demonstrably failed to sway Whitcombe and Tombs, yet not even this stark 
display of arrogance prompted newspaper editors to reframe their analysis of the 
dispute. The Evening Post reacted by labelling the firm ‘selfish and inconsiderate in 
the extreme’, but continued to denounce the boycott, adding that any disruption of 
trade would further antagonise the public.16 On 14 August, the Lyttelton Times 
summarised events, emphasising three ‘errors’ that had aggravated the standoff: 
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Whitcombe and Tombs’ rejection of the CMPA agreement; the Maritime Council’s 
announcement of the boycott (redeemed by their offer of arbitration); and finally, 
Whitcombe and Tombs’ refusal to negotiate with labour representatives. Despite 
reporting that Whitcombe and Tombs had both instigated and prolonged the dispute, 
William Pember Reeves cautioned against suspicions of a sinister anti-union plot: 
‘We shall continue to discredit the existence of any capitalist secret society until we 
see the most direct proof to the contrary’.17 
      On 16 August John Millar confirmed rumours that the Maritime Council had 
cancelled the Christchurch boycott in a widely published open letter. After 
condemning Whitcombe and Tombs, Millar expressed his gratitude to labour 
organisations across Australasia and asked the public to ‘mark their appreciation of 
this Company’s tactics by refraining from purchasing their goods’. He justified the 
Council’s moderation as a concession necessary to protect the interests of the wider 
labour community.18 The Evening Post saluted the Maritime Council’s ‘great moral 
victory’, as Millar’s probity had saved the colony from a general strike.19 The 
Lyttelton Times concurred, congratulating the Maritime Council executive on ‘the 
excellent sense shown by them in the face of undoubted provocation’.20 Despite 
having demanded Millar retract the strike threat, the conservative press responded to 
the 16 August declaration with scorn. Although the Otago Daily Times expressed 
relief at the boycott’s cancellation, the paper alleged that the decision resulted from 
internal disharmony as opposed to ‘a genuine recognition of the iniquity of so terrible 
a venture for so slight a cause’.21 The New Zealand Herald concurred, stating that 
indecisiveness scuppered the strike, and hailed the Railway Commissioners for 
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breaking the Maritime Council’s grand coalition.22 Astonishingly, the Press took 
credit for Millar’s decision, arguing that its reportage had shown the Maritime 
Council ‘the meaning of the disaster which they sought to bring upon the city’.23 
      While newspapers praised the Maritime Council for averting a general strike, the 
railway servants’ defection revealed a fundamental weakness in the federation. 
Conrad Bollinger argues that the defeat of the colony’s largest labour organisation 
encouraged employers to adopt a belligerent stance toward dispute mediation.24 In a 
slack labour market, employers could act ruthlessly against organised workers, 
diminishing the effectiveness of industrial action. Furthermore, the invocation of an 
idealised public, indignant at injustice and eager to maintain an equitable society was 
a convenient myth that allowed newspapers to promote the principles of labour 
organisation while condemning their practice. The Whitcombe and Tombs dispute 
had dragged on since March, during which period the firm was the subject of an 
ineffectual Sweating Commission investigation. Although newspapers retained their 
faith in the self-regulating egalitarianism of colonial society, public pressure had 
failed to persuade the company to even negotiate with its employees’ representatives. 
Organised labour had lost momentum – the image of a robust workers’ coalition able 
to protect members’ interests had been tarnished. 
      The Whitcombe and Tombs imbroglio marked a rhetorical shift in the framing of 
labour issues for some newspapers, and provided others with fresh ammunition 
against ‘troublemakers’. Responding to events in Christchurch, on 9 August the New 
Zealand Herald published an attack on new unionism, outlining a gloomy vision of 
the colony’s future if the labour movement maintained its influence. Positioning itself 
as a defender of ‘the community at large’, the Herald likened contemporary industrial 
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relations to the medieval state of perpetual war. Industrial unrest was considered an 
inevitable consequence of labour federation – the ‘united phalanx’ of trade unions 
alienated management from workers. Employers had become the ‘absolute slave’ of 
labour, and the future promised mass capital withdrawal and prolonged economic 
stagnation.25 The Press believed that the rise of new unionism had led ‘all men of 
business’ to view labour with apprehension.26 J.M. Ritchie, one of Dunedin’s pre-
eminent businessmen, echoed the paper’s suspicions in correspondence with James 
Mills – ‘unless we can organise as employers – we can be crushed as it is’.27 In the 
aftermath of the dispute, the Evening Post postulated that the emergence of the 
Maritime Council put labour on an equal footing with capital. For the Post, ‘parity’ 
required labour to respect the ‘rights of capital’.28 Classifying such mismatched 
adversaries as ‘equals’ allowed the paper to modify its stance on organised labour 
while retaining a liberal veneer. The Maritime Council’s hasty resort to ‘extreme 
measures’, in what the public considered a minor dispute, ultimately homogenised 
editorial perspectives on the labour movement. 
 
Origins and Outcomes of the Australasian Maritime Strike: 
 
Seeking to resist the surge of new unionism, Australasian capitalists began counter-
mobilising in the late 1880s. In New Zealand, such organisations relied on existing 
trade associations. Loose groups of employers only coalesced into formal 
organisations after the Maritime Strike began.29 By contrast, Australian capitalists 
vigorously protected their interests, and viewed organised labour with considerable 
hostility. Throughout the previous decade, Australian industrial disputes had evolved 
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from isolated questions of individual security towards cooperative agitation in 
support of union principles (a process compressed into a few years in New 
Zealand).30 In response, employers’ associations, including the Pastoralists Union, the 
Steam Ship Owners’ Association (SSOA), Employers’ Unions, and Chambers of 
Manufactures, sought to both negate the advances achieved by organised labour and 
defy demands for further concessions. The employers aimed to reaffirm the ‘freedom 
of contract’ – a phrase designed to emphasise the ostensible tyranny of unionism, 
while concealing employers’ intent to undermine workers’ bargaining position. The 
principle asserted employers’ right to negotiate with individual workers, and denied 
unions’ right to enforce a ‘closed shop’.31 In July 1890, SSOA chairman W.C. Willis 
typified employers’ attitudes when he remarked: 
All the owners throughout Australia have signed a bond to stand by one another...They 
are a combined and compact body, and I believe that never before has such an 
opportunity to test the relative strength of labour and capital arisen.32 
      Combined with their aggression, the dogmatic conception of industrial relations 
as a zero-sum game led Australian employers into conflict with organised labour. 
Exacerbated by a faltering economy, the Australian Maritime Strike arose from a 
series of minor clashes magnified by both sides’ refusal to compromise on 
‘fundamental’ principles. James Bennett argues that the term ‘Maritime Strike’ is a 
misnomer because it originated with the intertwining of problems in the maritime 
industry and the shearing sheds, and ultimately encompassed workers far beyond 
either industry.33 Established in 1886, the ASU claimed by 1890 to have orchestrated 
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3,180 strikes and organised 85 per cent of the 2,792 shearing sheds in South 
Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales.34 Protesting the exclusion of unionised 
workers from the Jondaryan Station in Queensland, in May 1890 ASU President 
William Spence organised an embargo of non-union wool in unison with local 
maritime workers. Spence’s effort to force employers to recognise the Queensland 
Shearers’ Union succeeded, but antagonised employers while exaggerating organised 
labour’s confidence.35 In subsequent weeks, Spence travelled to Melbourne to 
persuade the Trades Hall Council, Seamen’s Union, and Wharf Labourers to assist in 
future boycotts.36 
      Using the Jondaryan model, Spence planned to force New South Wales 
pastoralists to recognise the ASU, yet his campaign coincided with a disagreement 
brewing between ship-owners and maritime officers. Three weeks before Spence 
published his 1 July manifesto outlining the struggle to prevent the export of non-
union wool, the Australian MMOA had issued a series of demands to the SSOA. 
Their claims included a proposal to increase wages, introduce a ten hour day, and 
reform shipboard practice. The owners initially appeared amenable to the officers’ 
requests. However, on 19 July, the SSOA informed the officers that their requests 
would only be considered if they severed their affiliations with federated labour. 
Stuart Svensen regards the affiliation dispute as a ‘pseudo-issue’, designed to provoke 
a confrontation. Aside from the Melbourne branch, the officers were not affiliated 
with any trade organisations, yet ship-owners feared they would collaborate with the 
ASU and resume hostilities at the peak of the wool season. Instead, the SSOA 
conspired to precipitate a dispute at a moment of financial and organisational 
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weakness for the inter-colonial labour federations. The benefits of their gambit were 
obvious: defeat of the maritime unions would end pressure to improve wages and 
working conditions, and consolidate members’ control over Australian shipping.37 
      Displaying his disdain for negotiation, W.C. Willis met with a group of retired 
masters on 31 July and established a puppet union, the Mercantile Marine Service of 
Australia. Ship-owners granted the bogus organisation increased wages in exchange 
for a promise ‘not to work into the hands of any labour organisation’.38 Enraged, the 
officers issued an ultimatum on 7 August; if the SSOA refused to meet their demands 
within a week, all officers would stop work. Neither side relented, and on 16 August 
Australian shipping came to a halt when the officers walked out, followed by miners, 
railwaymen, dockworkers, and shearers. Within a week, 59 vessels were laid up, and 
over 5,000 men had left work, yet New Zealand shipping continued unabated.39 Eager 
to avoid the dispute, John Millar assured the Union Company that unionised seamen 
would continue working inter-colonial routes provided that the closed shop 
remained.40 
      Shunning Millar’s overtures, the Union Company acquiesced with the 
uncompromising approach adopted by the SSOA at its 23-24 August meeting in 
Albury. Ship-owners endorsed two major resolutions: the dismissal of any officer 
with trade union associations and an assertion of employers’ right to operate an open 
shop. Acting-manager David Mills demonstrated the company’s commitment to the 
agreement by employing non-union labour to unload the Tarawera in Sydney on 25 
August. Alongside the Albury declaration, the Maritime Council interpreted the 
decision as an act of aggression that rendered the continued employment of New 
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Zealand maritime unionists untenable.41 The following day, Millar instructed workers 
on inter-colonial routes to give 24 hours notice, but allowed the Union Company to 
maintain coastal services. Sir Robert Stout later remarked that ‘the Union Company, 
therefore, with its eyes open, practically invited a strike’.42 Why did the Union 
Company forgo conciliation? Gavin McLean argues that James Mills prioritised 
cordial relations with competitors over preventing short-term industrial unrest. Thus, 
compliance with the SSOA was primarily an economic decision – if the strike forced 
his Australian competitors to abandon their traditional routes, they would challenge 
the Union Company’s dominance of lucrative inter-colonial services. In August, the 
company was prepared to withstand a strike; trade was slack, unemployment was 
rising, and the company held over 11,000 tons of reserve coal.43 If securing future 
prosperity entailed a confrontation with his employees, James Mills was happy to 
undermine the emerging Australasian labour movement. 
      New Zealand coastal shipping continued uninterrupted until 28 August, when the 
Union Company vessel Wairarapa left Port Chalmers manned by a non-union crew. 
The next day, John Millar instructed all junior officers, dockers, seamen, cooks, and 
stewards to leave their posts. By the end of August, most unionised maritime workers 
had walked out, temporarily paralysing domestic shipping. The strike spread inland, 
and by early September, miners affiliated with the Maritime Council left work, 
protesting their employers’ failure to sever ties with the Union Company. The move 
sparked fears of coal and food shortages, exacerbated by previous production 
stoppages. Few reliable estimates exist, yet historians generally accept that around 
8,000 left work across New Zealand between August and November 1890, although 
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few participated for the duration.44 Within weeks the strike faltered, as haphazard 
organisation, public animosity, and financial weakness exposed the fragility of the 
Maritime Council’s grand coalition. Vast coal reserves enabled the Union Company 
to resume core services almost immediately, and the ports quickly reopened, manned 
by ‘gentlemen’ volunteers, farmers, and unemployed labourers.45 
      The railwaymen’s participation was crucial to a successful general strike, yet the 
ASRS refrained from joining, fearing the Railway Commissioners’ retribution. 
Painfully aware of their employer’s intolerance of industrial action, ASRS members 
acted with extreme caution, undermining the attempt to obstruct domestic 
transportation.46 After the Commissioners connived to press their employees into 
strike-breaking on the Lyttelton wharves, and dismissed 150 men for defying the 
order, 2,000 congregated at a protest meeting in Christchurch. The crowd asserted its 
solidarity with the dismissed men, but the ASRS allowed the railways to remain 
operational. By quickly hiring non-union workers, the Union Company decisively 
warded off the labour threat.47 On 24 September, the line announced that 34 of its 43 
steamers had resumed service, crewed and loaded by over 2,000 non-union men.48 
       Sensing defeat, union leaders sought to negotiate a settlement. Although Premier 
Atkinson declined to intervene in the dispute at a meeting with the Maritime Council 
executive on 1 September, when the Opposition MHR (Member of the House of 
Representatives) W.B. Perceval moved that the government convene a conference to 
mediate the dispute on 15 September, the House carried his motion 51 to 11.49 From 
30 September, Perceval sought to bring labour leaders alongside the colony’s largest 
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employers. Yet, foreshadowing the failure of negotiation, only George McLean of the 
Union Company represented capital at the conference. Unwilling to concede any 
ground to the defeated unionists, McLean precipitated the collapse of the meeting. On 
8 October, the Maritime Council instructed all shore unions, aside from the South 
Island miners, to return to work, while encouraging the remainder of its members to 
resist until the negotiation of an acceptable settlement.50 The order was futile. The 
unionists held out for another month, but their efforts neither influenced the public 
nor their former employers. The strike ended on 10 November, marked only by a 
notice posted outside the Maritime Council’s offices stating, ‘members of the 
Seamen’s Union were at liberty to rejoin their boats’.51 Mass industrial agitation had 
failed; if organised labour were to realise lasting social and economic reform, it 
would have to occur via the ballot box. 
 
The Maritime Strike in New Zealand Newspapers: 
 
The New Zealand press reacted slowly to the Australian strike. It was only between 
18 and 21 August, three weeks after the dispute began, that all six newspapers 
discussed in this thesis began publishing designated columns on the dispute. As with 
general labour columns, the headlines attached to these pieces revealed something of 
a newspaper’s stance on the strike – while most papers reported on the Australian 
‘Strike’ or ‘Trouble’, the Press consistently referred to ‘The Labor War in 
Australia’.52 Although news of the Australian situation quickly reached New Zealand, 
editors took time to formulate responses to the strike. An exception, the New Zealand 
Herald published an even-handed summary of the Australian strike on 20 August. 
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The paper lamented the ‘very considerable [economic] inconvenience’ inflicted by 
the strike, yet did not foresee its extension across the Tasman.53 
      By the time the SSOA Conference opened on 23 August, the Australian Maritime 
Strike was a major story in New Zealand newspapers. All six papers reported the 
owners’ unanimous resolution that: ‘no officer shall be given command of a vessel if 
he was connected with any association affiliated to any labour organisation’.54 The 
Union Company’s membership of the SSOA was widely publicised, yet the press 
ignored the meeting’s ramifications for domestic industrial relations. A lone 
exception, the Lyttelton Times ran an editorial on 27 August castigating the ship-
owners’ perfidy. William Pember Reeves believed that the Albury resolution 
constituted an attack on trade unions. With food prices rising, the decision to retain 
all non-unionised workers hired during the dispute amounted to a naked display of 
hostility. Furthermore, Reeves implicated the press in the ‘conspiracy’ against trade 
unionism. Contesting the dominant framing of strike stories, he identified the 
prevalence of the phrase ‘free labour’ as suggestive of a false struggle between 
‘organisation and individual liberty’. New Zealand newspapers not only reproduced 
the phrase in UPA reports from Australia, but it regularly featured in domestic 
journalism.55 By replicating employers’ emphasis on ‘freedom’, newspapers implied 
that trade unions discouraged independence and self-reliance.56  
      In the days following the Tarawera incident, both the Maritime Council and the 
Union Company released competing ‘manifestos’, seeking to manipulate public 
perceptions of the strike. Published widely on 28 August, the Union Company’s 
statement boasted of its fair wages, amenable working environment, and history of 
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industrial amity. Thus, blame for the ‘imminent paralysis of trade in all the colonies’ 
lay with the ‘Labour Union of all Australasia’.57 Conspicuously absent from the 
announcement was the company’s complicity in the Albury declaration. The Union 
Company had, as the Otago Daily Times noted, ‘unhesitatingly throw[n] the whole 
responsibility of the very serious disorganisation...upon the shoulders of the leaders 
of the unions’.58 Released the next day, the Maritime Council’s response reached a 
slightly smaller audience, published in all newspapers except the Press. The Council 
denied seeking a ‘trial of strength’, emphasising that as a SSOA member, the Union 
Company had conspired to challenge a fundamental principle of trade unionism. 
Furthermore, the company had employed ‘blacklegs’ at its Sydney wharves despite 
the FSU’s promise to maintain inter-colonial services. Only after these egregious 
provocations was ‘the Union forced to take action’.59 
      William Pember Reeves’ criticism of the complicity between capitalists and the 
press remained unique when the strike reached New Zealand ports.60 In addition to 
ignoring the Maritime Council’s account of the dispute, most newspapers uncritically 
reproduced the Union Company’s manifesto. The New Zealand Herald believed that 
the strike demonstrated the dangers posed by inter-colonial labour federation. If asked 
why they left work, the Herald pre-empted the maritime workers’ reply: ‘We are 
called out from Sydney by...an organisation we cannot disobey’.61 On 28 August, the 
Press reached a similar conclusion, warning the Maritime Council that the public 
would hold it accountable for an industrial ‘standstill’ and ‘coal famine...in the midst 
of actual plenty’. ‘Perfectly satisfied’ that labour had no quarrel with the Union 
Company, the paper believed that the Council’s strike order had ‘alienated the last 
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vestige of public sympathy [for organised labour]’.62 Weighing in the following day, 
the Otago Daily Times unequivocally apportioned blame for the strike: ‘It 
is...madness for New Zealand seamen to be compelled by an Australian command to 
leave an employment with which they have every reason to be satisfied’. By contrast, 
the editorial absolved the Union Company from accountability in the unfolding ‘war 
between labour and capital’.63 Mirroring the Union Company’s official statement, all 
three editorials ignored the ship-owners’ attack on trade unionism at Albury. 
      Unfortunately for John Millar, providing a convincing justification for the New 
Zealand strike proved difficult. The Maritime Council was embroiled in what the 
public considered an Australian dispute. At issue were not wages or working 
conditions, the staples of industrial ferment, but the defence of principles 
fundamental to new unionism, a movement most New Zealanders barely 
understood.64 As Florence McCarthy noted during the Grey Valley lockout, organised 
labour remained severely deficient in public communications. While the conservative 
press framed the dispute as a product of inter-colonial solidarity, greed, and radical 
ideology, the few ‘allies’ of labour in the press mounted a weak and incoherent 
defence of the strike. In its first editorial on the strike on 1 September, the Grey River 
Argus sought to reframe the strike as a defensive response to capitalist aggression. 
Asking, ‘is boycotting any worse than monopoly?’ the paper compared the public 
‘howl of indignation’ directed at the strikers with consumers’ meek acceptance of the 
Union Company’s immediate increase in shipping rates. Furthermore, the Argus was 
the only newspaper to link the Union Company’s enforcement of the Albury 
resolution with the outbreak of a New Zealand strike. Arguing that the strike 
demonstrated the fallacy of ‘moderate’ unionism, the paper highlighted the vast 
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power imbalance between labour and capital that allowed the ship-owners to ‘starve 
the men out’, rather than consider their grievances.65 
      While the Grey River Argus portrayed the Union Company as a ruthless 
behemoth, the remainder of the liberal press eschewed such advocacy. In its first 
editorial on the New Zealand strike, published on 2 September, the Lyttelton Times 
ignored the origins of the strike, and instead praised the picketing workers’ 
‘admirable demeanour’. Adapting the ‘social norms’ frame, the paper held that a 
demonstration of exemplary behaviour by the strikers would engender public 
sympathy. To avoid jeopardising the aims of trade unionism – the moral and material 
elevation of the working classes – the paper urged workers to protest in such a 
manner ‘that their opponents are forced to respect them’.66 Meanwhile, the Evening 
Post expressed hopes of a rapid resolution to the strike, arguing that both sides had 
expressed ‘a desire for pacific adjustment of the difficulty’. The Post assiduously 
avoided the strike’s origins, devoting its attention to the structure of an eventual 
reconciliation. Worried that grandstanding politicians would hijack the arbitration 
process, the Post mooted Churchill Julius, the Anglican Bishop of Christchurch, as a 
potential mediator.67 Although neither paper condemned the striking workers, nor did 
they examine the grievances that precipitated and sustained the dispute.  
      The dire predictions that filled editorial columns were not supported by accurate 
information regarding the number of workers on strike. Daily news coverage rarely 
featured reliable data on the strikers. Where quoted, numbers had a rhetorical value – 
round, obviously estimated figures, congruent with public expectations but frequently 
contradicted by later estimations. Discrepancies in the reported number of strikers in 
Wellington during September emphasise the unreliability of these estimates. On 1 
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September, it was widely reported that 400 men had left work, a number quadrupled 
by the New Zealand Herald within four days.68 Three weeks later, when the strike 
had begun to wane, the Evening Post reported that 500 men remained out.69 While 
not impossible, the sudden leap between 1 and 5 September does not correspond with 
any reported intensification of the Wellington strike. Reports seldom included figures 
for other centres, but the rare exceptions were also unreliable. On 8 September, the 
Otago Daily Times noted that 1,500 of 8,000 workers affiliated with the Auckland 
TLC had joined the strike.70 In an era when trade unionism was strongest in the South 
Island, the suggestion that nearly half of the colony’s 21,000 organised workers lived 
in Auckland was implausible. Exaggerating the strike’s impact, newspaper editors 
ignored the reality that less than four per cent of wage earners participated in the 
strike – hardly an overwhelming menace.71 
City Number on Str ike Paper Date 
Auckland 1,500 (of 8,000 TLC affiliates) Otago Daily Times, p.2. 8/9/1890 
Auckland 1,500 Evening Post, p.2. 8/9/1890 
Wellington 400 Grey River Argus, p.2. 1/9/1890 
Wellington 400 Otago Daily Times, p.2. 1/9/1890 
Wellington 400 Press, p.5. 1/9/1890 
Wellington 1,500 New Zealand Herald, p.5. 5/9/1890 
Wellington 500 Evening Post, p.2. 26/9/1890 
Wellington 500 Otago Daily Times, p.2. 27/9/1890 
Christchurch 800 Lyttelton Times, p.4. 3/9/1890 
Greymouth 600 Evening Post, p.2. 25/9/1890 
Table One: Newspapers’ estimates of the number of workers on strike, September 1890. 
 
      As their estimates testify, the press exaggerated the impact of the strike. 
Newspaper reports depicted a society paralysed by the suspension of vital costal 
shipping routes. In reality, the strike’s impact on the colony varied regionally. 
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Although the Maritime Council had ordered out seamen working inter-colonial routes 
on 25 August, domestic services continued until the Wairarapa sailed on 28 August. 
Even then, John Millar’s strike order was not enacted smoothly, not least because 
crews could not be withdrawn mid-voyage.72 Although the Maritime Council aspired 
to represent all workers, regional unions decided whether their members followed 
Millar’s instructions. Thus, the strike began in an ad hoc fashion. After the initial 
confusion, Dunedin seamen and dockers left work on 28 August, and their 
Christchurch counterparts walked off the Lyttelton wharves on the afternoon of 29 
August.73 On the same day, the Evening Post remarked: ‘Although the strike 
practically commenced in Wellington today, there was nothing to be seen’.74 In 
Auckland, where the Union Company had few employees, shipping continued largely 
unhindered until the Northern Company transported non-union crews on 5 
September. Within two days, the company’s entire fleet was stranded in port.75  
      Although its offices were distant from the epicentres of the strike, the New 
Zealand Herald established itself as the Maritime Council’s most vituperative critic. 
In a hysterical editorial published on 2 September, the paper reiterated the case for 
organised labour’s absolute culpability in the dispute. Declaring the colony 
‘perilously near’ to civil war, the Herald demanded government intervention ‘to 
prevent hundreds from perishing’. Public opinion was deemed unfavourable to the 
strikers ‘for the simple reason that they have no substantial grievance to complain 
of’.76 The previous day, the Press had also expounded upon the absence of a ‘just’ 
cause for the strike, aside from the ‘quarrel between the ship owners in Australia and 
their officers’. Dismissing the question of affiliation, the paper defended the Albury 
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resolution, arguing that any workers’ ‘alliance for offence and defence’ subverted 
discipline. The results of such alliances were clear: the Maritime Council had 
‘ruthlessly sacrificed’ the interests of the colony in favour of supporting their 
Australian comrades.77 Central to the Press’ scorn for the Maritime Council was the 
organisation’s purported secrecy; the paper depicted the leadership as a shadowy 
cabal of troublemakers. Unsurprisingly, the SSOA escaped similar scrutiny. Again, 
critics exploited the ideological basis of the strike, calculating that abstruse union 
principles would not resonate with the public. 
      After the initial shock had subsided, newspaper editors vacillated between 
exaggerating the consequences of a nationwide strike, and simultaneously reporting 
the Maritime Council’s inability to maintain an embargo on domestic transportation. 
The disjuncture between editorial demagoguery and daily reportage on the strike is 
revealing. Apparently unaware of the irony, on the day that its editorial warned of an 
impending civil war, the New Zealand Herald reported, ‘there has been no very 
noticeable outward effect upon trade [in Auckland] up to the present time’.78 The next 
day, the paper described the situation across the colony as ‘all quiet’.79 Similarly, 
while the Press lamented the economic damage wrought by the strike, it reported that 
work at the Lyttelton wharves was ‘proceeding most satisfactorily’.80  
      Although the first 48 hours of the strike paralysed domestic shipping, a loose 
alliance of farmers, capitalists, and shipping companies quickly organised makeshift 
crews and replacement labourers. Unemployment peaked at the end of winter, leaving 
an abundance of men desperate for work in September.81 Middle-class volunteers – 
‘men of independent means, members of athletic clubs, bank clerks, schoolmasters, 
                                                
77 Press, 1 September 1890, p.4. 
78 NZH, 2 September 1890, p.5. 
79 NZH, 3 September 1890, p.5. 
80 Press, 1 September 1890, p.5. 
81 Merrett, ‘A Reappraisal of the 1890 Maritime Strike’, pp.107-08. 
 
 
 
86 
etc’ – united by their distrust of trade unionism, supplemented non-union labour.82 On 
30 August, the day after the Lyttelton strike began, the 12.10pm train left 
Christchurch carrying 300 rural labourers. The ‘young farmers’, coordinated by Press 
owner George Stead, unloaded the Tekapo (losing 15 tons of coal overboard), and 
later in the afternoon, the Rotorua left Lyttelton manned by a non-union crew.83 By 
early September members of the Otago Rowing Club and Union Company clerks 
worked the docks at Port Chalmers.84 Reporting from Auckland on 30 August, the 
New Zealand Herald claimed that enough ‘free’ labour had assembled to ‘furnish a 
crew of competent men’ to operate a large steamer. The following week, the Herald 
noted that a ‘dozen gentlemen’ and ‘40 athletic young fellows from the Auckland 
Rowing Club’ assisted the unloading of docked vessels.85 Middle-class support 
allowed the Union Company to resume selected routes on 5 September.86 
      While the press generally represented the Maritime Strike as an example of the 
dangers inherent in labour federation, the advent of employer mobilisation was 
received warmly. On 3 September, a group of Otago businessmen met at the Dunedin 
Chamber of Commerce to form an organisation that secured its members ‘all the 
advantages of unanimity of action now enjoyed by the various trade unions’.87 The 
Press pre-empted the meeting by publishing an advertisement encouraging employer 
solidarity. Entitled ‘Advance New Zealand!’ the article detailed the structure of an 
ambitious colony-wide employers’ union.88 Within a week, Employers’ Associations 
were established in the four main centres, as well as provincial towns across the 
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colony.89 The new associations were autonomous, but together formed a rough 
coalition. Commenting on these associations, the Press was bellicose, noting, ‘Mr 
Millar and his colleagues have declared Canterbury in a state of siege’ leaving 
employers with ‘no alternative but to organise’.90  Revealing the common ground 
between the liberal and conservative press, the Lyttelton Times also supported the 
employers’ associations, noting that federated labour had ‘set a model of moderation’ 
that capitalists would benefit from emulating. So long as the employers refrained 
from ‘bitter speeches and defiant challenges’, the paper believed the development 
would encourage dispute resolution.91   
      The difference in frames applied to violent incidents related to the strike, 
depending on the perpetrator’s allegiance, illuminates the anti-labour biases shared by 
liberal and conservative newspapers. Although contemporaries lauded the relative 
amity of the Maritime Strike, animosity between unionists and non-union labour 
occasionally flared into fighting. When strikers instigated violence, newspapers 
adopted a tone of haughty condemnation. On 17 September, the Lyttelton Times 
devoted an entire page to a story on ‘The Wilson’s Road Outrage’.92 The ‘outrage’ – 
a brawl between ‘free’ and unionised labour in the Christchurch suburbs – occurred 
on 8 September, and District Court hearings began the following week. Although 
nine of the ten accused were acquitted on grounds of self-defence, other newspapers 
also referred to the confrontation as the ‘Wilson’s Road Outrage’, or ‘The 
Christchurch Outrage’ – headlines that implied an exaggerated propensity to violence 
amid the union ranks.93 In the same vein, Press titled a report on a minor 
confrontation between unionists and farm labourers, ‘Rioting At Dunedin’. Picketing 
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unionists were described as a crowd of ‘larrikins...ready for mischief’, yet the ‘riot’ 
failed to escalate beyond stone throwing. A week later, under the headline ‘Free 
Labourers Attacked’, the paper described how the orderly nature of the Lyttelton 
strike was shattered by the ambush of a non-union labour gang, perpetrated by 
‘members of the Wharf Labourers’ Union and the Seamen’s Union’.94  
       Yet, when trade unionists were the victims, the press responded in a more 
conciliatory fashion. On 12 September, Robert Allan, a non-union labourer, was 
arrested after assaulting William Gerrard, a Wellington unionist. Pushed by Allan 
during an argument, Gerrard fell into the hold of the Australia, fracturing several ribs 
and vertebrae – leaving him a paraplegic. However, the Press excused the incident as 
‘An Unfortunate Occurrence’.95 The Evening Post also trivialised the story, 
publishing it under the headline ‘Mishap Aboard The Australia’.96 Although 
Gerrard’s injuries were life threatening, in following days the Press headlined the 
story ‘An Unfortunate Fracas’, while simultaneously reporting violence against ‘free’ 
labour under the rubrics ‘The Free Labor Assaults’, and ‘Brutal Assault’.97 The 
difference in tone between crime reports, based on the identity of the perpetrator, 
clearly demonstrated where newspapers’ sympathies lay, and with whom they wanted 
readers to identify. 
 
Those ‘Irresponsible Men’ – The Railway Commissioners Curtail the Strike: 
 
The faltering intrusion of the railwaymen into the Maritime Strike further polarised 
public discourse, forcing editors to address the consequences of the Railway 
Commissioners’ reprisal – the first state intervention in the dispute. Chastened by the 
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Whitcombe and Tombs affair, the railwaymen remained at work on 28 August. 
Confident that their coal reserves would outlast the strike and in command of one of 
the few large, well-organised workforces in the colony, the Commissioners’ 
recognised an opportunity to curtail the strike.98 At Westport and Lyttelton, managers 
ordered railway workers to handle goods normally unloaded by dockers. The men 
refused to serve as strike-breakers, and by 3 September, the Railways Department had 
suspended 61 workers in Westport and 150 in Lyttelton. Escalating the standoff, on 9 
September the Commissioners dismissed the president, vice president, and two 
members of the ASRS after they refused to cease their activism. Outraged Opposition 
MHRs decried the intervention as an attempt to crush the union. Opposition leader 
John Ballance demanded an explanation, noting the ‘remarkable revulsion of public 
feeling’ at the misuse of power by such ‘irresponsible men’.99 Workers expressed 
their indignation at rallies in Christchurch on 3 and 11 September, but resolved only 
to censure the Commissioners’ conduct. Meanwhile, ASRS members continued 
operating passenger and freight services. Indifferent to public opprobrium, the 
Commissioners upheld their controversial decisions, issuing a statement on 6 
September advising employees who had ‘recklessly and foolishly’ disobeyed orders 
to ‘give notice in a proper and orderly manner and resign their places’.100 
      The prospect of the strike spreading to include government employees prompted 
the Evening Post to turn against organised labour. Until the dismissal of the ASRS 
leadership, the paper confined its analysis of the strike to platitudes on the virtues of 
mediation. However, on 11 September, the Post commended the Commissioners’ 
decision, noting that ‘a service of railways could not be carried on efficiently if such 
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insubordination...was permitted to pass unnoticed’. Siding with the Atkinson 
Government’s argument that civil servants ‘cannot serve two masters’, the Post 
believed that Ballance had made a ‘fatal tactical mistake’ in appropriating the matter 
for political advancement.101 The Press, another prominent supporter of the 
Commissioners, declared the dismissals an unavoidable consequence of the 
railwaymens’ disobedience. The paper believed that the incident demonstrated the 
dangers of a powerful railways union – it ‘encourage[d] the men to disobey the rules 
of service’. Furthermore, the Press used the opportunity to attack the union’s 
leadership, accusing it of adopting the Maritime Council’s ‘false position’ and 
subsequently encouraging ‘a spirit of insubordination’ amongst railway workers.102 
      Congruent with the debate’s political cleavage, on 15 September the Lyttelton 
Times published an impassioned defence of the dismissed railwaymen. Three days 
earlier, William Pember Reeves grilled Acting-Premier Edwin Mitchelson in the 
House, demanding an explanation from the Railway Commissioners.103 In his 
editorial, Reeves explained why the ‘despotic’ Commissioners had ‘endeavour[ed] to 
destroy’ the ASRS just months after they had officially recognised the union. He 
argued that they had followed a ‘Russian policy’ during the June negotiations – 
swallowing unpalatable demands while preparing to marginalise the union in a future 
period of strength. Reeves’ sympathies undoubtedly rested with the dismissed 
workers, yet in light of the forthcoming election he was eager to tar the government 
with the scandal. Utilising his editorial platform, Reeves argued that the Railway 
Commissioners had silenced free speech and ‘squelch[ed] Unionism’ to ingratiate 
themselves with ‘a Conservative and capital representing government’.104    
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      In the aftermath of the railways controversy, newspapers displayed an increasing 
hostility toward labour leaders. The deposition of the ASRS leadership coincided 
with the Australian arrival of the British ‘socialist’ Henry Hyde Champion. Described 
as ‘a Tory at heart’, Champion arrived in Australia on 12 August, intending to study 
the labour movement, but grew frustrated with colonial unionists’ failure to recognise 
his ability and install him as leader.105 Australian distrust of Champion was mirrored 
in England, where contemporaries considered him a gentleman intriguer, tainted by 
allegations that he spent ‘Tory gold’ to split the liberal vote in 1885.106 Despite his 
ignorance of local conditions, Champion entered the debate over the Maritime Strike. 
On 6 September he wrote an article for the Melbourne Age proposing a series of 
concessions necessary for labour to reach a palatable compromise. After establishing 
his trade union credentials, Champion argued for the abandonment of the ‘closed 
shop’, asserting that he could ‘hardly believe any responsible trade unionist’ would 
refuse to work alongside non-union labour. In a section on intimidation Champion 
argued that trade unionists needed to court the widest possible segment of the public: 
a path requiring the rejection of violence. The point was apposite, yet undermined by 
his failure to address instances of state and employer coercion. Champion concluded 
with a final slight to Australian labour, asserting that capitalists had no qualms with 
trade unions, they merely objected to their ‘arbitrary and unfair’ negotiating tactics.107 
      Champion’s piece was understandably popular amongst Australasian capitalists. 
The Age reported that prominent employers had ‘expressed themselves in sympathy 
with the views expressed in the article’, while Whitcombe and Tombs printed a poster 
summarising Champion’s opinions, entitled ‘A Labour Delegate’s Views’, at the 
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behest of a group of employers.108 Although New Zealand unionists considered 
Champion a ‘renegade’, the press largely supported his programme for industrial 
harmony.109 The Press approvingly described his article as ‘the severest rebuke which 
has yet been administered to the organisers of the present strike’. Disingenuously 
summarising the piece, the paper commended Champion’s ‘advice’ for the marine 
officers to sever their connections with ‘Trades Hall’, approach the SSOA and ‘trust 
to their honor [sic] to treating them fairly’.110 Supporting their editorial, the Press 
published Champion’s article on 19 September, two days after it appeared in the 
Otago Daily Times.111 On 23 September, both the Evening Post and Grey River Argus 
published the article in its entirety, prefaced by a note establishing Champion’s 
metropolitan labour credentials as a ‘delegate from the English Trades Congress’.112 
      Champion’s opening salvo against labour leaders precipitated renewed criticism 
of the Maritime Council executive in the press. Following the mould established by 
the New Zealand Herald in its May identification of ‘professional agitators’ as the 
progenitors of industrial disharmony, these attacks were grounded in the rhetoric of 
colonial consensus. Situating themselves as guardians of social order, newspaper 
editors sought to both extinguish any remaining public sympathy for labour’s 
figureheads and marginalise the intellectual and organisational leadership of a feared 
class movement. On 12 September, the New Zealand Herald ignored the Maritime 
Council’s manifesto, declaring that the strike’s leaders had ‘failed to give any reasons 
for their action that would weigh with intelligent and impartial men’. Instead, they 
surveyed their mayhem with ‘gloomy satisfaction’.113 The next day, the Otago Daily 
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Times asked ‘what is it, precisely, that is aimed at by continuing the strike?’ Aside 
from the initial disruption on 29 August, the paper considered the strike an abject 
failure and reminded John Millar of his duty to end the strike, if only to prevent 
further suffering amongst the union rank and file.114 The most strident criticism came 
from the Press, which boldly claimed that ‘the Leaders of the Unions are mainly 
responsible for what has come on the colony’. If workers had not ceded their 
autonomy to ‘self-appointed agitators’, the strike would not have occurred. Instead, 
the colony faced the ‘virtual destruction of the majority of local industries’ and a 
future stifled by ‘the autocratic rule of the Maritime Council’.115   
      In a climate hostile to organised labour, it was remarkable that unionists enjoyed 
the support of one of New Zealand’s largest newspapers, the Lyttelton Times. While 
the conservative press hounded labour leaders, the Times remained an ardent defender 
of trade unionism. In an editorial that reaffirmed the necessity of the labour 
movement, the paper remarked that the ‘touchstone of adversity’ had divested 
workers of their fair-weather friends. The ‘Tory organs of the Press from Auckland to 
Invercargill’ had shown their true colours by tacitly supporting ‘a determined 
effort...to crush all Unions’.116 The chief target of William Pember Reeves’ ire was 
the Otago Daily Times – for its perceived betrayal of the labour movement. When the 
Daily Times used its editorial column to criticise Christchurch Bishop Churchill 
Julius, for delivering a ‘purely imaginary’ sermon on ‘the tyranny and selfishness of 
capitalists who grind the faces of the poor’, the Lyttelton Times responded in kind.117 
On 7 October, the paper’s editorial expressed surprise that the Daily Times had ‘gone 
over bodily to the enemy’s camp’, despite its ‘sweating’ investigations and support 
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for the formation of a Tailoresses’ Union in 1889. If these problems were ‘purely 
imaginary’, why had Daily Times editor George Fenwick previously acknowledged 
their existence? Reeves accused the paper of distorting an ‘eloquent call for peace’ as 
an attack on capitalism.118 Fenwick’s terse reply came on 13 October, when he 
branded the Lyttelton Times’ defence of Julius as ‘spiteful, acrimonious, discourteous 
and untrue’. He acknowledged his paper’s previous support of trade unionism but 
defended the Daily Times’ new stance as a reaction to the ‘false track’ taken by a 
‘badly advised and badly led’ movement – only an enemy of labour would abide its 
leaders’ mistakes.119 
 
      While the metropolitan dailies contested the causes, magnitude, and possible 
solutions to the Maritime Strike, the pro-labour Grey River Argus maintained a local 
focus. The paper’s predominant concern was the impact of the strike on the West 
Coast economy, perilously reliant on the turbulent mining industry. The fragile truce 
that allowed the mines to reopen following the Grey Valley lockout lasted just three 
weeks. On 28 August, the Denniston miners threatened to strike if the WCC 
continued to supply Union Company vessels. The company ignored the ultimatum, 
eager to secure ‘large reductions in wages and to bring the Union to reason’, and the 
Denniston mine closed on 3 September.120 Three weeks later, the neighbouring Grey 
Valley miners ceased work when the GVCC violated an agreement not to refuel 
Union Company steamers.121 Despite widespread public concerns about fuel 
shortages, news from the region rarely featured in the press, yet its relatively small 
labour force exaggerated the impact of the shipping boycott. While employers in the 
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main centres quickly organised replacement workers, the threadbare non-union gangs 
in Greymouth were only unloading one ship per day by mid-September.122 
      However, in late September the Grey River Argus recognised the arrival of 
‘strange policemen’ in concert with the swearing in of 75 local ‘specials’ as 
indications that the ‘peaceful character’ of the dispute had ended.123 Justifying the 
paper’s fears, the following day the hastily assembled constabulary struggled to 
restrain an angry crowd of unionists from disrupting the loading of the Brunner with 
coal at Greymouth. The day’s events offered scope for a story sensationalising the 
strikers’ rowdy conduct, yet the Argus published a comprehensive summary of the 
arguments advanced by unionists at a rally two days later. The story, ‘Mass Meeting 
At Victoria Park’, spanned two pages, as the paper rejected the consensus myth in 
favour of reporting the miners’ grievances.124 Consistent with its aim of representing 
labour fairly, on 30 September the Argus re-examined the strike’s origins, explicitly 
situating the Maritime Council’s intervention as a defensive response to employer 
aggression. Compiling statements from prominent figures on both sides, the paper 
assembled a narrative indicting Australasian ship-owners for deliberately provoking 
organised labour. Concluding the article, the Argus reporter challenged ‘anyone who 
has made himself acquainted with the facts and incidents of the dispute to say the 
Maritime Council recklessly and thoughtlessly rushed into this trouble’.125 
      While the Grey River Argus strove to correct the distorted public image of the 
labour movement, it remained an organ for pragmatic reporting. By early October, the 
miners were in disarray. Food and money ran out, hardships barely alleviated by the 
meagre £200 the West Coast unions received from the Maritime Council’s Strike 
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Defence Fund.126 Initial hopes that labour shortages would force employers to 
negotiate were dashed on 3 October, when the Argus reported that 150 free labourers 
had arrived to reopen the Denniston mine. The paper believed the development 
demonstrated that, having ‘overcome the first inconvenience’, capitalists had time on 
their side. Now that non-union labour had reached even the remotest of West Coast 
mines, the Argus urged the Maritime Council to consider whether ‘they are in such a 
position as will reasonably warrant them still holding out, or whether it would not be 
more prudent to effect a compromise before it becomes too late altogether’.127 The 
warning was prescient; by 31 October, 200 men – one third of the picketing miners – 
had reapplied for work, further weakening their comrades’ situation.128 Unionism had 
no place in the new order. After accepting sharp wage cuts, the 80 successful 
applicants entered employment stripped of their union protection and customary 
privileges.129 
      As management ruthlessly exploited the miners’ two former strengths – their 
remoteness and tight organisation – news coverage of the strike rapidly dwindled. In 
late August, aggregated reporting on the strike filled around a page in the average 
metropolitan daily. Yet, after the initial shock and excitement dissipated, the quantity 
of reporting on the strike steadily decreased. In areas least affected by the strike, this 
process occurred rapidly: by mid-September the New Zealand Herald had reduced its 
strike coverage to just two columns, and a week later it was no longer a daily feature 
in the newspaper. The transition was more pronounced in the Grey River Argus, 
which reduced almost a page of strike news on 1 September to half a column by the 
end of the month. In cities with large populations of trade unionists – Wellington, 
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Christchurch, and Dunedin – the strike remained topical into October, although by the 
middle of the month most newspapers reduced their daily coverage to less than half a 
column. 
 
A Sincerity Gap? Expectations and Outcomes of the Labour Conference: 
 
Although the strike stagnated, both on the wharves and in the press, fresh 
developments still elicited newspaper reportage and commentary. By late September, 
the forthcoming Labour Conference overshadowed reporting on the pickets. 
Announced on 16 September, the conference was intended to broker an end to the 
strike. The press responded cynically to the proposal, and few thought that it would 
succeed. The Evening Post held little hope that either side would concede the debate 
over the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ shop.130 Affecting a similarly gloomy outlook, the Otago 
Daily Times claimed that ‘both sides [were] too much dependent on Australia’ for a 
reconciliation to occur.131 On 28 September, Employers’ Associations justified press 
cynicism by refusing to attend the conference unless the Maritime Council allowed its 
members to work alongside non-union labour.132 The Press applauded the 
announcement, maintaining that the ‘undoubted moral and legal right of employers to 
retain...free labour’ underpinned successful enterprise. Furthermore, labour leaders 
were accused of advocating partisan interests ahead of those of ‘that far larger portion 
of the labor market which is not included in their attempted monopoly’.133 By 
contrast, the Lyttelton Times believed the employers risked making the same ‘grave 
mistakes’ as the Railway Commissioners and Whitcombe and Tombs.134 
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      When the Labour Conference began on 1 October, both parties outlined 
entrenched positions that they refused to relinquish, nullifying the week’s 
negotiations. Speaking first, George McLean defended the Union Company’s motives 
and actions to the assembled delegates. He argued that the company paid investors 
‘reasonable’ dividends (8 to 9 per cent annually), thus had not exploited its workforce 
in pursuit of exorbitant profits. He then turned on organised labour, describing their 
insistence on the closed shop as unreasonable and insubordinate. In response, John 
Millar asserted that the Maritime Council had instigated the strike on a matter of 
principle, rather than for economic reasons – the SSOA sought to limit its employees’ 
freedom of association, a decision in which the Union Company was complicit. Yet, 
the strike reached New Zealand when the Council reluctantly responded to the 
company’s decision to hire a non-union crew on the Wairarapa. Throughout, both 
Millar and John Lomas reiterated their opposition to union labour working alongside 
non-union labour. With neither side willing to compromise, the prospect of a 
resolution quickly faded.135 On 3 October, the Evening Post summarised the 
prevailing sentiments: ‘The difference [between capital and labour] would appear so 
wide, so distinct, and so important as to preclude any other settlement than that of 
absolute surrender’.136 Neither side contemplated capitulation – the Maritime Council 
could hardly renounce the principles that had instigated the strike, while the Union 
Company attended primarily to set the terms of the unions’ surrender. Thus, the 
conference ended fruitlessly on 6 October.  
      Although the press had predicted the failure of the conference, newspaper editors 
blamed the breakdown of negotiations on labour leaders. The Evening Post believed 
that new unionism created irreconcilable tensions between labour and capital. 
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Whereas ‘the principles of old Unionism might be fairly conceded’, the Maritime 
Council sought to ‘become irresistible’ and overwhelm its enemies.137 Later criticism 
followed the mould set by the Evening Post, as newspapers attacked the stubbornness 
of organised labour, yet praised the same trait in employers. The Otago Daily Times 
condemned the labour delegation for seeking ‘terms that would impose the grossest 
humiliation on the victors’. Conversely, the paper lauded George McLean’s 
negotiation on behalf of the abstaining employers.138 Ignoring McLean’s veto of a 
proposed settlement, the New Zealand Herald commended the ‘great patience and 
moderation’ he displayed in his negotiations with the ‘impudent’ unionists.139 In a 
similar vein, the Press commended McLean’s support for the ‘open shop’ but 
demonised his fellow delegates. Once again, the paper emphasised the pernicious 
influence of the union official, describing the strike as a vendetta conducted by ‘Mr 
Millar and his co-leaders’ against ‘the producers of the colony’.140 
      The failure of negotiations in Wellington intensified criticism of John Millar in 
the press. By discrediting the Maritime Council executive, newspaper editors fostered 
the notion that socialist demagogues, rather than widespread working-class 
dissatisfaction with life in a ‘workers’ paradise’, had instigated the strike. Millar’s 
decision to continue the seamen’s strike attracted particular criticism. The Evening 
Post attempted to create a rift between the Council executive and its members, calling 
upon the remaining strikers to ignore Millar’s orders. Juxtaposed against his 
struggling cohorts, Millar was unfairly depicted as a fickle labour aristocrat, a ‘mere 
bird of passage’ who in defeat would ‘shake the dust of New Zealand off his feet and 
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leave the country’.141 Overlooking the autonomy of the Maritime Council’s members, 
the Press held Millar culpable for the attempt to ‘kill the inter-colonial trade’ and 
engineer a ‘coal famine’ in his ‘war against the producers in the colony’. The paper 
argued that a ‘handful of rash incapables’ had subverted the labour movement, 
followed not by aggrieved workers, but by an unthinking labour force that had 
unwittingly injured its future prosperity.142  
 
The ‘Reign of Terror’ – After the Maritime Strike: 
       
Coinciding with the failure of negotiations, maritime traffic stabilised and coal 
production resumed. Unable to report on commodity shortages or violent ‘outrages’, 
the newspaper editors reassigned column inches to the election campaign. Although 
the strike continued until 10 November, its progress was barely noted in the press. 
Even John Millar’s order for the remaining strikers to resume work was only reported 
by the Evening Post and Otago Daily Times.143 On 12 November, the Otago Daily 
Times celebrated the strike’s demise. Considered the ultimate expression of new 
unionism, the Maritime Strike began because trade unions had abandoned 
conciliation and fashioned a ‘distinctly aggressive character’. Having instilled ‘an 
infectious mania’ amongst its members, the Maritime Council executive embarked 
upon a premature strike, the failure of which was predicted by ‘all outsiders’. By 
contrast, the paper praised the Union Steam Ship Company, concluding that ‘their 
successful resistance of an attempted tyranny on the part of labour...rendered a 
service not only to employers, but to working men themselves’.144  
      In the aftermath of the Maritime Strike, the labour movement collapsed. A 
number of Maritime Council affiliates, notably the MOMA, Cooks’ and Stewards’ 
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Union, and regional wharf labourers’ associations, disappeared during or shortly after 
the strike, developments ignored by the press. At the wharves, employers formed 
labour bureaux that discriminated against former union members.145 In December, the 
Canterbury ASRS voted to separate from the Maritime Council, and required 
members’ donations to liquidate debts incurred during the strike.146 On the West 
Coast, blacklisting became standard – to gain employment miners had to renounce 
their union membership. In February 1891, John Lomas travelled to Victoria to attend 
an AMALA meeting convened to reorganise Australasian mining unionism. He 
returned with £200, and when the hysteria subsided, assembled the remaining West 
Coast unionists. Only 49 of 300 miners attended, and instead of sacrificing the few 
remaining loyalists, the New Zealand AMALA disbanded.147 For Lomas, defeat 
proved less ignominious. He made tentative enquiries to Union Company officials 
regarding a subsidised passage to London in late 1890, but remained in New Zealand, 
later becoming a clerk and factory inspector at the Department of Labour.148 
      The Maritime Council fared little better, dissolving after its accounts were audited 
in February 1891. With the unions they represented either disintegrating or destroyed, 
the executive disbanded to begin the slow process of rebuilding trade unionism. Size 
was no guarantee of survival. The Maritime Council’s largest affiliate, the FSU, 
suffered badly for its participation in the strike. The Auckland branch disbanded, not 
to reappear until 1897, and the Wellington and Dunedin branches were significantly 
diminished. William Belcher, FSU Secretary between 1894 and 1913, described the 
months following the strike in detail: 
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Then began what may be termed the “reign of terror”. Every conceivable device was 
brought into action to try and retard the new growth of unionism. The employers 
contended that it was their duty to stand by the “loyalists” and the strikers got little or 
no chance of work...Added to this was the large element of non-unionists who were as 
ignorant of the principles of unionism as they were of the beauties of [the] Pleiades. 
These men had to be educated. To get near them on board of ship was well nigh 
impossible, and the Union official or delegate was for many years absolutely 
prohibited from boarding a vessel. The men were also very reluctant about approaching 
the Union officers for fear of being victimised.149 
Trade unions were not the only victims of the strike’s failure. Melanie Nolan argues 
that 1890 marked both ‘the beginning and end of large scale Trans-Tasman industrial 
action’.150 Some formal Australasian labour associations survived, but the unity 
displayed by the colonial maritime labour federations in 1890 would never recur.151  
      The economic impact of the strike is difficult to quantify, but available trade 
figures suggest that it did not jeopardise the colony’s economic recovery. Although 
the total number of vessels arriving in New Zealand ports fell from 781 in 1889, to 
744 in 1890, total trade increased from £15,350,811 to £15,689,286, or by slightly 
over one shilling per capita. Despite production stoppages on the West Coast, the 
amount of coal extracted in 1890 was an increase on the previous year. 1889 saw the 
first drop in production since figures were first collected in 1878, and in 1890 total 
production rose from 586,445 tons to 637,397 tons. Seemingly, the only concession 
to the strike was a minor decrease in coal exports, from 86,405 tons in 1889, to 
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76,388 tons the following year.152 These figures belie the cause and effect arguments 
of contemporary conservatives who sought to transfer the liability for falling profits 
from capital to labour.153  
      The strike also influenced the colony’s decision to remain outside the Australian 
federation movement. Undoubtedly, the declining importance of Australasian trade 
(in 1870, Australia received 46 per cent of the total value of New Zealand exports, a 
figure that fell to 16 per cent in 1890) was the most significant reason behind New 
Zealand’s refusal to join the Australian federation.154 Yet, for many, the Maritime 
Strike reinforced suspicions that federation would disadvantage the colony. The 
notion that the strike had spread to New Zealand at the behest of Australian labour 
organisers was widely held by contemporaries. Echoing such sentiments, on 13 
September, the Otago Daily Times remarked that ‘this rude lesson’ demonstrated that 
an Australasian federation would be ‘terribly oppressive to New Zealand’.155 
Although one factor amongst many, the strike and its Australian associations 
disturbed the political elite, and deepened the ambivalence they felt towards joining 
an Australian federation.  
      For the most part, the press was complicit in the downfall of the Maritime 
Council. However, their antagonism to the emergence of a robust and assertive labour 
movement has yet to be adequately explained. Documenting similar anti-labour 
sentiments in the Australian press, Stuart Svensen argues that the phenomenon was 
primarily economic: ‘As shipping companies were a major source of advertising 
revenue, the SSOA enjoyed a near-total monopoly of support from the metropolitan 
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daily papers’.156 When applied to the New Zealand press, the theory holds little 
weight. Paid shipping news was a fixture on the front pages of all newspapers in port 
towns, regardless of their political persuasion. Although the Lyttelton Times and Grey 
River Argus published strident criticism of the Union Company, both maintained 
commercial relationships with the company. Furthermore, the Lyttelton Times’ 
circulation figures increased during the strike. The paper’s circulation figures lifted 
from 7,685 readers in July, to 7,816 in August – potentially offsetting lost advertising 
revenues and suggesting that readers shared the paper’s sympathy for the strikers.157 
It is interesting to note however, that the Maritime Council spent less than £3 on 
advertising during the strike, paling in comparison to the shipping companies’ daily 
expenditure on column space.158  
      As a general rule, Laurel Hepburn’s observation that newspapers reported news in 
a fashion consistent with the class and politics of their controllers holds weight – if 
only because these controllers almost always belonged to the elite. Nineteenth 
century newspaper proprietors and editors had the utmost faith that their enterprises 
were socially powerful and persuasive agencies.159 Thus, it was hardly surprising that 
the Press, a newspaper with a conservative tradition and newly acquired by George 
Stead, a leading figure in the capitalist strike-breaking machine, established itself as 
the strike’s leading critic. By the same token, the labour advocacy of the Lyttelton 
Times can be attributed to the political convictions of its owner-editor William 
Pember Reeves. Yet, Hepburn’s theory fails to explain the stance taken by papers like 
the Evening Post or Otago Daily Times. As Reeves noted, the Daily Times had led 
public opinion on the exploitation of female workers, and would conduct future 
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labour advocacy campaigns under George Fenwick. Thus, it cannot be considered an 
antediluvian enemy of the working-class.160 Similarly, the Evening Post had 
advocated workers’ rights earlier in the year, and despite its criticism of the Maritime 
Council, remained an opponent of the Atkinson Government. Economic and political 
locations aside, all newspapers aside from the Lyttelton Times and Grey River Argus 
deliberately employed consensus rhetoric, masking the reasons behind the largest 
strike in the colony’s history. 
      The dominant framing of the strike, as a minor disturbance to colonial consensus, 
bears similarities to the fixation on egalitarianism that has prevailed in New Zealand 
labour historiography since William Pember Reeves’ 1902 State Experiments in New 
Zealand and Australia.161 New Zealand’s colonists regarded the tight-knit, 
egalitarian, and stable agrarian society they had forged in Pacific isolation with pride 
– sentiments evident during the ‘sweating’ scandal.162 Just as early official 
publications rarely featured material that detracted from this Arcadian narrative, 
newspaper editors eagerly juxtaposed the relative comfort of workers’ wages and 
conditions with the surly rhetoric of their leaders.163 By contrast, the press never 
respected the Maritime Council’s principled opposition to the possibility of an 
enforced ‘open shop’. Elite attitudes toward organised labour were encapsulated by 
the November 1890 report of the Royal Commission on Grey Valley Mines, which 
condemned trade unions as vehicles for migrant agitators to entrench their social 
position through the exercise of ‘despotic power’.164 By relegating the extraordinary 
progress of new unionism to a brand of charlatanism practiced by charismatic leaders 
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upon misguided workers, newspaper editors carefully maintained an image of 
consensus. Yet, the production and reproduction of the egalitarian myth cannot 
merely be considered a cynical ploy of the elite. Myopic as it may seem, the majority 
of the press genuinely believed that the public would confirm their convictions at the 
forthcoming General Election by repudiating the opposition, and returning the 
Atkinson Government with a renewed mandate. 
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Chapter Four: From the Pit into Parl iament? Organised Labour 
and the General Election of 1890.  
 
After the turmoil of the Maritime Strike, the 1890 General Election presented voters 
with the opportunity to support social reform or repudiate the demands of political 
and industrial reformers. For the first time, the election was contested along rough 
party lines, with the Opposition Liberals seeking to overthrow Sir Harry Atkinson’s 
ragged government of hard-line conservatives, free-traders, and moderates. Despite 
industrial defeat, trade unions organised politically, officially supporting the Liberals 
– though the terms of their alliance varied regionally. Eager to thwart the rise of the 
‘Reds’, conservative newspapers and candidates alike ridiculed labour’s political 
ambitions, reminding voters that Opposition candidates were not ‘true’ New 
Zealanders, but dangerous radicals who had enabled the disastrous strike.1 Liberal 
newspapers and candidates internalised this position and assiduously avoided the 
landmark dispute in their speeches and manifestos. Yet, by focussing on the strike, 
instead of the unprecedented mobilisation of thousands of voters, the democratising 
impact of electoral reform, and widespread prejudices against wealthy runholders and 
landlords, conservatives underestimated the challenge they faced on polling day. 
Conversely, the liberal press sought to capitalise on trade unions’ gains by co-opting 
workers into the Opposition fold, marginalising radical voices in the process. 
Desperate to prevent vote-splitting, the Liberal ‘machine’ warned workers that an 
alliance with middle-class radicals and moderate farmers, primarily a vote for land 
and taxation reform, was the only way to prevent a ruinous conservative victory.   
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A History of the Franchise in New Zealand:  
 
After the assumption of British authority over New Zealand under the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840, a Crown appointed Governor ruled the colony. Colonial 
administration was undertaken by an appointed Executive Council, while the 
Legislative Council met sporadically to pass legislation. Early immigrants, influenced 
by British liberalism and radicalism, chafed under the autocratic rule of the Governor, 
and formed Constitutional Associations demanding self-government. Although most 
were influenced by the Westminster system they had left behind, ‘the most 
respectable [men] of every class’, from artisan radicals to educated elites contested 
the nature of any future democracy.2 Most favoured open voting and a limited 
franchise, yet some, inspired by Chartism, desired further reform – championing 
universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, and annual parliaments.3   
       After a decade of debate, the British Parliament passed the New Zealand 
Constitution Act on 30 June 1852. The Act established a General Assembly, which 
comprised a Governor, an appointed Legislative Council, and a 37 member elected 
House of Representatives. ‘Modest’ qualifications limited the franchise to males aged 
over 21, provided they owned or leased property of a certain value. Those qualified 
could vote in every district they held property. Aside from Māori, who were 
effectively disenfranchised because of communal land tenure, contemporaries 
considered New Zealand’s franchise generous, an assessment historians have 
generally accepted.4 In 1864, the Canterbury journalist and politician James 
                                                
2 Martin, The House, p.10; John Miller, Early Victorian New Zealand: A Study of Racial Tension and 
Social Attitudes 1839-1852, Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1958, p.151. 
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FitzGerald boasted, ‘there is hardly a man who cannot get a vote in New Zealand’.5 
By contemporary standards, the 1852 franchise was liberal, yet a significant 
proportion of colonists could not vote. According to the 1858 Wellington provincial 
census, 882 of 3,379 Pākehā males aged over 21 were unqualified to vote. The 
restriction prevented ‘opportunistic sojourners’ – recent immigrants and itinerant 
labourers – from disrupting colonial politics.6 
      Until the late 1870s, the franchise enshrined under the Constitution Act 1852 
expanded gradually. The Representation Act 1860 extended the vote to adult males 
who held a miners’ right (at an annual cost of £1), while the Māori Representation 
Act 1867 allowed all adult Māori males to vote in four special electorates.7 Yet, 
universal male suffrage had been introduced in South Australia, Victoria, New South 
Wales, and Queensland by 1860, and in 1867, the Second Reform Act enfranchised 
all male householders in Britain. By contrast, the New Zealand political system 
remained ‘ludicrously complicated’ – different voting qualifications applied to 
freeholders, leaseholders, rural and urban householders, lodgers, ratepayers, miners, 
and Māori.8 Voter participation was low by later New Zealand standards. Between 
1855 and 1875, voter turnout fluctuated between 46 and 61 per cent.9 Political 
instability precluded electoral reform. Between 1876 and 1879, five ministries held 
office, and legislative measures to expand the franchise were consistently defeated.   
      In December 1879, the Hall Government passed the Qualification of Electors Bill, 
granting the vote to all adult males after 12 months’ residence in the colony. Plural 
voting and the freehold qualification were retained, but proposed amendments to 
                                                
5 J.E. FitzGerald, The Representation of New Zealand, Christchurch: Press Office, 1864, p.9. 
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enfranchise women who met the property qualifications were omitted from the 
approved legislation. The new measures significantly enlarged the electorate and 
heralded the beginning of demotic, colony-wide politics. Before the Bill’s passage, 
there were 82,271 registered Pākehā voters: 71 per cent of the Pākehā male 
population. By 1881, that figure had risen to 120,972: 91 per cent of the Pākehā male 
population.10 Plural voting remained until 1889, when George Grey introduced a 
‘one-man, one-vote’ provision to the Representation Act Amendment Bill.11 Aside 
from Māori property owners, in the forthcoming election all male New Zealanders 
would be restricted to voting in a single electoral district, virtually completing the 
democratisation of the male franchise. 
 
The Political Labour Movement to 1890: 
 
New Zealand historians have traditionally amalgamated the collapse of the Maritime 
Strike in November and the December election campaign into a narrative 
documenting the rapid transition of the labour movement from an industrial to a 
political force.12 The argument overemphasises the uniqueness of 1890 at the expense 
of over ten years of working-class political action. Capitalising on the spirit of inter-
trade cooperation fostered by a series of anti-Chinese immigration rallies in early 
1879, union representatives established the Auckland Working Men’s Political 
Association (WMPA) in August. The Association, founded to ‘secure the better 
representation of the working classes in Parliament’, began life as a vehicle to 
disseminate an anti-Chinese, protectionist political agenda – the descendant of the 
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anti-immigration Working Men’s Protection Societies founded in Auckland and 
Christchurch in 1871.13              
      Two years later, Christchurch unionists established a sister organisation, pledging 
to ‘use every legitimate effort to obtain a representation of Labour in the General 
Assembly’.14 The Christchurch WMPA articulated a nuanced manifesto, combining 
liberal land and taxation policy with radical demands for triennial parliaments, an 
elected upper house, and universal manhood suffrage.15 At the landmark January 
1885 Trades and Labour Councils’ Conference in Dunedin, delegates from across 
New Zealand outlined the political aspirations of the labour movement. The 
conference passed a motion calling upon regional unions to select ‘an artisan or 
labourer’ to stand at the next election, a commitment reaffirmed at the 1886 
conference.16 The task was daunting. Of the 40 Wellington MHRs elected by 1896, 
almost 90 per cent were ‘high white collar’ (merchants, professionals, pastoralists) – 
a situation replicated across the colony.17 
      Forestalling the progress made since 1879, economic depression attenuated 
organised labour’s immediate political ambitions. By the end of 1886, all of the TLCs 
and WMPAs had collapsed as the labour movement struggled through economic 
doldrums. Undeterred by the immediate organisational vacuum, trade unions became 
an integral part of the Liberal coalition in 1890. In 1887, William Pember Reeves 
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formed the Canterbury Electors’ Association, which released a manifesto combining 
‘provincialism with a “liberal” working class policy’.18 The Association had a broad 
base, yet retained a radical flavour, denouncing the wealthy and courting working-
class voters. Reeves organised a popular ticket, winning seven seats – the core of 
which formed his ‘United Liberal’ bloc in the 1890 election.19 In Dunedin, unionists 
founded the Caversham Labour Representation Committee in 1887 to unseat the 
longstanding local MHR, Sir William Barron, after he voted against eight-hour day 
legislation. Barron retained his seat, but the Committee’s candidate, Caversham 
Borough Council President Richard Rutherford, polled strongly, securing almost 40 
per cent of the vote.20 
      The rise of organised labour in New Zealand coincided with the early 
development of party politics. As with new unionism, the desire for political reform 
emerged during the ‘Long Depression’, as New Zealanders grew disillusioned with 
their prospects of improvement. Vast rural estates, amassed by pioneering runholders, 
stifled the opportunities of a growing population eager to exploit the economic 
possibilities created by the advent of refrigerated transportation.21 Yet, as Tom 
Brooking argues, the ‘land question’ cannot be reduced to economics – concerns 
about debt repayment, productivity, wealth distribution, concentration of political 
power, and sentimental attachments all informed contemporary debates.22 To remain 
a settler society that rewarded industry with individual advancement, the colony 
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required urgent political reform. Although global economic problems brought hard 
times to the colony, the government’s capacity to address colony-wide problems 
increased during the 1880s. The end of the provincial system in 1876 saw central 
government assume responsibility for land legislation, extend its powers of taxation, 
and eventually establish departments responsible for colony-wide infrastructure, such 
as the Post Office and railways. As John Martin notes, during the centralisation of 
power, successive governments realised that state intervention was required to redress 
growing economic disparities and social unrest.23 
      Concurrent with the emergence of new political demands, the composition of the 
House of Representatives underwent a renewal. By the 1880s, politics was regarded 
as a long-term commitment – a career of hard work and service, rather than an 
esoteric, gentlemanly pursuit. A new breed of career politicians with backgrounds in 
journalism, commerce, and the professions succeeded the ‘patrician runholder bloc’ 
that had previously dominated the House. As the franchise expanded, accountability 
increased – re-election required the formation of enduring connections between the 
debating chamber and the voting public. Political speakers began touring the colony, 
while in the main centres election campaigns were organised on bloc tickets. The 
factional system of government, within which members vied for power in isolation 
from the electorate, was superseded by a form of political organisation that better 
represented voters’ concerns.24 
      At the forefront of these new trends in political organisation was the nascent 
Liberal coalition, which emerged as a coherent Opposition to the Atkinson 
Government after the 1887 election. It is important to note that the term ‘liberal’ was 
used indiscriminately in New Zealand politics; ‘everybody wanted to be known as a 
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“liberal”’, regardless of practice.25 However, the first parliamentary group to 
consistently refer to themselves as ‘Liberals’ gathered under the leadership of Sir 
George Grey in the late 1870s. Grey established Liberal Associations across the 
colony, the antecedents of an unrealised central organisation.26 David Hamer 
questions Grey's influence on the Liberal party of the 1890s, arguing that he created a 
rhetorical division between putative liberals and conservatives to serve his own 
agenda. The fall of the Stout-Vogel Government (1884-1887) crystallised divisions 
within the House, as the Stout-Vogel group entered opposition ‘more or less as a 
body’, rather than disintegrating into factions.27 Yet, emblematic of the politics of the 
era, John Ballance – a prominent minister in that Cabinet – seldom mentioned a 
Liberal party during the election campaign. Instead, he sought to emphasise the 
liberal quality of his own achievements, while distancing himself from the 
inconsistent record of the government.28 
      When the Tenth Parliament convened in October 1887, the loan-money that 
fuelled provincial competition for public works projects had evaporated, 
foreshadowing a bleak economic outlook.29 Elected during the height of the 
depression, Harry Atkinson cobbled together a ‘Scarecrow Ministry’ of free-traders, 
‘skinflints’, and moderate conservatives, united by a common antipathy to Vogel and 
a desire for retrenchment.30 From its inception, Atkinson’s premiership faced 
criticism from all sides. Despite sharing his aversion to tax increases, the ‘skinflints’ 
lambasted the continued reliance on foreign capital in the 1887 and 1888 budgets. 
Meanwhile, the Opposition disparaged Atkinson’s aversion to industrial protection 
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and commitment to retrenchment rather than financial reform. In May 1888, 
Atkinson’s decision to increase customs duties further destabilised the government. 
The provision, defended as an unavoidable revenue gathering measure, passed 
through the House, but enraged free-traders and fragmented the government.31 While 
the economy had lifted by 1889 and the government reported a small surplus, 
Atkinson’s hold over the premiership remained tenuous, especially as poor health 
curtailed his appearances in the House. Conservatives never regained their trust in 
Atkinson, and feared his unrealised, reformist ambitions, while the equally fragile 
Opposition condemned the government’s failure to alleviate the depression, address 
growing urban inequality, and Atkinson’s obstinate neutrality in the labour disputes 
that wracked the colony.32  
      As the 1890 election loomed, New Zealand seemed ‘stuck in political as well as 
economic despair’.33 With large-scale borrowing unfeasible, twenty years of pork 
barrel politics ended and allowed the development of new ‘national’ politics. 
Liberalism, with its focus on reform that transcended provincial limitations, was the 
dominant response to the new political environment.34 Yet, those outside the 
government did not resemble a cohesive Opposition until the unanimous election of 
John Ballance as leader on 20 June 1889. Significantly, a broad caucus, rather than a 
provincial bloc selected Ballance.35 David Hamer has suggested that 1880s 
parliamentarians were overwhelmingly concerned with retrenchment and stable 
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government.36 Despite sharing these common interests, Opposition MHRs 
differentiated themselves from Atkinson’s supporters on several fundamental, if 
vaguely defined issues: land and taxation reform, the nature of future retrenchment, 
and a commitment to expanding the political role of organised labour.37 
      Nevertheless, organised labour fitted uneasily into John Ballance’s plans to forge 
a robust Opposition ‘party’ that could defeat the Atkinson Government in the 1890 
general election. John Angus, in his analysis of late nineteenth century Otago politics, 
discerned two factions within the Liberal party: former supporters of the Stout-Vogel 
Government, and candidates representing organised labour. Angus argues that 
established Liberals such as Ballance and Sir Robert Stout adopted more radical 
positions to accommodate the labour faction and prevent them from splitting the vote 
by moving even further to the left. Yet, countervailing pressure from the ‘moderate 
farmer element’ tempered the radical faction within the emerging Liberal coalition.38 
Although sympathetic to workers’ concerns, Ballance’s liberalism was ‘broad based 
rather than sectional’.39 He courted the broadest possible segment of the electorate, 
and believed the election would be fought over the land question, and in particular, 
the government’s failure to promote closer land settlement. With land nationalisation 
atop his agenda, Ballance considered industrial tensions a subsidiary issue – to be 
properly addressed when land tenure reforms alleviated the chronic depression.40  
      During the previous decade, trade unions had complemented industrial action 
with political activism, a trend amplified, rather than originated, by the failure of the 
Maritime Strike. The difference between the 1890 election and previous elections was 
the decision by organised labour to seek direct parliamentary representation, rather 
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than relying solely on the uncertain support of middle-class radicals. Respected 
politicians such as Sir Robert Stout and Sir George Grey advocated working-class 
political representation, and sought to convince the public of the trade unionists’ 
responsibility and respectability, while encouraging the unionists to co-operate with 
‘public opinion’ (by which they meant the middle classes).41 The June 1890 session 
revealed the danger of depending on the established Opposition, when the Atkinson 
Government responded to the Sweating Commission report by tabling a series of 
Labour Bills. The proposed legislation anticipated, and in some areas surpassed, the 
Liberals’ future labour programme, but received little bi-partisan support.42 Early 
Closing, Eight Hours, and Bankruptcy Bills failed to pass the first reading in the 
House, while the Factories and Shops Bill was delayed in Committee until it lapsed 
when Parliament adjourned in September. The Employers’ Liability Bill and the 
Shipping and Seamen’s Act Amendment Bill passed through the House, yet the 
Legislative Council vetoed both measures.43 Atkinson’s belated attempts at industrial 
reform were hampered by a weak and divided government, a reactionary Legislative 
Council, and an Opposition content to watch the government ‘sink deeper into the 
political morass’ regardless of the consequences for labour.44  
      As with the parliamentary Opposition, no single political platform unified 
organised labour during the election campaign. Instead, the idea of a ‘Labour party’ 
as a vehicle for reform emerged organically in the urban centres.45 In October 1889, 
the Maritime Council did not explicitly promote working-class representation in 
parliament, instead choosing to ‘use its influence in support of or in opposition to any 
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bill or bills affecting maritime labour’.46 The Council exercised its lobbying power 
during its Wellington conference, when the executive met with Atkinson to discuss 
his ill-fated labour legislation. Yet, the conference also foreshadowed unionists’ 
desire for political representation. Several newspapers reported that conference 
delegates considered ‘the question of a labour platform at the next general 
election...at great length’, but failed to reach any conclusions as they struggled to 
negotiate settlements in the Shag Point and Petone Woollen Mill disputes.47 The 
urgency of industrial action over the following months hindered the development of a 
comprehensive political platform, but amid the turmoil of the Maritime Strike, a 
labour manifesto emerged.48 Importantly, mass organisations, rather than small cadres 
of middle-class radicals and labour activists (as had been the case in the 1880s), 
promulgated these new political desires.49 
     For over a year before the election, union leaders urged members to join the 
electoral roll. Yet, labour’s political activities remained confined to voter registration 
until late August 1890.50 On 23 August a gathering of Christchurch trade unionists 
established the People’s Political Association (PPA). Similar to the defunct 
Canterbury Electors’ Association, the PPA acted as a de facto Christchurch Liberal 
election committee, and articulated a platform of land and labour reform similar to 
the ‘Liberal manifesto’ published by the Lyttelton Times on 19 September. Both 
William Pember Reeves and the PPA advocated for a progressive land and income 
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tax, ensuring the availability of smallholdings for workers and farmers, continued 
public works spending, and the implementation of a new suite of labour legislation.51  
      However, tensions existed between the established Liberals and the emerging 
labour faction in the Christchurch electorate. William Pember Reeves feared that 
overt politicisation of the trade union movement would ‘driv[e] a wedge’ through the 
Liberal vote, and warned labour against over-ambition: ‘directly they go beyond this 
point [industrial activism] and form themselves into a political association, they will 
begin to lose ground with the moderate portion of the public’.52 William Tanner, a 
bootmaker and the labour candidate for the suburban Heathcote seat, objected to the 
paternalism of the middle-class radicals, arguing that ‘working men...would not be 
satisfied with “working men’s friends” but would insist on the genuine article’.53 Yet, 
such tensions did not prevent the labour faction and the established Opposition from 
uniting behind a joint ticket: incumbents Reeves, R.M. Taylor, and W.B. Perceval 
stood in the city electorate; Tanner in Heathcote; W. Hoban (ASRS President) in 
Kaiapoi; and John Joyce (journalist and incumbent MHR) in the Akaroa electorate.54 
No candidate was selected to contest the Avon seat – perhaps to increase the chance 
that Edwin Blake, the incumbent, could defend the seat against George Stead. 
      Shortly after the formation of the Christchurch PPA, the Otago TLC held a 
meeting in conjunction with the Maritime Council, and formed the Labour 
Parliamentary Committee (LPC). Although the older craft unions protested the 
politicisation of the labour movement, most Dunedin unions sent representatives. Sir 
Robert Stout refused to stand as a labour candidate, and the LPC selected David 
Pinkerton (Otago TLC President), William Earnshaw (a brass-founder), and William 
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Dawson (a wealthy brewer) to stand in the city electorate. The trio, funded by the 
TLC, campaigned on a platform of industrial protection, labour legislation, public 
works spending, and the introduction of a progressive land and income tax.55 Notably 
absent from the agenda was fragmenting the large estates, the cornerstone of 
Ballance’s campaign. Erik Olssen examined the complicated relationship urban 
workers had with the land question in his discussion of class in late nineteenth 
century New Zealand. Although some aspired to become farmers, ‘it is far from clear 
that the enthusiasm for breaking up the great estates invariably meant a desire for 
land’.56 In the Otago Workman, Samuel Lister gave three reasons why urban workers 
benefited from land reform. Breaking the runholders’ estates would cement the 
Liberal alliance between unionists and small farmers, diminish the power of the 
wealthy monopolists who had conspired to defeat the Maritime Strike, and settle the 
itinerant rural labourers who had been mobilised as strike-breakers.57 Contrary to the 
Liberals’ populist ambitions, indignation with the crushing defeat of the Maritime 
Strike fuelled labour politics in Dunedin.58  
      As in Christchurch and Dunedin, the Wellington TLC provided the organisational 
impetus for the articulation of a workers’ political platform. After a meeting on 3 
October, the Council printed pamphlets outlining a ‘wage-earners’ manifesto’.59 The 
manifesto called for candidates seeking wage-earners’ votes to support the breaking 
of large estates via a programme of legislation and taxation, cessation of Crown land 
sales, preservation of the current education system, industrial protectionism, foreign 
labour restrictions, and the transition to an elected Legislative Council.60 The TLC 
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also selected a list of candidates to contest the city’s electorates, all of whom were 
jointly endorsed by the Liberal party. William McLean (Secretary of the Empire Loan 
Company), T.K. MacDonald (WWC Chairman), and F.H. Fraser (a city councillor) 
contested the city electorate, while G.T. London, later mayor of Petone, stood in the 
Hutt seat.61 Protesting the apparent hegemony of the skilled workers, the city’s 
seamen and wharf labourers nominated MacDonald, George Fisher (the Liberal 
incumbent) and Robert Winter (former member of the Canterbury ASRS executive) 
as an alternative ticket. Attempts to unify the competing factions failed, and on 5 
December Wellington voters had the opportunity to support five labour candidates.62  
      Under the aegis of the United Labour Election Committee (ULEC), Auckland 
trade unionists released a political platform on 1 November 1890. Written by the 
radical journalist Arthur Desmond, the manifesto endeavoured ‘to make our island 
home an island Commonwealth’ by emancipating labour through a series of ‘clearly 
defined proposals for reform’. The five-point programme called for a one per cent 
land tax to replace the existing property tax; an end to Crown land sales; a minimum 
wage attached to all government contracts; railway management reform; and the 
institution of a State Bank of Issue.63 As in Christchurch, the labour and Liberal 
parties maintained close associations. Desmond was a protégé of Sir George Grey, 
and on 12 November the ULEC voted unanimously to support Grey’s Central 
Electioneering Committee, and agreed to select a joint ticket to contest the city 
electorate – alongside Grey (who retired from public life on 24 November, replaced 
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by the manufacturer J.M. Shera), they selected two lawyers, W.L. Rees and W.J. 
Napier.64 
 
Climbing the Hustings: 
 
John Ballance returned to Whanganui to begin his election campaign immediately 
after the parliamentary session ended on 17 September. His urgency was motivated 
by the desire to gain an early advantage over his opponents. Custom dictated that the 
premier open the election campaign, but Atkinson’s heart condition prevented him 
from campaigning until early November.65 Opening with a speech at the Oddfellows’ 
Hall on 23 September, Ballance defended his policy in Opposition, attacked the 
record of a ‘dead’ government, and outlined the legislative programme of a future 
Liberal administration.66 Unsurprisingly, the cornerstone of Ballance’s agenda was 
land reform, the sine qua non of individual and colonial improvement. Land 
monopolists bore the brunt of his ire: ‘As sure as night follows day, so sure will it be 
found that these estates will be subdivided and disposed of, and for every one man at 
present there will be ten in the future’.67 Ballance offset his radical, double pronged 
attack (via graduated taxation and compulsory purchasing schemes) on the wealthy, 
with an equivocal stand on the colony’s labour troubles. Although he ‘strongly 
condemned’ the Railway Commissioners’ draconian response to dissent, he 
emphasised the undesirability of the Maritime Strike and the consequent necessity of 
a state arbitration system. Displaying a populist streak, Ballance noted with pride that 
his Opposition had united with the ‘skinflints’ to force retrenchment on the 
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government. Concluding the address, he stressed the unity and discipline within the 
Liberal ranks – alluding to the fractured government and the necessity of strong, 
stable leadership.68 
      The premier’s silence, and public uncertainty regarding the election date muted 
the press response to Ballance’s speech.69 However, initial impressions served as a 
useful political barometer. Although the Evening Post criticised the Atkinson 
Government, the paper showed little affection for John Ballance. Earlier in the year it 
had described his leadership as ‘very disorganised’ and on 24 September reported that 
Ballance’s speech ‘contain[ed] nothing to induce even the most strenuous opponent 
of the present Government to cherish a hope that any improvement in policy or 
administration’ would ensue if he became premier.70 When the Wanganui Herald 
defended Ballance’s actions, the Post accused the paper of playing ‘Mr. Puff’ and 
‘interpreting the meaning behind’ the Opposition leader’s oracular comments.71 The 
Press expressed similar sentiments, deriding Ballance for hiding his deficiencies 
behind the ‘old quack nostrum of graduated land tax’. Yet, the paper’s management 
was split between the desire to scare voters away from the Liberals and fostering 
disharmony within the party’s ranks. In the week after Ballance began his campaign, 
the Press accused him of giving ‘his approval to the proceedings of the Trade 
Unionists’, yet drew attention to the disjuncture between his ‘large professions of 
sympathy’ with the embattled unionists, and his equivocation over the origins of the 
Maritime Strike.72  
      For most newspapers, Ballance delivered his speech into a political vacuum. The 
Maritime Strike still monopolised headlines, and following the close of the 
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parliamentary session, the press anticipated the collapse of the hastily arranged labour 
conference. Few candidates began campaigning so soon after Parliament had 
adjourned, and confusion reigned regarding the cohesion of the Liberal ‘party’ and 
the role of labour in the election. The New Zealand Herald framed the election as a 
contest between two roughly formed parties, postulating that ‘the victory of the 
Opposition would be a period of office for Stout, Ballance, Fish [member for 
Dunedin South], Fisher [member for Wellington East], and Seddon’.73 Emphasising 
the fragility of the Liberal-labour axis, on 2 October the Herald introduced a regular 
column informing readers of the alignment of all candidates standing for election. 
Ignoring the factional nature of Atkinson’s government, the Herald aggregated 
conservative candidates under the monolithic bloc of ‘Government Supporters’, while 
offering separate listings for ‘Oppositionists’, ‘Labour’ candidates, and those of either 
‘Independent’ or ‘Doubtful’ political leanings.74 By contrast, the Otago Daily Times 
dismissed suggestions that organised parties had superseded factional politics, 
reporting that ‘the total absence of well defined party lines...renders all political 
forecasts necessarily vague and unsatisfactory’.75 
      While Ian Merrett’s claim that labour issues were incidental to the election is 
exaggerated, most newspapers struggled to arrive at a nuanced political framing of 
the colony’s recent labour troubles.76 Early in the election campaign, the spectre of 
the Maritime Strike was unsophisticatedly portrayed as an insurmountable block to 
the political ambitions of organised labour. Many voters distrusted trade unions, yet 
the coincidence of significant electoral reform with the emergence of a powerful 
labour movement remained a phenomenon unexamined by contemporaries. The 1889 
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amendments to the Representation Act had reduced the number of Pākehā MHRs 
from 91 to 70, primarily at the expense of urban seats, and increased the ‘country 
quota’ from 18 to 28 per cent.77 Yet, George Grey’s ‘one-man, one-vote’ provision 
eliminated almost 30,000 multiple registrations, a change significant enough to shift 
the balance of power against presumably conservative landholders in marginal seats 
such as New Plymouth, Wanganui, Waitotara, and Masterton.78 Regardless of the 
strike’s outcome, the surge in trade union membership had created powerful urban 
voting blocs that would influence the outcome of a tight election. Whether out of 
naïveté, or the desire to suppress or ignore the ambitions of the politically ambitious 
unionists, the metropolitan newspapers rarely presented their readers with useful 
analyses of the changing political environment. 
      The New Zealand Herald editorial on 4 October exemplified newspapers’ 
underestimation of labour politics. While surprised by the level of labour 
participation in the election campaign, the paper suspected it would prove futile, as 
the Maritime Strike had aroused reactionary sentiments ‘throughout every 
constituency’. Reminding undecided voters of the complicity between labour and the 
Liberals, the paper noted ‘so far as the “labour party” have any influence it will be 
given to the Opposition’.79 In a similar vein, the Otago Daily Times argued that 
organised labour had rejected ‘humanitarian reforms’ in favour of ‘imaginary ideals’ 
aimed at provoking social revolution. Labour leaders’ aggression ‘towards the whole 
community outside unionism’ suggested that ‘the election [would] naturally turn to a 
large extent upon issues arising out of the strike’.80 The Grey River Argus refrained 
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from emphasising the futility of organised labour’s ambitions, if only because it 
believed that ‘the dark horse of the labor party is not yet in evidence – it may never 
be, even, though there is no scarcity of time in which to make political 
combinations’.81    
      Newspapers adopted a similarly acerbic tone on the rare occasions on which they 
published commentaries on organised labour’s political agenda. In a long editorial on 
6 October, the Evening Post concurred with the Wellington TLC’s diagnosis of the 
colony’s problems – specifically ‘population exodus’, ‘the disturbed relations 
between labour and capital’, and the necessity of preventing another term of ‘ill-
judged legislation and inefficient administration’. The paper accepted the necessity of 
land and taxation reforms to end ‘the aggrandisement of the few at the expense of the 
many’, but rejected the cessation of Crown land sales. Industrial protection and 
immigration restriction were deemed economically disastrous, while progressive 
taxation would unfairly burden capitalists and slow the economy. Similarly, the Post 
argued that the demand for an elected Legislative Council displayed the unionists’ 
‘want of acquaintance with the principles of representative government and 
constitutional law’. Discouraging readers from electing radical candidates, the paper 
concluded by listing its ideal parliamentarian: ‘He must be able to command the 
respect and confidence of other members, or his influence...is likely to be very small, 
and his power in Parliament a myth’.82 
      Consistent with its earlier division of organised labour into two disparate factions, 
on 18 October the New Zealand Herald examined the ‘split’ between the colony’s 
‘best working men’ and their leaders. The paper argued that the Maritime Strike 
alienated the majority of ‘unionists pure and simple’, who were now ‘very sceptical 
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about labour leaders and labour candidates’. By contrast, the Herald depicted labour 
leaders as avaricious anarchists, eager to ‘destroy land values...[and] rob the present 
owners by means of a land tax’.83 The Press concurred, arguing that having failed to 
crush local industries, union leaders seemed ‘bent upon trying their hand on the 
agricultural community’, while the Otago Daily Times believed they leaned ‘towards 
social revolution’.84 The accusations were misleading – land reform was an urgent 
concern, championed by the press, the Opposition, and many in government.85 That 
the Herald and Press considered the ‘land question’ an unpopular attack on the 
wealthy testified to the dogmatic conservatism of the papers’ management, and their 
alienation from the wider electorate. 
      Although campaigning began in late September, detailed accounts of candidates’ 
speeches rarely featured in the press. Editors, however, made exceptions for 
candidates whose rhetoric aligned with their ideological sensibilities. When Edwin 
Jellicoe, an independent candidate in the Wellington electorate, delivered a speech at 
the Opera House on 15 October, the Evening Post reprinted his criticism of the 
Maritime Council and ran an editorial praising his ‘masterly’ assessment of the recent 
strike. Jellicoe, an ex-adviser to John Millar, criticised the actions of his former 
associate, arguing that Millar had prolonged the New Zealand strike on Australian 
orders.86 Although Jellicoe was unlikely to win one of the Wellington seats, the New 
Zealand Herald also deemed his address worthy of publication. On 16 October the 
paper reported on the speech, emphasising his scorn for ‘the actions of J.A. Millar 
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with regard to the labour difficulty’.87 In Christchurch, the Press utilised a similar 
tactic, publishing a speech critical of organised labour given by the former Minister 
of Justice, William Rolleston. Claiming that he could see no reason for the strike, 
Rolleston argued that trade unions had ‘gone outside...the course laid down by the 
best men who had been foremost’ in their formation.88 Two days later, the paper’s 
editorial praised Rolleston’s tough stance on organised labour and reiterated its 
condemnation of the Maritime Council’s decision to instigate and prolong the 
Maritime Strike.89  
 
Demonstrating Solidarity: 
 
The advent of a colony-wide labour ‘Demonstration Day’ on 28 October offered a 
brief respite from the slow building coverage of the election campaign. Prompted by 
the European and American May Day demonstrations organised at the Second 
International, in May the Maritime Council instituted a holiday to celebrate the 
achievements of New Zealand workers.90 28 October 1890 was not only the first 
anniversary of the Council’s formation, but also the fiftieth anniversary of Wellington 
workers’ proclamation that ‘8 hours shall be the working day, and that anyone 
offending shall be ducked in the harbour’.91 ‘Eight-hour’ demonstrations had been 
held in Auckland and Dunedin during the early 1880s, yet falling attendances saw 
annual parades abandoned in 1887.92 Premier Atkinson gazetted a notice closing all 
government offices for the day, but Demonstration Day was not a public holiday. 
While councils in Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin afforded workers a day’s 
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holiday as a gesture of goodwill, employers pressured the Auckland TLC to postpone 
the demonstration until the Prince of Wales’ Birthday on 10 November. Furthermore, 
by late October the impending collapse of the Maritime Strike cast a pall over the 
planned festivities. Nevertheless, the Demonstration Day proceedings were not the 
funerary march that Neill Atkinson uncharitably described.93 Held six weeks before 
the election, labour leaders believed that the celebrations gave workers an opportunity 
to ‘assert their moral and political equality by peacefully organising public space’. 
Well-organised public spectacles demonstrating workers’ unity, respectability, and 
decency would counteract the misconception that the working classes were idle, 
drunk, and degenerate.94 
      Despite the Maritime Council’s best intentions, elements within the press 
remained wary of organised labour. The Evening Post believed that the spectre of the 
strike altered the tone of the festivities. When the Council deliberated a labour 
holiday in May, ‘the aims of Trade Unionism, so far as they were apparent to the 
public were legitimate’. By attacking the colony’s industrial base, the Post reminded 
readers that unions had jeopardised their tenuous claim to legitimacy. Accordingly, 
the events of 28 October were considered an unwelcome reminder of a ‘struggle 
entered upon without justification, directed without wisdom, illegitimate in its object, 
[and] hopeless from its very inception’.95 The Otago Daily Times hoped the holiday 
would serve as ‘a symbol of peace’, but dismissed trade unionism as ‘little more 
than...a power for working mischief’. Undermining its assertion that the 
demonstration signalled a positive future for unionism, the paper identified the 
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exclusion of bankers, company directors, and merchants from the Dunedin parade as 
evidence of ‘the existence of a schism’ within the labour movement.96     
      Aware of the scrutiny that public demonstrations attracted, labour leaders worked 
tirelessly to ensure the day’s success. Workers across the country participated in 
street parades, sports, and variety concerts – a morale boosting show of vitality amid 
hard times. Over 3,000 workers joined the parade in Dunedin, each trade marching in 
work clothes under its own banner. Later, 11,000 attended the sports and banquet 
held at the Caledonian Ground. Christchurch unionists turned out in equal force, with 
2,000 workers marching to Addington, where 8,000 enjoyed a day of sports and 
dancing.97 In Wellington, 1,500 workers marched from the Government Buildings to 
Newtown Park, led by Samuel Parnell, the 80-year-old founder of the eight-hour 
movement, while ‘pride of place’ was given to local Maritime Council members.98 
Before a crowd of 4,000 in Newtown, Parnell argued for ‘a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and a consequent enjoyment of the world by bona fide 
producers’. Reporting on the procession, the Evening Post eschewed the bitterness of 
its prior editorial, describing the day’s events as ‘successful’.99 The Lyttelton Times 
was more effusive, arguing that the ‘unexpectedly complete success of the Labour 
holiday’ demonstrated the best attributes of trade unionism, while employers’ 
acquiescence with the celebrations displayed the stability of New Zealand society.100 
 
An Election Without Issues? 
 
Hopes that the peaceful demonstrations would engender a sense of goodwill towards 
trade unionism were soon dashed. Unable to find fault with the Demonstration Day 
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celebrations, the press renewed its criticism of organised labour’s increased political 
engagement. On 29 October, a meeting held at the Wellington Opera House by the 
independent candidate John Duthie disbanded ‘amidst great confusion’ as sections of 
the audience refused to let him speak. In an editorial the following day, the Evening 
Post mourned the absence of the ‘spirit of fair play’ that tempered the excesses of 
even the rowdiest ‘British mob’. Arguing that the ‘uproar was evidently the result of 
organisation’, the paper claimed the ‘leaders of the falsely so-called labour party’ 
were responsible, a charge labour leaders denied.101 Despite admitting that the 
purported instigators of the unrest ‘had not the courage to appear personally on the 
scene’, their complicity went unquestioned by the Post, which urged ‘the respectable 
portion of the electorate...to assert their strength’ by repudiating labour candidates.102 
A masterpiece of insinuation, the report implicated organised labour in an 
orchestrated attempt to sabotage a political meeting, without providing evidence to 
support the accusation. On 31 October, the Grey River Argus provided a less 
sensational account of the meeting, described from the outset as ‘particularly lively’. 
Its report noted that jeering began after Duthie had ‘raised the wrath of a large section 
of the audience’ by attacking popular Liberal candidate George Fisher, a detail 
omitted by the Evening Post.103 Other reports implicated Duthie’s supporters in the 
fracas; during the disruption they mounted the stage, cheering and waving their hats 
and handkerchiefs – further enraging the audience.104 
      In the days following Duthie’s address, the Evening Post’s sensational framing set 
the tone for press coverage of the incident. In an article entitled ‘The Tactics of the 
Labour Party’, the New Zealand Herald published selections from editorials on the 
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fracas, intended to display the ‘intensity of disgust’ the disturbance had provoked.105 
While the Press admitted that the ‘circumstantial correctness’ of its report could not 
be verified, it expressed satisfaction that unionists had revealed the division between 
themselves and those who represented ‘law and order’. Once aware of the unionists’ 
anarchic intent, the paper argued that ‘every lover of fair play, good order, and sound 
legislation’ was duty bound to vote against ‘any man who seeks the labour vote’.106 
Reporting on a similar interruption to a Dunedin meeting, the Otago Daily Times 
believed ‘the recent disturbances’ represented a vulgar new trend. The only solace to 
be taken from the incident was the satisfaction ‘that they [the labour party] will pay 
the penalty for these offences at the polls’.107 
      The disruption of a Wellington public meeting was easily construed as 
metonymic of wider colonial problems. The incident confirmed established public 
prejudices about labour. These prejudices were exploited in order to portray the 
Wellington ‘rowdies’ as representative of their class and its anarchic intent. 
Newspapers eagerly constructed binary oppositions between the ‘organised 
rowdyism’ exhibited by purported trade unionists, and a set of idealised colonial 
values – ‘fair play’, class harmony, courtesy, moderation, and orderliness – embodied 
by the aggrieved Duthie.108 The definition of a desirable New Zealand character 
broke with previous coverage of labour issues in 1890. During the unrest of the 
preceding six months, newspapers emphasised the objectionable aspects of the labour 
movement – self-interest, radicalism, class antagonism, ignorance, and greed – yet 
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failed to articulate viable alternatives.109 Faced with a reminder that the mass politics 
of new unionism had not faded with the demise of the Maritime Strike, newspapers 
reacted by accentuating the threat to an orderly society. Whether the disruption of 
Duthie’s meeting was planned or simply the response of a hostile crowd to a 
candidate’s misjudgement, the reaction to the incident emphasised elite fears 
regarding demotic politics. As during previous industrial disputes, the working 
classes were characterised as malleable and ignorant, just as easily swayed by deviant 
agitators as they were influenced by the exemplary conduct of men like Duthie, or 
indeed, newspaper editorials. 
      The horrified response to the interruption of a minor political address also 
revealed the unease wrought by the absence of strong political leadership during a 
period of uncertainty. Following the end of the parliamentary session, Premier 
Atkinson ‘seemed to have withdrawn from political reality altogether’. He contested 
the Egmont seat without enthusiasm; prevented from campaigning by his heart 
condition, Atkinson secluded himself at his New Plymouth estate.110 On 6 November, 
45 days after John Ballance began his campaign, the premier released his election 
manifesto to the press. In a lengthy address, Atkinson reminded voters of the 
government’s achievements: the conversion of a £500,000 deficit into a £36,500 
surplus in three years, reducing the number of MHRs from 95 to 74, promoting closer 
land settlement, freeing the railways from political interference, and fostering closer 
relations with the Australian colonies. On the Maritime Strike, Atkinson subscribed 
to the consensus interpretation, stressing the ‘danger and unwisdom of our local 
unions being so connected with outside associations’. Atkinson’s rhetoric was tired 
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and regressive – the difficulties of leading a fractured government had exhausted his 
desire for reform. If elected, he pledged ‘to steadily follow the course we have 
entered upon’, promising no further retrenchment, no additional spending, no taxation 
reform, and no labour legislation. Instead, he presented the absence of ‘political or 
financial fireworks’ as an exercise in prudence and virtue.111  
      Sir Harry Atkinson’s bland manifesto provoked fierce reaction in the press. 
Conservative newspapers lauded Atkinson’s muted approach as a necessary 
corrective to the turbulence of the previous year. The Press believed that ‘the great 
majority of colonists’ shared his aversion to ‘sensational proposals’, and lauded a 
manifesto ‘worthy of the author and the occasion’. Yet the paper offered little 
comment on Atkinson’s future plans, instead using its editorial to praise the austerity 
he displayed during his tenure as Treasurer, and offer its support in obstructing the 
‘revolutionary project’ of taxation reform.112 Casting Atkinson’s apathy as 
expediency, the Otago Daily Times argued that his late entry into the election 
campaign limited the ‘agony of electioneering’ suffered in 1887. For the Daily Times, 
his caution represented a healthy medium between the ‘skinflints’ and the Liberals. 
While admitting that Atkinson’s policy was ‘excessively stolid’, the paper recognised 
the impediments to further retrenchment and the necessity of future borrowing, and 
hailed the manifesto as ‘a piece of statecraft such as no other man in the colony could 
give us’.113 Despite his much-admired prudence, Atkinson attracted criticism from the 
‘skinflint’ right. While the New Zealand Herald branded his address ‘the most 
important manifesto of the impending electoral campaign’, it expressed concern that 
                                                
111 ibid.; ODT, 6 November 1890, p.4. 
112 Press, 7 November 1890, p.4. 
113 ODT, 7 November 1890, p.4. 
 
 
 
135 
without future retrenchment and tax cuts, the colony would suffer another exodus of 
settlers and capital.114 
      For the liberal press, the premier’s manifesto bespoke his age, health, and 
diminishing political influence. The Lyttelton Times believed the address revealed a 
man ‘without health, without heart, [and] without party’. Reviewing a woeful final 
year in office, the Times dismissed Atkinson’s parsimony as a smokescreen for his 
‘feeble conservatism’.115 The Grey River Argus treated Atkinson with greater 
hostility, accusing him of giving ‘no indication whatever that...legislation of any kind 
can improve the position of the colony’. Frustration with his taxation policy, rather 
than his approach to labour issues, predominated, with the paper branding his 
opposition to income taxation a ploy to ‘spare the pockets of [his] friends—the 
landholders’.116 The premier’s reluctance to address the ‘land problem’, either by 
legislation or implementing punitive taxation provided another focal point for his 
detractors. His satisfaction with the colony’s ‘gradual’ settlement was seized upon by 
the Evening Post as evidence of his isolation from the electorate. Lambasting his 
administration’s ‘failure to provide means for gratifying...[settlers’] earnest desire’ to 
settle the land, the paper argued that he would best serve the colony by leading the 
Opposition.117 
 
      Although the antagonistic spirit engendered by the premier’s opening address 
reinvigorated coverage of the election campaign, labour issues were overshadowed by 
the colonial obsession with land. Given the preponderance of union-backed 
candidates in the Wellington city electorate, the TLC manifesto surprisingly omitted 
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eight-hour or compulsory arbitration legislation. On the hustings, candidates focussed 
on ‘breaking’ the estates. In speeches featured in the Evening Post on 7 and 15 
November, T.K. MacDonald addressed the ‘land question’ – advocating for the 
acquisition of ‘vast tracts’ of Māori land and criticising the government’s failure to 
prevent wealthy speculators from elevating land prices beyond the reach of 
smallholders and settlers.118 Land reform also dominated the agendas of the 
Wellington TLC’s other candidates, F.H. Fraser and William McLean. At his first 
electoral address on 13 November, Fraser’s remarks predominantly concerned 
graduated land taxation, land nationalisation, and education reform, followed by a 
cursory endorsement of any future eight-hour legislation.119 Following the example of 
his fellow candidates, William McLean also neglected to mention the Maritime 
Strike, instead reiterating the consistency of his support for land reform and accusing 
Atkinson of putting the colony ‘entirely at the mercy of those who owned the greater 
part of the wealth’.120  
      Mirroring the impact of the Maritime Strike, the salience of ‘traditional’ labour 
issues to the election varied regionally. While North Island labour candidates directed 
their ire at already unpopular targets – the premier and his wealthy supporters – 
labour politicians assumed more combative roles in Christchurch and Dunedin. These 
tactics were partially stimulated by their location in electorates with larger 
populations of trade unionists, but also emerged as a response to greater press 
hostility. However, as W.J. Gardner has noted, Canterbury candidates were hardly 
loquacious about industrial relations.121 At PPA meetings, Reeves, Perceval, and 
Taylor routinely described themselves as ‘thorough believer[s] in Unionism’ as a 
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vehicle for working-class empowerment, despite expressing their reservations with 
the strike as a bargaining tactic.122 Hoping to destabilise the popular ticket, the Press 
eagerly reported on inconsistencies in their political pronouncements. On 18 
November, the paper attacked Taylor’s proposed foreign bondholders tax. Dredging 
up Reeves’ statement that anyone considering the idea ‘ought to be booted out of the 
country’, the paper accused him of hypocrisy for standing on a ticket that included 
Taylor.123 Speaking the following day, Reeves reaffirmed the solidarity of the PPA 
ticket. Turning on the Press, he boasted that if the foreign bondholders’ tax was the 
largest division it could discern amongst the trio ‘it shewed...that for all practical 
purposes the three gentlemen who had come together to carry the Christchurch seats 
were united in opinion’.124 
      The Press’ attempt to split the liberal vote in Christchurch justified William 
Pember Reeves’ fears. As editor of the Lyttelton Times, he opposed the formation of 
an independent ‘labour party’, warning against the dilution of the left-leaning vote. 
He justified the PPA’s decision to ask the electorate to return all three candidates with 
the argument that his opponents ‘ask for the votes of Liberal electors, but [stand] – 
consciously or otherwise – in the conservative interest’.125 Reeves also used the 
Lyttelton Times to attack rival candidates. Responding to a speech by the Ministerial 
candidate for Christchurch, E.W. Humphreys, Reeves declared that Humphreys had 
misled his audience by asserting that he had supported the failed Eight Hours Bill. 
‘Unfortunately he did oppose it...[h]e was one of those who the session before last 
helped to kill it’.126 Reeves believed that the conservative influence extended beyond 
false claims of sympathy with trade unions. On 25 November, he published a robust 
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editorial defending the ‘radical candidate’ for Heathcote, William Tanner, from 
vicious rumours spread by ‘unauthorised partisans’. The Lyttelton Times reported that 
a rumour had been circulating suggesting a vote for Tanner would effectively 
disenfranchise the electorate, as the other MHRs would not tolerate ‘the presence 
among them of an artisan’. Dismissing the claim, the paper declared that any ‘good, 
thoughtful, working-man candidate...has every right to appeal to any New Zealand 
constituency where he has friends’.127 
      While aspiring politicians assiduously avoided reference to the Maritime Strike, 
its spectre was felt strongly in Port Chalmers. In a symbolic re-enactment of the 
strike, the seat was contested by John Millar, the primary figure associated with the 
rise of new unionism, and James Mills, the incumbent member and Managing 
Director of the Union Company – the largest employer in the electorate. Millar stood 
reluctantly, either out of a sense of duty, or as an expression of defiance. Directed at 
‘working men’, his speeches advocated Liberal land, taxation, and education policies, 
and he withheld comment on the strike.128 Neither his opponent nor the press shared 
such reticence. In a snide report on the Port Chalmers race, the New Zealand Herald 
asserted that ‘the labour vote is not unanimous’ and warned Millar ‘that many of his 
apparent supporters are apparent only’.129 The Otago Daily Times contended that 
Millar ought to ‘keep perfectly quiet’ given his orchestration of a ‘disaster upon the 
whole community’. Millar’s candidacy saw him accused of using the strike as ‘a 
stepping stone to personal advancement’.130 By contrast, Mills examined the strike at 
‘very great length’, blaming Millar and his executive for fabricating a pretext to 
‘figh[t] capital’, an outrage to be remedied with strict legislative restrictions on trade 
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unions.131 Inevitably, the ‘the most unpopular...man in New Zealand’ lost to a man 
with ‘almost feudal’ ties to the electorate, yet Millar had proven to be as gifted a 
politician as he was an organiser.132 On 5 December he reduced Mills’ margin of 
victory by two-thirds, and cultivated a core of loyal supporters that would see him 
take the seat in 1893.133   
 
Calling out the Vote: 
 
In the week before the election, newspapers rallied support for favoured candidates 
while endeavouring to sabotage opponents’ chances of election. Ever fearful of 
divisions emerging within the Liberal-labour coalition, the Lyttelton Times published 
the Canterbury TLC’s manifesto on 1, 4, and 5 December. Instructing ‘the working-
men of Canterbury’ to vote for Liberal candidates, it argued that ‘any division of the 
liberal party vote’ would ensure a conservative victory. Only in solidarity could 
workers free themselves from ‘the monster...then crush it out of existence’.134 
William Pember Reeves reiterated the warning in emotive editorials on 4 and 5 
December. The latter, addressed to ‘Liberals of Canterbury!’ reminded voters that 
Atkinson had placed the burden of taxation on the ‘poorer classes’, and ‘locked up’ 
the country ‘against the toiling masses’, prompting the exodus of 1888. Reeves 
concluded by commanding liberals to do their ‘duty’ by voting for land, labour, and 
taxation reform.135 
      While the Lyttelton Times sought to heighten perceptions of the colony’s 
stagnation, other newspapers dampened such fears, maintaining that consensus 
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remained the default setting in New Zealand politics. The Otago Daily Times insisted 
that unlike the 1887 election, there was no ‘real party fight going on’ and ‘no great 
questions of policy’ to consider. Challenged by an Opposition caucus populated by 
‘the dregs of one of the worst Administrations New Zealand has known’ in an 
election devoid of substance, the Daily Times asserted that the Atkinson Government 
was entitled to the confidence of the electorate.136 These sentiments were not 
confined to the conservative press; Atkinson’s opponents offered comparable 
synopses of the campaign. The Grey River Argus mourned the ‘sameness’ of local 
candidates’ speeches, in an ‘almost monotonous’ election. In the Grey constituency, 
voters were compelled to ‘choose the least of two evils’, as the paper found little 
between the two purportedly liberal candidates, save for personality.137 Similarly 
ambivalent, the Evening Post remarked, ‘there is not really any political principle 
before the constituencies on the present occasion’. Dismissing the taxation debate as a 
matter of expediency on both sides, the paper nevertheless argued that ‘the present 
ministry is not one which we think can...safely be continued in office’.138 
      If the conservative press were to be believed, radicals and agitators obstructed the 
colony’s path to economic growth and social harmony. Under this paradigm, the 
popular clamour for land and taxation reform was dismissed as the invidious 
scheming of vengeful union leaders. Yet by early December, the conservatives 
realised that labour would influence the outcome of a tight election. Newspapers that 
had rejected the notion of cohesive political parties replaced condescending columns 
asserting the colony’s revulsion against unionism, with warnings that portrayed the 
colony’s loosely organised labour platforms as a threatening colony-wide coalition. 
On 3 December, the New Zealand Herald identified the emergence of ‘Labour 
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candidates’ as a novel feature of the campaign. Led by ‘King Millar’, trade unionists 
were ‘inexplicably’ opposed to Sir Harry Atkinson, and saw land reform as a tool to 
cripple the wealthy.139 The Otago Daily Times described the ‘party’s’ policy as the 
self-interested and antagonistic advancement of a working-class agenda, a single-
mindedness that the paper had not identified in either the skinflints or the Railway 
Commissioners.140 Such arguments were wholly disingenuous; as Jim McAloon has 
noted, many wealthy candidates advocated liberal policies before and during the 1890 
campaign.141 By identifying labour as the driving force behind the year’s tribulations, 
editors maintained the fantasy that the status quo could, and would, survive.  
      Conservative panic coloured Election Day editorials. Despite ridiculing the PPA 
throughout the campaign, the Press worried that the Liberal-labour coalition would 
repeat its 1887 success, printing voting instructions above its final pre-election 
editorial. Fearing ‘mistakes’, the paper reminded electors to ‘strike out’ the names of 
‘the so-called “Liberal Trio”’, vote for the Ministerial candidates E.W. Humphreys 
and J.T. Smith, and ‘not exercise their third vote’.142 The Herald published a similar 
guide, instructing readers to elect a ticket of two Ministerialists and three 
independents to represent Auckland.143 In Dunedin, the Otago TLC printed posters 
denouncing electors that did not ‘Vote Straight For The [Labour] Ticket’ as a ‘Traitor 
To His Country’.144 Rather than instructing its readers on how to vote, the Otago 
Daily Times declared its fervent hope that ‘the leaders of the Labour Party [would] 
not succeed in inducing the working classes to follow their mandates in the election’. 
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Failing that, the paper urged the future administration to refrain from submitting 
‘their judgement to the dictation of the ring of labour leaders’.145 
      The election result came as a shock the following morning. Unpredicted by most, 
the electorate swung toward the Liberals, particularly in the South Island. However, 
the size of the swing was shrouded in confusion. Typically, newspapers that had 
favoured the Opposition over the incumbent government declared a Liberal victory. 
The Evening Post considered the result ‘disastrous for the present ministry’ which 
was ‘clearly in a decided minority’.146 The Lyttelton Times went further, proclaiming 
that ‘the people have proved true to Liberal principles, and have by a substantial 
majority declared against Sir Harry Atkinson’.147 Even the Otago Daily Times 
concurred, lamenting a result that indicated electors ‘have not thought, they have 
merely felt’.148 However, the New Zealand Herald refused to concede, asserting that 
‘the new house...will meet with the present ministry in office’.149 The Grey River 
Argus concurred, citing the re-election of the ‘principle [sic] members of the 
Ministry’ as an indication of Atkinson’s likely return as premier.150 
      Amid the confusion, one feature remained constant: candidates endorsed by 
labour had achieved extraordinary success. Of the 38 candidates endorsed by unions 
and TLCs (26 of which were also endorsed by Liberal organisations), 19 were 
elected.151 Despite the joint endorsement of many of these candidates, the press 
emphasised the division between ‘labour-leaning MHRs’ and ‘non-labour 
Oppositionists’.152 The Press divided the 35 confirmed Opposition MHRs into two 
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categories, 20 members represented ‘Labour’ while the remaining 15 came from the 
traditional ‘Opposition’.153 The Otago Daily Times used the same categories, but split 
the Liberal vote between 22 ‘Labour’ members and 14 Oppositionists.154 Newspapers 
universally hailed the triumph of the ‘labour party’ without investigating the new 
members’ biographies. Of the 19 labour candidates, just five were manual workers: 
T.L. Buick, a carpenter from Wairau; J.W. Kelly, a tailor from Invercargill; Earnshaw 
and Pinkerton in Dunedin; and Tanner in Christchurch.155 
      The press covered the ‘labour party’ inconsistently during the election campaign. 
The term entered the popular consciousness when newspapers imparted the Duthie 
incident with ‘national’ resonance. Labour politicians were no longer risible 
extremists, but representatives of a dangerous organisation with a cohesive agenda. 
Ironies abounded in this paradigm shift. Although a coherent parliamentary 
Opposition emerged in 1889, no clearly defined political parties existed in New 
Zealand. Neither labour nor the Liberals could boast more than disaggregated local 
and regional electoral committees, whose aims and ambitions frequently conflicted. 
William Tanner later admitted ‘there was no concert...or even mutual correspondence 
in 1890 before the election, and in 1891...we 5 [labour candidates] met for the first 
time’.156 By crediting the existence of a ‘labour party’, newspapers awarded unions 
an honour that they refused to bestow on the Liberals. Furthermore, the land and 
taxation reform programme, which the conservative press offered as evidence of a 
radical agenda, was the cornerstone of Liberal policy. In reality, the reforms were 
conceived and promoted by the middle-class radicals and rural smallholders, backed 
by labour in return for support on industrial legislation. Nevertheless, the press 
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directed its criticism at a recognised enemy, the ‘labour party’, to avoid alienating a 
far larger segment of the population. 
      Parliament reopened on 23 January 1891, and in the weeks following the election 
intense speculation surrounded the composition of the new government. Defying 
pressure from John Ballance and the Lyttelton Times, Sir Harry Atkinson refused to 
resign.157 While Ballance planned his strategy from Whanganui, ‘anti-Ballance 
forces’ gathered in Wellington. Judith Bassett argues that they understood the 
implausibility of forming a government, but refused to capitulate until the House 
convened.158 Revising its earlier pessimism, on 9 December the Otago Daily Times 
thought it impossible that Ballance could assemble a majority, and called upon 
Atkinson to form a coalition government with moderate Liberals.159 Yet, in the weeks 
following the election Atkinson faltered, while the prospect of government 
engendered greater cohesion amongst the Liberals. Worried about losing the House, 
conservatives within Cabinet determined to ‘strengthen’ the Legislative Council 
‘before the Reds g[ot] into the saddle’.160 The plan, hatched months earlier, had the 
support of the Governor, Lord Onslow, who persevered with the proposed 
appointments in spite of public opprobrium.161  
      When Parliament met, the first order of business was the election of a Speaker. 
The Opposition candidate, William Steward, defeated the government nominee, 
William Rolleston, by 36 votes to 29. Edwin Mitchelson, the Minister of Public 
Works and Native Affairs, announced the resignation of the Atkinson Government, 
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leaving Ballance free to form a ministry.162 Ballance had spent the previous month 
deliberating his future administration, so his Cabinet was ready to be sworn in the 
following day. The new Cabinet bridged the political and geographic divides within 
the Liberal party, yoking small farmers and businessmen with labour-aligned 
members to create a robust government. In addition to the Premiership, Ballance 
assumed responsibility for the Treasury, Trade and Customs, and Native Affairs. 
William Pember Reeves received the Education and Justice portfolios, and Richard 
Seddon became Minister of Public Works, Mines, and Defence. The Otago farmer 
John McKenzie took the important posts of Lands, Immigration, and Agriculture, 
while from the Legislative Council, the Wellington lawyer Patrick Buckley was 
appointed Attorney General. Joseph Ward and A.J. Cadman received minor offices, 
and would be rewarded in future Cabinet reorganisations.163 Generally, the press 
buried their animosity in recognition of Ballance’s organisational acumen.164 While 
the new Cabinet was sworn in, Onslow foreshadowed future problems for the 
Liberals, announcing the appointment of seven new Legislative Councillors, 
including Atkinson, who would become Speaker.165 
 
      While the election of a Liberal government improved the lot of working people, 
labour’s position within the party remained tenuous. Timothy McIvor notes that the 
Ballance Cabinet ‘was the most radical the country had seen’.166 In June 1891, 
Reeves was given responsibility for the newly created Bureau of Industries (renamed 
the Department of Labour in 1892). Aided by his Chief Clerk Edward Tregear, 
Reeves introduced legislation concerning Shop Assistants, Coal Mines, Contractors’ 
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and Workmen’s Lien, Factories, and Workmen’s Wages.167 The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 was the pinnacle of the Liberals’ labour 
programme, yet its passage through the House testified to Reeves’ determination in 
the face of an indifferent Cabinet. The Act, which provided for Conciliation Boards 
across the colony, and a three member Arbitration Court, made arbitration 
compulsory for all employers cited in disputes. While the Liberals’ arbitration 
mechanisms would see New Zealand hailed as ‘a country without strikes’, Reeves 
fought for the Bill alone.168 Between 1891 and 1894 no other minister spoke to the 
bill, safeguarding their predominantly rural interests.169 Although Harry Holland and 
his allies later referred to compulsory arbitration as ‘Labour’s leg-iron’, memories of 
defeat were raw in the 1890s.170 In spite of their political success, the failure of the 
Maritime Strike left trade unions ‘broken, flaccid, and penniless’ – workers would not 
strike again until 1906.171 
      Initially, the decision to embark upon a Liberal-labour alliance, rather than 
forming an independent labour party, as Australian unionists had, proved beneficial. 
Despite the lack of Cabinet unanimity on labour issues, Reeves had the support of 
Liberal votes to ensure the success of his legislative programme. Tregear fondly 
described the Liberals’ first two terms in office as ‘the Torchlight Procession’. Yet, 
with time, ‘the torches burnt out’.172 The party drifted to the right, stalling reforms, 
and alienating the unions. The death of Ballance in April 1893, the installation of 
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Richard Seddon as premier, and the 1893 election prompted this change of direction. 
Seddon did not share Ballance’s politics, and his desire for ‘moderation’ marginalised 
the radical wing of the party.173 The doubling of the country Liberal contingent in 
1893 strengthened Seddon’s position, reducing the government’s dependence on 
labour and bolstering its ties to rural interests.174 In February 1895, these cracks 
deepened, when Seddon suggested that trade unionists moderate their demands for 
further labour legislation, or risk jeopardising their cause.175 Although Reeves tried to 
downplay the speech, the Lyttelton Times suggested that ‘fear of “a reaction”...led 
[Seddon] to revise an important part of the policy of his Government’.176 Isolated by 
the Liberal hierarchy, on 10 January 1896 Reeves resigned his offices and left for 
London to take up the Agent-Generalship. The departure further weakened the 
Liberal-labour alliance. In 1897, for the first time, no minister attended the annual 
Trades and Labour Conference.177 Nevertheless, no alternative to the Liberal party 
emerged until the formation of the New Zealand Socialist Party in 1901, and the 
Independent Political Labour League in 1905. 
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Conclusion 
 
The conviction that the New Zealand Maritime Strike began either in sympathy with 
or at the behest of Australian unionists is an enduring legacy of the press response to 
labour tensions in 1890. Furthermore, newspapers’ insistence that domestic troubles 
arose from foreign meddling, rather than internal disharmony, altered public 
perception of the strikers and coloured political rhetoric during the election campaign.  
Contrary to popular perceptions about the ephemeral nature of news, the anti-labour 
narrative fostered by the press permeated the historiography of the Maritime Strike. 
Then, as now, newspapers selectively represented reality, emphasising events and 
ideas congruent with their political agendas, and omitting contradictory narratives.  
Evaluating the strike in 1891, W.T. Charlewood argued, ‘it was plainly the policy of 
the labour party to help their brethren in Australia’.1 Twenty-five years later, J.D. 
Salmond echoed the sentiment: ‘In this dispute the workers of New Zealand had no 
direct interest’.2 Although Ian Merrett demonstrated that Salmond and others had 
‘arrived at a gross mis-representation of events’ by relying on partisan newspaper 
coverage, the consensus interpretation continues to attract advocates.3 Many histories 
gloss over the strikers’ motives, content to rehash Salmond’s conclusions.4 This 
thesis has addressed Merrett’s concerns, assessing the coverage of the labour 
movement in 1890 in six metropolitan newspapers as the remarkable rise of trade 
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unionism soured in a climate of increasing industrial tension, capitalist counter-
mobilisation, political opportunism, and hostile reportage. 
      The Maritime Council emerged during a period of economic uncertainty, and 
aligned New Zealand workers with broader trends in the international labour 
movement. The decision to organise beyond the boundaries of trade or region was 
unprecedented in 1889, yet came after a decade of inter-colonial co-operation. 
Reacting to the lack of solidarity between established craft unions and their 
reluctance to incorporate the growing ranks of unskilled labour, workers in New 
Zealand (and worldwide) pioneered inclusive and assertive labour federations.5 While 
new unionism generated enthusiasm amongst workers and provoked a wave of 
counter-mobilisation from nervous capitalists, federated labour remained 
underfinanced and untested. The 1887 Jubilee affair, John Millar’s inspiration for 
pioneering new models of collective action, revealed the possibilities and pitfalls of 
his ambitious project. The protracted ‘victory’ over the Northern line, allowed only 
by the largesse of Australian unions, maintained, rather than improved pre-strike 
conditions.6 
      Popularly associated with the rise of new unionism, the London Dock Strike 
hinted at the movement’s weaknesses, as well revealing the impact of newspaper 
coverage on an industrial dispute and the international dimensions of collective 
action. Despite the unprecedented mobilisation of 150,000 men, the strike floundered, 
crippled by a lack of money. Newspapers broadcast the dockers’ plight across the 
British Empire and, suitably encouraged, Australian workers responded with 
overwhelming generosity, donating over £36,000. By contrast, New Zealand 
                                                
5 Larry Peterson, ‘The One Big Union in International Perspective: Revolutionary Industrial Unionism, 
1900-1925’, in James E. Cronin and Carmen Sirianni (eds.), Work, Community, and Power: The 
Experience of Labour in Europe and America, 1900-1925, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1983, pp.51-52. 
6 Atkinson, ‘Auckland Seamen and their Union’, pp.71-72. 
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newspapers limited their response to expressions of sympathy, rather than 
coordinating fundraising efforts, a failure reflected in the paucity of donations wired 
from New Zealand. To prevail in an industrial dispute, trade unions needed to exert 
financial pressure on their opponents, either through a general boycott or by depriving 
the business of labour. Each avenue depended on public support – a boycott required 
widespread participation to register an effective protest, and a strike needed broad 
community support. Few workers could survive on their savings for more than a 
fortnight. Thus, a strike’s success depended on organisers’ ability to distribute 
financial assistance among workers’ families. Yet, strike relief was costly and unions 
possessed few assets in 1890.7 Thus, the generosity of the wider labour community, 
the press, and the public was vital to sustain a strike for more than a few weeks.8  
      In early 1890, the Maritime Council appeared to enjoy the press support required 
to orchestrate a protracted industrial dispute. Though New Zealand newspapers 
avoided campaigning on behalf of the London dockers, editors expressed their 
indignation at the Londoners’ wages and working conditions. Similarly, newspapers 
appeared aghast that ‘London style’ sweating could occur in New Zealand and 
condemned instances of union-busting. However, while espousing the principles of 
trade unionism, both liberal and conservative newspapers condemned their practice. 
Underlying this approach was the conception of New Zealand as an egalitarian, 
consensus society – one in which workers’ organisation was tolerated, so long as 
unions remained docile. Thus, the Evening Post encouraged the Wellington textile 
                                                
7 If strike relief was distributed at a flat rate of 6s. per day (the wage of an unskilled worker), a month 
long strike involving 60 workers would cost a union £270. Yet, ‘at best strike pay was a series of 
inequalities, the amount varying between trades, over places and over time’. Scates, ‘Gender, 
Household and Community Politics’, pp.71-72; On 9 September, the New Zealand Herald reported 
that ‘according to the Registrar-General’s report, the assets of the Trade Unions in the colony only 
amount to about £5700, of which sum £4000 belongs to the Seamen’s Union’. Most unions were 
considerably less wealthy – on 28 February, the 800 strong Canterbury ASRS reported total capital of 
£141.14s. Clearly even a brief strike would stretch the finances of most New Zealand unions. NZH, 9 
September 1890, p.5; LT, 28 February 1890, p.6. 
8 Walker, ‘Media and Money’, pp.55-56. 
 
 
 
151 
workers until they refused binding arbitration, and the New Zealand Herald’s support 
for railway reform faded when the ASRS challenged the Railway Commissioners.9 
The desire for strong, yet moderate unions was paradoxical. The Otago Daily Times 
fretted over the Maritime Council’s power when it was established, and again during 
the Shag Point Dispute, but hailed the federation’s size as decisive in ending the 
maritime officers’ dispute.10 In this idealised view of industrial relations, robust trade 
unions stood on equal terms with powerful employers, supported by a public eager to 
maintain an equitable society. If their cause were just, unionists would prevail by 
virtue of reason. Yet, the stakes were high, and trade unions remained poorly 
resourced and relatively untested. If confronted by belligerent employers, they had 
little alternative but to strike or withdraw.  
      When industrial tensions erupted into conflict in early 1890, the press applied the 
consensus frame to alienate the striking workers from the reading public. Confronted 
with the spectre of a railway strike, the New Zealand Herald dismissed the workers’ 
concerns, asserting that ‘professional agitators’ had provoked the dispute for personal 
advancement.11 The emergence of dedicated union officials allowed workers to 
organise more effectively. Thus the argument that they fostered radicalism and 
disrupted the direct ‘relationship’ between employer and employee – the cornerstone 
of the ‘moderate’ approach – had a distinctly anti-labour tone. The appeal of 
‘moderate’ unionism lay in the constant assertion that workers had no quarrel with 
their employers and that a broad consensus existed on wages and working conditions, 
disrupted only by the emergence of newly aggressive forms of labour organisation.   
      Initially limited to the conservative press, the consensus narrative gained traction 
as the colony’s industrial tensions increased. John Millar’s overconfident decision to 
                                                
9 EP, 14 April 1890, p.2; NZH, 20 May 1890, p.4. 
10 ODT, 28 October 1889, p.2; ODT, 16 June 1890, p.2. 
11 NZH, 20 May 1890, p.4. 
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boycott Whitcombe and Tombs enraged conservative papers, while the middle-class 
liberals who had previously supported the Maritime Council criticised the decision. 
Even the Lyttelton Times, labour’s staunchest ally in the press, considered the 
declaration a mistake.12 The Australian origins of the Maritime Strike, which arrived 
in New Zealand a fortnight after the abandoned boycott, dominated early reporting of 
the strike. Thus, the Union Company’s provocation of its workforce – hiring non-
union workers in Sydney and Dunedin, in violation of an agreement with the FSU – 
was largely overlooked, as the press repeatedly asserted that a small cadre of agitators 
had conspired to undermine the domestic consensus. This time the conspirators were 
Australian labour bosses, directing the strike through their New Zealand lieutenants. 
Although the liberal press did not abandon the labour cause, middle-class radicals had 
little fondness for the strike, and devoted their efforts to encouraging conciliation and 
attacking employers’ excesses, rather than contesting the spurious allegation that New 
Zealand workers had no desire to strike. 
      While the men remained ‘out’, the divisions between liberal and conservative 
newspapers narrowed. The railwaymen’s threatened involvement further antagonised 
the press – only the Lyttelton Times objected to the suppression of dissenting workers 
by a government agency.13 With time, liberal newspapers’ support of the strike 
wavered. Concerned with the fragile West Coast economy, the Grey River Argus 
advised the Maritime Council to accept defeat and seek a settlement, while the 
Lyttelton Times stooped to bickering with rival publications.14 In mid-September, the 
widespread syndication of Henry Champion’s Melbourne Age article attacking the 
labour establishment reinforced the perception that Australasian workers welcomed 
the open shop. As press hostility against the strikers increased, contradictions 
                                                
12 LT, 14 August 1890, p.4. 
13 LT, 15 September 1890, p.4. 
14 GRA, 3 October 1890, p.2; LT, 7 October 1890, p.4. 
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inherent in the dual functions of disseminating news and working to end the strike 
became apparent. While editorials lamented economic damage wrought by the 
shipping boycott, reports from across the country emphasised the rapid resumption of 
work on the wharves. Strike news was typically framed according to its subject – 
assaults on non-union men were considered ‘outrages’, the reverse ‘accidents’. 
Reporting on the October Labour Conference marked a nadir in the coverage of the 
strike. Condemned to failure by the withdrawal of all but one of the employers’ 
delegates, the meeting dissolved ignominiously. Despite the employers’ obvious 
disdain for the proceedings, the press held the labour contingent accountable for the 
failure.  
      Though the strike continued until 11 November, its final weeks barely featured in 
the press. While it is often remarked that the Maritime Strike intensified the 
politicisation of the labour movement, a decade long process by 1890, most 
newspapers and candidates struggled to comprehend the unprecedented level of 
worker mobilisation, their failed industrial action, and the ramifications of electoral 
reform – particularly the 1889 ‘one-man, one-vote’ provision. Atkinson’s supporters 
construed the strike as a fillip for the incumbent government – reminded of the threat 
that radicals posed to New Zealand’s prosperity and social cohesion, voters would 
reject change. Liberal and labour candidates, and their supporters in the press, 
implicitly accepted this approach, desperate not to alienate voters. Even in electorates 
with large populations of trade unionists, labour candidates’ manifestos addressed a 
broad range of ‘liberal’ issues rather than specific proposals for industrial reform. The 
ambiguity surrounding the Liberal party, and the complex relationships between local 
labour candidates and Liberal organisations further obscured the coverage of labour’s 
political ambitions. Furthermore, labour candidates did not have access to the 
unbounded publicity that newspaper ownership afforded its proprietors – a privilege 
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John Ballance, William Pember Reeves, and George Stead enjoyed. Campaign news 
was scarce, and editors served as ‘gatekeeper[s]’ of information, mediating readers’ 
exposure to campaign news through the in-house political agenda.15 Thus, 
conservative papers dismissed the notion that labour candidates would enter the 
House of Representatives, while the liberal press emphasised the unity between 
labour and Liberal candidates, desperate to preserve the fragile Opposition.  
      In late October, the publicity generated by the Demonstration Day celebrations, 
and the moral panic provoked by the fracas at John Duthie’s political meeting, gave 
labour politics a new prominence. The former offered a reminder that the failed strike 
had not diminished labour’s unity; the latter presented the conservative press with a 
gilt-edged opportunity to convince readers that labour politics threatened the colonial 
consensus. Duthie’s reception at the Wellington Opera House was quickly 
universalised as newspapers began referring to a cohesive ‘labour party’ – a term now 
synonymous with rowdiness, demagoguery, and disorder. By exaggerating the size, 
strength, and incivility of the labour movement, conservative newspapers sought to 
portray Sir Harry Atkinson’s stolid politics as a necessary corrective to New 
Zealand’s economic and industrial crises. 
      Although ‘liberal’ politics implied a ‘national’ agenda, journalism remained 
parochial, with most stories focussed on local candidates. However, in the final 
weeks of the campaign, newspapers addressed the broader significance of the 
election. Eager for reform, liberal newspapers attempted to heighten public 
perceptions of colonial stagnation, while attempting to maintain the Liberal coalition 
of middle-class radicals, smallholders, and trade unionists. When assessing 1890, it is 
useful to remember Raewyn Dalziel’s caution that the ‘turning point...was by no 
                                                
15 Richard Kielbowciz, News in the Mail: The Press, Post Office, and Public Information, 1700-1860s, 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, p.4. 
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means obvious to those who lived through it’.16 However, it is clear that conservative 
newspapers encouraged this contemporary opacity – seeking to convince the public 
that the colonial consensus remained firmly intact, challenged only by a ragged bunch 
of Oppositionists and self-aggrandising trade union leaders. Although grudging 
admissions of defeat replaced crowing predictions of another term for Atkinson on 6 
December, the conservative press refused to capitulate until Parliament met on 23 
January. 
 
      When, in mid-August, Grey River Argus editor Florence McCarthy remarked on 
trade unions’ inability to communicate with the public, he identified a fundamental 
problem for the labour movement.17 Although he had determined the predicament, 
McCarthy failed to implicate the controllers of the mainstream press as a barrier to 
the transmission of ideas and information concerning organised labour. It is important 
to recognise that from content analyses one can only infer editors’ motives in the 
framing of news stories, whose influence on readers is difficult to determine 120 
years after events transpired.18 Thus, the extent to which newspapers reinforced social 
conformity, led public opinion, or reflected the opinions of their audience is often 
unclear.19 However, this study clearly demonstrates the relationship between the press 
and organised labour, and how competing visions of New Zealand society influenced 
the production and content of newspapers in 1890. A rigid hierarchy of voices had 
been established during the commercialisation of the press, and labour activists were 
at the bottom of the pecking order – portrayed either as renegade voices without a 
                                                
16 Raewyn Dalziel, ‘Towards Representative Democracy: 100 Years of the Modern Electoral System’, 
in Jock Phillips (ed.), Towards 1990: Seven Leading Historians Examine Significant Aspects of New 
Zealand History, Wellington: GP Books, 1989, p.61. 
17 GRA, 13 August 1890, p.2. 
18 Meg Spratt, ‘Science, Journalism, and the Construction of News: How Print Media Framed the 1918 
Influenza Pandemic’, American Journalism, Vol. 12, no. 3, p.76. 
19 Taylor, ‘Contemporary Media Portrayals of the 1913 Dispute’, in Nolan (ed.), Revolution, p.144. 
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popular following, or radical anti-capitalist demagogues. Liberal newspapers’ support 
for the labour cause was equivocal, consisting of hollow rhetoric on moderation and 
stern disapproval of industrial action. If newspapers such as the Grey River Argus and 
Lyttelton Times did not publish material written by labour activists, they were 
unlikely to reach a wide reading audience elsewhere. Labour leaders understood this 
predicament, but despite the creation of vibrant organisations they lacked the capital 
to create a communications infrastructure that could sustain the movement in the face 
of prevailing public and press hostility. Despite the popularity of inter-colonial labour 
journals, particularly those from Britain and Australia, the lack of a domestic labour 
periodical remained a problem until the New Zealand Federation of Labour took 
control of the Maoriland Worker in 1911, a year after the New Zealand Shearers’ 
Federation established the weekly.20 Until then, the labour cause remained, as Harry 
Farnall, editor of the Watchman, warned in 1885, ‘like a steamer without a propeller – 
all vapour and no progress’.21 
                                                
20 Between 1890 and 1910, a series of short-lived trade or regional labour periodicals emerged, but no 
significant national labour newspaper existed. Erik Olssen, The Red Feds: Revolutionary Industrial 
Unionism and the New Zealand Federation of Labour 1908-1914, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 
1988, pp.40-43; Jane Tolerton, Ettie: A Life of Ettie Rout, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1992, pp.66-81.  
21 ‘The ‘Watchman’’, 1885, Roth Papers, MS-Papers 94-106-29/03, ATL. 
157 
 
 
Appendix One: Employers’ Associations, 1890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Although the Oamaru Farmers’ and Employers’ Club was established in July, it co-operated with the 
latterly formed, and larger, Otago Employers’ Association in all matters regarding the Maritime Strike 
and subsequent arbitration conference. North Otago Times, 22 September 1890, p.2. 
Location Date of Formation Source 
Oamaru1 10 July 1890 North Otago Times, 11 July 1890, p.2. 
Auckland 28 August 1890 Star, 29 August 1890, p.4. 
Wellington 29 August 1890 EP, 29 August 1890, p.2. 
Gisborne 3 September 1890 Poverty Bay Herald, 4 September 1890, p.2. 
Dunedin 3 September 1890 Otago Witness, 4 September 1890, p.19. 
Napier 5 September 1890 EP, 12 September 1890, p.2. 
Christchurch 6 September 1890 Star, 6 September 1890, p.3. 
Ashburton 6 September 1890 Ashburton Guardian, 6 September 1890, p.3. 
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Appendix Two: Liberal / Labour General Election Manifestos, 
August – November 1890 
 
Issue Political Manifesto  
 
 
 
 
 
Auckland United 
Labour Election 
Committee1 
Christchurch 
People’s 
Political 
Association2 
John 
Ballance's 
Manifesto3 
Lyttelton 
Times 
Manifesto4 
Otago 
TLC5 
Wellington 
TLC6 
‘Breaking' the large 
estates  √ √ √  √ 
Cessation of Crown 
land sales √    √ √ 
Creation of a State 
Bank of Issue √      
Creation of national 
labour tribunals   √ √   
Eight-hour day 
legislation  √  √ √  
Elected Legislative 
Council  √    √ 
Estate Tax   √  √ √ 
Increased honoraria 
for MHRs     √  
Industrial protection    √ √ √ 
Land and Income tax 
/ Abolition of 
property tax 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Maintenance of 
triennial parliaments  √     
Minimum wage on 
government 
contracts 
√      
Public works 
spending  √  √ √  
Railway 
management reform √ √     
Restriction of foreign 
contracted labour     
 √ 
Secular school 
system  √  √ 
  
Utilisation of Crown 
lands for settlement √  √  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 NZH, 1 November 1890, p.5. 
2 McAloon, ‘Radical Christchurch’, in Cookson and Dunstall (eds.), Southern Capital, pp.169-70. 
3 EP, 1 October 1890, p.2. 
4 McAloon, ‘Radical Christchurch’, in Cookson and Dunstall (eds.), Southern Capital, pp.169-70. 
5 Olssen, Building the New World, p.181. 
6 EP, 6 Monday 1890, p.2. 
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